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Abstract 
 
In this dissertation, I examine the conceptual underpinnings of a new management theory 
called authentic leadership to discover why so little attention has been paid to gender. In 
much of the scholarly literature on authentic leadership, I suggest there is a failure to 
interrogate the complexities surrounding the concept of authenticity, especially as it relates to 
the diversity of lived experience. Rather than encouraging a genuine approach to leadership, 
this theory’s normative foundation is more likely to encourage social conformity. By 
contrast, I suggest that Hannah Arendt’s insights into uniqueness provide a different lens 
from which to consider how lived experience influences the manner in which gender, 
authenticity and leadership intersect. As part of this inquiry, I conducted a phenomenological 
study. My guiding question was: how do senior women leaders describe their experiences of 
authenticity, or lack thereof, in the university workplace? These women’s descriptive 
accounts reveal ethical tensions regarding personal principles and institutional priorities, and 
suggest that gender prejudice is embedded in organizational practices, as well as the cultural 
imagination. In exploring gender prejudice, I trace authenticity’s modern underpinnings to 
the emergence of bourgeois selfhood. Historically, women’s desire to lead was affected by 
notions of gender propriety. These societal restrictions still bear a trace on some women’s 
sense of possibility, which serves to perpetuate gender inequities. Research findings also 
suggest that it is the self in relation that is fundamental to comprehending what it might mean 
to lead authentically. When we broaden our definition of what constitutes authentic 
leadership so as to account for the myriad ways in which we live and lead, we discover how 
people without positional authority can change their communities in profound ways. Thus, 
leadership is not dependent upon a person’s organizational position, but rather on how their 
actions demonstrate how much they care for the world. This more expansive context, 
together with Arendt’s insights, opens up new avenues of thinking about the interconnections 
among gender, authenticity and leadership.  
Keywords 
Hannah Arendt; authentic leadership; authenticity; gender; women leaders; pluralism; 
uniqueness; social conformism; feminist theory.  
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Preface  
The common and the ordinary must remain our primary concern, the daily food 
of our thought – if only because it is from them that the uncommon and the 
extraordinary emerge.
1
      Hannah Arendt. 
In this dissertation, I examine the conceptual underpinnings of a new management theory 
called authentic leadership to discover why so little attention has been paid to gender. In 
much of the scholarly literature on authentic leadership, I suggest there is a failure to 
interrogate the complexities surrounding the concept of authenticity, especially as it relates to 
the diversity of lived experience. In failing to account sufficiently for lived experience, I 
suggest that this theory has a tendency to privilege a leader’s self-knowledge above her 
connection to others. For Arendt, a focus on the self leads to alienation from the world
2
 
because it serves to suppress plurality and the creation of a meaningful environment.  
A critical interrogation of the scholarly literature on authentic leadership reveals an 
underlying presupposition that authenticity means the same thing to everyone, and manifests 
itself in the same way. I disagree with this viewpoint by showing how an Arendtian focus on 
uniqueness reveals problems with the assumption that a quality like authenticity can be 
measured. As such, her concept of uniqueness can uncover inherent difficulties with the 
discourse of authentic leadership, not least because it allows us to think about how the 
intersections of identity influence our social life. Following Arendt, I contend that each 
individual, because of her life experiences, has a unique way of perceiving the world. This 
uniqueness is, however, mediated by the social world. Thus, our way of being is constantly 
impinged upon by social factors, many of which we remain unaware. Nevertheless, this 
background knowledge has an effect, not only upon the way that we perceive the world, but 
also on how we interpret the actions of others. In short, context matters. But context is often 
                                                 
1
 Arendt spoke at a conference in her honour in Toronto in September 1972; this is purportedly taken 
from her speech. See Margaret Betz Hull, Hidden Philosophy of Hannah Arendt (London and New 
York: Routledge 2002), 36. 
2
 World is not to be confused with the Earth but refers to the sum total of human interaction and 
durable objects.   
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overlooked in authentic leadership scholarship, which means that differences fade into the 
background. The result is that uniqueness is obscured by normative ways of thinking about 
the place of authenticity in leadership.  
Thinking with Arendt can deepen our understanding of authentic leadership by revealing how 
much this theory takes for granted. For instance, underlying this discourse is an assumption, 
sometimes explicit, on other occasions implicit, that authentic leadership will result in 
individual success, as well as better organizational outcomes. But insofar as all action is 
contingent, we cannot predict leadership success ahead of time. Moreover, I find myself 
puzzled by scholarship that seems to suggest that leaders can effect positive change merely 
by dint of their charisma.
3
 Not only does this tend to reinforce the great man theory of 
leadership that rests on the belief that a leader can dominate others through strength of will, 
but it also ignores the damage that some leaders cause. In addition, perceiving leaders as 
distinct from others serves to reproduce hierarchical modes of being whereby some bodies 
are judged to be better, or in this case more authentic, than others.  
I see authentic leadership as an example of a theory that on the surface seems to foreground 
ethical issues, but is sometimes implicitly underpinned by concerns regarding leadership 
efficiency. For Arendt, the modern drive to organizational efficiency has severe drawbacks, 
not least of which is that in Western society we have become “a society of jobholders.”
4
 The 
ideology of market forces dominates our political and social landscape, and the current focus 
on economic accountability is a prime example of this mentality. But fiscal accountability is 
not the same as, and may run contrary to, ethical action. Thus, no amount of rules and 
policies are sufficient to stop some leaders from doing bad things if they chose not to care for 
others.  I will show how instrumental ways of thinking tend to obscure deeper dimensions of 
human life.  
                                                 
3
 Charisma can be both a positive and a negative force for leadership. See Donna Ladkin, “The 
Enchantment of the Charismatic Leader: Charisma Reconsidered as Aesthetic Encounter,” 
Leadership, 2 no. 2 (2006): 165-179. 
4
 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 40.  
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Many scholars who write on authentic leadership are from the discipline of social 
psychology, and lean toward behavioral explanations.
5
 Arendt is resistant to modern theories 
such as behaviorism, because she argues that these theories focus on some of the insidious 
trends in modern society, especially the promotion of indifference, and the ensuing 
suppression of uniqueness. As an example, she views bureaucracy as potentially the most 
tyrannical form of leadership, since it is based on the rule of nobody.
6
 This nameless, 
faceless form of organizational rulership serves to suppress uniqueness and plurality in 
favour of social conformism.   
While Arendt has much to tell us in terms of how we need to create environments where 
dialogue and debate flourish, she has little to say about gender and leadership. Therefore, I 
augment her ideas about leadership with the descriptive accounts of the ten senior women 
leaders whom I interviewed. This interweaving of different perspectives is important from an 
Arendtian perspective since, by thinking in the place of another, we can expand our own 
understanding. In considering the interconnections among authenticity, gender and 
leadership, I chose to interview senior women leaders in the higher education sector. The 
reason why I chose this particular sector is because of my background knowledge, having 
worked for more than twenty years in university administration, and as a member of various 
leadership teams. Interviewing women leaders served to deepen my understanding of how 
gender affected their understanding of authenticity and leadership.  
In addition, I argue that gender normativity influences how we think about leaders. I contend 
that some of the prejudice against women leaders exists because they challenge the 
normative, hierarchical framework of officialdom. Simply put, women leaders are out of 
place in the gender hierarchy. This lack of “spatial” belonging may mean that some women 
resort to hierarchical ways of leading in order to fit in. But while assimilation may appear to 
be a strategic route to the “top,” it leads to a continuation of structural inequalities. 
Furthermore, in trying to live up to some ideal leadership standard, women perpetuate what 
                                                 
5
 For an informative review, see Bruce J. Avolio, Fred O.Walumbwa, and Todd J. Weber. 
“Leadership: Current Theories, Research, and Future Directions.” Annual Review Psychology, 60 
(2009): 421-439. 
6
 Arendt, Human Condition, 40.  
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Arendt termed the “what” over the “who” - that is, they become so caught up in their desire 
for success that they forget to distinguish between their role as leader and themselves as 
individuals.  
Furthermore, in much of the published research on authentic leadership, there is limited 
acknowledgement of intersectionality, so important in the area of women's studies, but under-
examined within authentic leadership scholarship.
7
  In my assessment of authentic leadership 
scholarship, I draw upon some feminist critiques that alert us to the importance of taking into 
account multiple axes of identity.
8
 By bringing an intersectional analysis to bear on the 
theory and practice of authentic leadership, I highlight some of the gaps in authentic 
leadership theory. Integral here is the need to comprehend how different social factors such 
as race, class, sexuality and age influence perceptions of leadership.  
Chapter Breakdowns 
In chapter one, I provide a literature review of authentic leadership, and outline some of the 
problems I see with this discourse. I argue that this theory has, for the most part, overlooked 
gender dynamics and the ways in which lived experience influences our ideas about 
authenticity. A secondary research aim is to try and understand why the theory of authentic 
leadership has emerged at this particular historical juncture. Specifically, why do today’s 
leaders need a theoretical justification to teach them how to act authentically? Is a desire for 
authentic leadership an antidote to an ever-increasing bureaucratic existence that serves to 
distance people from one another, or is it an attempt to make leaders more accountable for 
their actions? For example, one thing that surprised me was how often authenticity in 
leadership is linked to greater efficiency.
9
 While I understand that it is important for a leader 
                                                 
7
 This situation is changing. See, for example, Evangelina Holvino, "Intersections: The Simultaneity 
of Race, Gender and Class in Organization Studies," Gender, Work and Organization (2010): 248-
273.  
8
 For more on this topic, see Jan Shaw, "Papering the Cracks with Discourse: The Narrative Identity 
of the Authentic Leader,” Leadership, (2010): 89-108. 
9
 See, for example, Adrian Chan, “Authentic Leadership Measurement: Challenges and Suggestions,” 
in Authentic Leadership Theory and Practice: Origins, Effects and Developments, ed. William L. 
Gardner, Bruce J. Avolio, and Fred O. Walumbwa (Amsterdam: Elsevior, 2005), 227-251.  
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to be effective and ethical, there are times when I feel that the former is taking precedence 
over the latter.  
In the section on leadership training, I suggest that training programs designed to increase a 
person’s authenticity may serve to reinforce normative ideas of what constitutes a “good” 
leader. Thus, rather than developing genuine leaders, as is hoped, the theory of authentic 
leadership may result, paradoxically, in increasing conformity. I see this conformity working 
in two ways. First, there is external conformism in terms of the laws we obey as a member of 
society. Second, there is the manner in which we modify our behaviour to fit what we 
perceive is in keeping with others. Social conformity may also be marked by a desire to 
please, which may prove problematic for some women leaders. Additionally, there is often an 
assumption within the literature that by displaying particular behaviors a leader is being 
authentic. However, this ignores how they may be merely complying with what they think is 
expected of them and, thus, being hypocritical. While I am not arguing that leaders should 
not adhere to rules, I do contend that following social rules per se, as well as leadership 
programming that purports to teach authenticity, is not necessarily conducive to authentic 
action.  
In chapter two, I explore how the concept of authenticity is shaped by bourgeois ideas about 
gendered identity. I trace the antecedents of authenticity back to the Age of Enlightenment, 
since this was when modern ideas surrounding authenticity were initially formulated.
10
 In 
regards to the formation of the liberal subject, I show how authenticity is linked to virtue, and 
describe the ways in which virtue was gendered differently. I argue that Enlightenment 
notions of virtue serve to constrain women’s autonomy and, hence, limit their ideas about 
their own possibilities. These gendered values concerning what constituted virtuous action 
placed limitations on women’s ability to perceive themselves as leaders within the socio-
political sphere. Furthermore, I suggest that this historical diminishment of women’s 
potential ability to lead may still bear an influence on gender prejudice in regards to 
leadership. I argue that theories of the present are influenced, in some manner, by gendered 
perspectives of the past. Hence, a lingering trace of gender prejudice toward women leaders 
                                                 
10
 See Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 1991, 25. 
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is embedded within the cultural imagination. My hope is that by understanding authenticity 
through the lens of the past, we may open up new avenues of inquiry that shed light on the 
connections among gender, authenticity and leadership in ways that complement current 
scholarship. 
In chapter three, I consider the concept of authenticity through the lens of existential 
phenomenology,
11
 because this tradition has gone the furthest to develop an account of the 
authentic self. Here, I explore the connections between Arendt’s work and Martin 
Heidegger’s theory of authenticity, as elucidated by the latter in Being and Time. I rethink his 
concept of authenticity in light of her diverse insights into the complex webs of relationships 
and interwoven narratives that affect our comprehension of what it means to be authentic. 
Specifically, I argue that Arendt’s account of what it means to be unique enriches 
Heidegger’s definition of authenticity. While Heidegger sees authenticity as emerging from 
silent resolution, for Arendt, uniqueness lies in our speech and action. She argues that it is 
natality, not finitude, which is central to understanding existence. For Arendt, natality refers 
to the fact that through action, we “insert ourselves into the world.”
12
 As such, each act is 
like a second birth that brings something new into existence. Her emphasis on natality stands 
in contrast to Heidegger’s belief that it is by coming to terms with death that a person can 
realize her potential for authenticity. In short, I suggest that, taken together, Arendt’s 
concepts of uniqueness and plurality add depth to Heidegger’s concept of Mitsein (being 
with), because she emphasizes how we are always in relationship. Her focus on the 
importance of plurality illuminates hidden consequences that arise from leadership that is 
self-oriented. Put simply, a focus on the self can lead to a disconnection from the world of 
others.  
Throughout the thesis, I suggest that thinking with Arendt illustrates how authenticity in 
leadership requires not only an internal sense of purpose, but also responsiveness towards 
                                                 
11
 In common with thinkers in the existential phenomenological tradition, I will often use the term 
“we.” I recognize that this is somewhat contentious since the “we” may cover over the inequities that 
exist. However, I hope that my larger argument of the importance of uniqueness and plurality will 
show that the “we” is meant as an inclusive phrase.  
12
 Arendt, Human Condition, 176. 
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others. Such a responsive orientation necessitates being willing to think from different 
perspectives. To enhance my own understanding of the intersections among gender, 
authenticity and leadership, I conducted a qualitative phenomenological inquiry.
13
 In chapter 
four, I discuss my methodological approach, which is rooted in hermeneutic, existential 
phenomenology. Arendt used the term “thinking without banisters” to describe her 
methodological approach, a way of thinking that I try and adopt for this project. Thinking 
without bannisters refers to the manner in which we try and think from the position of 
another; this is not so as to attempt to think in the same way as someone else but rather to 
enrich our understanding of different perspectives. Since Arendt chose not to discuss her 
methodology in any detail, I briefly compare different methodological approaches to 
phenomenology by the major thinkers of this tradition, specifically, Edmund Husserl, Martin 
Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. As well, I examine some feminist contentions 
regarding phenomenological inquiry that, to my mind, enrich phenomenological inquiry by 
illustrating how a gendered analysis offers a fuller understanding of lived experience.  
Central to Arendt’s oeuvre is that storytelling is intrinsic to comprehending how we live in 
the world. The reason why storytelling is central to human existence is because each one of 
us has a story, unique to ourselves, that can be told. I suggest personal narratives can enrich 
an understanding of what constitutes authentic leadership. These descriptive accounts enable 
us to comprehend how each person’s unique experiences are important to understanding 
authenticity as it pertains to gender and leadership. In chapter five, I examine the descriptive 
accounts of the women leaders whom I interviewed. While I recognize that what is 
remembered is only one person’s perspective on what occurred, nevertheless, each person’s 
understanding of their particular experience opens up fresh ways of thinking about 
authenticity as it relates to gender and leadership. 
My original research question asked in what ways senior women leaders describe their 
experiences of authenticity (or lack thereof) within an institutional context. What emerges 
from my research findings is a different way of thinking about the place of authenticity in 
leadership. Not only do these women offer insights into ethical dilemmas in regards to the 
                                                 
13
 Research Ethics Approval for this study was obtained from Western University in fall 2010. The 
ethics review number is 17419S. 
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institutional workings of power and privilege,
14
 they reveal how gender affected their ability 
to navigate institutional barriers. In examining common themes, these descriptive accounts 
illustrate how gender differences reinforce hierarchies in subtle and, sometimes, not so subtle 
ways. As a result, a woman’s sense of belonging may be undermined by gender prejudice 
regarding normative ideas about what constitutes a good leader, which, in turn, may impede 
her ability to speak or act in a manner consistent with personal conviction.  
These women leaders’ descriptive accounts also serve to complicate the notion of what 
constitutes an authentic leader, and run contrary to most scholarship on authentic leadership, 
especially as regards to the importance of self-knowledge. Instead, their accounts emphasize 
how leadership is a relational enterprise, founded upon mutual respect and trust. As such, 
they reaffirm Carol Gilligan’s contention that women are socialized to lead differently, in a 
manner that is relational rather than hierarchical.
15
 Viewing authentic leadership through a 
relational lens allows us to see previously hidden aspects of this phenomenon. For example, a 
common pattern to emerge from the interviews was the importance of building strong 
relationships through care. Indeed, caring was perceived as integral to many research 
participants’ understanding of the place of authenticity in leadership. A focus on situated, 
gendered embodiment brings to light new ways of thinking about authenticity and leadership.  
Over the course of writing this thesis, my thinking about leadership has shifted dramatically. 
Something that one of the women I interviewed said has stayed with me. She argued that we 
need to explode the notion that leadership is dependent upon a particular institutional 
position. Women lead in all walks of life: the problem is that much of this leadership is 
unnoticed or ignored. Her words reminded me of what I had always known, but had 
forgotten. From the account of a mother starting a Girl Guide troop for little girls from 
families of different ethnic and racial groups, to the story of how a single mother acts on 
behalf of others to change school policy by showing how the school privileges the nuclear 
family, we see instances of authentic leadership in action. I perceive a correspondence 
                                                 
14
 As an example, see Mary Uhl Bien, “Relational Leadership Theory: Exploring the Social Processes 
of Leadership and Organizing,” The Leadership Quarterly, no. 17 (2006): 654-676.  
15
 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). While it is true that scholars mention relationships, it 
seems to me that the major focus is on the leader, and their capacity to enact change.  
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between the extraordinary but everyday actions that these women described to me, and 
Arendt’s insistence that power can spring up anywhere that a group of committed individuals 
are willing to work together to fight against perceived injustices. From an Arendtian 
perspective, such spontaneous acts demonstrate how individuals work alongside their 
communities to try and improve others’ lives. Yet these everyday acts by women in their 
communities are rarely described as leadership, since common ways of thinking about 
leaders are tied up with power and prestige.  
In the conclusion to this thesis, I explore how my own ideas about the interconnections 
among gender, leadership and authenticity have altered. At the beginning of this project, my 
intention was to focus on leadership within an institutional setting. What became apparent 
through dwelling with the descriptive accounts, however, is that leadership within the context 
of an institution is not how these women described what it means to be an authentic leader. 
Rather, they spoke of leadership as situational, and considered it from a wider, societal lens 
than I had anticipated. What emerges from these accounts is that it is not sufficient to 
describe how women lead in institutions; rather we need to describe how women lead in a 
diversity of situations. By considering what it means to lead beyond the confines of the work 
environment, we obtain insights into how a focus on gender can redefine our understanding 
of the role of authenticity in leadership. While I am not implying that these accounts are 
indicative of women’s leadership per se, I am suggesting that patterns emerge that may 
expand our understanding of the interconnections among gender, authenticity and leadership.  
Curiously, what started out as a phenomenology of authentic leadership has ended up being 
concerned with what might be termed a phenomenology of social conformity. Perhaps this is 
not so surprising, since to concern oneself with lived experience is often to find that theories 
regarding truth are out of step with how we live in the world. Yet it is still somewhat 
perplexing to set off on the way to somewhere and find oneself on the path elsewhere.
1 
 
Chapter 1   
1 Authenticity, Leadership and Gender 
In this chapter, I provide a review of the main trends in authentic leadership scholarship. I 
argue that this leadership theory has, for the most part, overlooked gender dynamics, and 
the ways in which lived experience influences our ideas about authenticity.
16
 Within 
current scholarship on authentic leadership, I suggest there is a tendency to abstract 
knowledge such that it offers a limited view of human existence. The problem with such 
abstraction is that it can lead to a lack of understanding of the multiple ways in which we 
live. Furthermore, I contend that authentic leadership, as currently construed, has a 
tendency to privilege a leader’s self-knowledge over their connection to others. For 
Arendt, a focus on self leads to an alienation from the world. Theories that privilege self 
over others serve to suppress a plurality of perspectives, and the creation of a meaningful 
environment.  
I suggest that examining authentic leadership through the lens of hermeneutic, existential 
phenomenology may offer a richer way of thinking about the connections among gender, 
authenticity and leadership, because of its emphasis on situated, embodied knowledge. In 
particular, thinking with Arendt complements existing scholarship because it alerts us to 
the need to consider equality and difference. Specifically, her concept of uniqueness, 
understood as a person’s particular qualities and social location, and her notion of 
plurality - that is, how we exist in a world of others - can deepen our understanding of the 
role that authenticity plays in leadership. For example, how we see ourselves is always 
related to who we are in context with others, since it is through action and speech that 
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each individual reveals herself to others.
17
 This individual revealing is always related to a 
person’s cultural and socio-historical place in the world.  
A secondary research aim is to understand why, at this particular historical juncture, the 
theory of authentic leadership has emerged. Specifically, why do today’s leaders need a 
theoretical justification to teach them how to act authentically? Is a desire for authentic 
leadership an antidote to an ever-increasing bureaucratic existence that serves to distance 
people from one another, or is it an attempt to make leaders more accountable for their 
actions? One thing that surprised me was how often in the scholarship the concept of 
authenticity is linked to greater efficiency in leadership. While I recognize that it is 
important for a leader to be effective, there are times when I felt that “efficiency” may 
serve to obscure ethics. Some leadership scholars who write on this topic impose a 
framework through which they attempt to determine and measure authenticity. This 
instrumental way of thinking is potentially damaging to human relations, and brings to 
mind Heidegger’s notion of Gestell, or enframing.
18
  
A serious problem in modernity, according to Heidegger, is how we see things through a 
scientific worldview that privileges calculation and efficiency. This mode of thinking 
tries to establish in advance how we encounter the world. I suggest that current 
discussions of authentic leadership adopt a mode of what Heidegger terms “enframing” 
through the overemphasis on measurement, efficiency and quantification. This 
instrumental way of thinking can have damaging consequences, not least because it fails 
to comprehend the depth and breadth of human existence. Rather than offering us insight 
into what it might mean to lead authentically, this somewhat narrow approach may lead 
to a rigidity of thinking, and a covering over of difference. In part, this is borne out of a 
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desire to control and quantify human interactions.
19
 For example, we will see that some 
scholars argue there are four dimensions to authentic leadership, that is, self-awareness, 
balanced information processing, relational transparency and internalized moral 
perspective. But focussing on these four dimensions leads to a prescriptive way of 
thinking that obscures the multiplicity of lived experience. 
Thus, the theory of authentic leadership may result, unintentionally perhaps, in increased 
conformity to a particular way of thinking. Social conformity is a problem for leadership 
because it works to suppress uniqueness in favour of uniformity. In Arendtian terms, in 
trying to live up to some uniform standard, leaders may, sometimes unwittingly, other 
times deliberately, perpetuate the “what” of being over the “who.” That is, their unique 
identity may become covered over by their social role as leader. Social conformism is 
counterproductive to authenticity, I suggest, because it is founded on fitting in, rather 
than being one’s unique self. In a way, then, the discourse of authentic leadership is 
paradoxical in that on the surface it suggests an inclusionary model, while on a deeper 
level it may lead to sameness.
20
 
 Social conformity is a particular problem in terms of gender since women have generally 
been socialized to please others rather than forge their own path. I see this conformity 
operating in two ways. First, there is conformism in terms of laws and rules we obey as 
members of society. Second, there is our complicity with regard to how we take up social 
rules, and modify our behaviour to fit what we perceive is in keeping with others. 
Moreover, the suggestion that by displaying particular behaviors a leader is authentic 
ignores how they may just be complying with social norms, as well as being hypocritical. 
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Such conformity may also prove dangerous in crisis situations, where there is no “moral 
handbook” to offer leaders guidance. 
I try and demonstrate how social factors affect the ways in which we think about the 
connections amongst gender, authenticity and leadership. I suggest that Arendt’s theory 
of uniqueness, which I discuss in detail in chapter three, has parallels with the notion of 
intersectionality. The term “intersectionality” refers to how identity is influenced by 
multiple factors, for example, class, race, or gender.
21
 Both concepts alert us to the need 
to take into account how different facets of identity work together. Being alert to 
difference helps us to consider how the intersections of identity play a role in how we 
think about leaders. That being said, I face something of a dilemma, since Arendt made 
limited reference to women leaders, and the public statements she made were far from 
positive. Therefore, I augment Arendt’s lack of concern with gender with feminist 
accounts of leadership. Later in the chapter, I show how gender normativity influences 
how we think about women leaders. I suggest that prejudice against women leaders is, in 
part, because they challenge the normative, hierarchical framework.
22
 Simply put, for 
some people, women leaders seem out of place in the higher echelons of organizational 
and public life. This prejudice has an additional effect in that to conform to leadership 
“standards,” some women choose to lead by assimilating to dominant styles of leadership 
that serves to perpetuate structural inequities.  
I begin by outlining the main themes put forward by scholars of authentic leadership. 
Then, I compare dominant ideas with ethical themes that emerge in the area of leadership 
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studies. As part of this discussion, I consider some problems with leadership 
programming as it relates to authenticity, especially the way in which such training 
reinforces Anglo-American models of leading. Then, I turn to Arendt to see what insights 
we can obtain from her thinking about leadership and related aspects such as authority. 
Next, I explore the question of authenticity in leadership through the lens of gender. In 
the conclusion, I gather together these divergent strands to see what has emerged with 
regard to the interconnections among authenticity, gender and leadership. 
1.1  Authentic Leadership – A Review 
The concept of authentic leadership gained popularity in 2003 with the publication of Bill 
George’s book Authentic Leadership: Rediscovering the Secrets to Creating Lasting 
Value. Due to the myriad ethical scandals within the corporate sector, he argued that the 
concept of leadership needs to be completely rethought. What is required to fix the 
ethical gap are leaders who are morally responsible, have a deep sense of purpose and 
stay true to core values. These qualities, he suggests, enable leaders to establish the 
relationships necessary to build a strong organization, while at the same time allowing 
them to lead with conviction and self-discipline.  
At around the same time as George published this business bestseller, within scholarly 
literature, the construct known as authentic leadership was gaining importance in the 
academic community. According to Peter Northouse there are three different approaches 
to authentic leadership.
23
 First, there is the intrapersonal as outlined by Boas Shamir and 
Galit Eilam who argued that authentic leaders are original since they choose not to copy 
others. From their perspective, it is the insights gained from their life stories that enable 
authentic leaders to obtain self-knowledge. The second strand is that represented by Alice 
Eagly who focuses on the interpersonal - that is, the relationships between leader and 
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follower. But the dominant scholarly perspective is the developmental perspective 
identified by Bruce Avolio and colleagues.
24
  
In the definition put forward by Avolio et al., authentic leadership has four main 
dimensions, that is, i) self-awareness, ii) balanced information processing, iii) relational 
transparency and iv) internalized moral perspective. It is suggested that authentic leaders 
possess greater self-awareness, which enables them to understand their strengths and 
weaknesses, and be cognizant of the effect they have on others. Second, balanced 
processing means that a leader - as part of their decision-making process – is able to 
analyze information objectively. Relational transparency refers to being trustworthy and 
demonstrating appropriate emotional responses. Authentic leaders are genuine in their 
self-presentation so that there is no “fake self” on display. Not only are these leaders 
always honest, they display the right emotion for the right situation. Finally, an authentic 
leader’s internalized moral perspective means they are guided by internal values rather 
than societal pressures.  
While past research in authentic leadership was mostly conceptual, Bruce Avolio and 
Keith Mhatra
25
 state that there are now measurable tools, as well as reliable techniques, 
to test for authenticity in leadership. They employ a survey instrument known as the ALQ 
(Authentic Leadership Questionnaire), developed by Avolio and others. Through 
empirical testing, Avolio and Mhatra contend there is now positive proof that there are 
four dimensions to authentic leadership, namely, self-awareness; relational transparency; 
internalized moral perspective and balanced processing are verifiable. Empirical data 
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from various research studies backs up previous theoretical claims about authentic 
leadership.
 26
  
Avolio and Mhatra assert that it is because authentic leaders have a deeper understanding 
of self that they are able to be consistent in their dealings with others. Through this 
heightened sense of self, authentic leaders foster strong relationships by role-modeling 
positive behaviour. In developing a positive environment, authentic leaders not only 
improve overall morale, but also increase employee effectiveness. Put simply, 
authenticity can be good for the bottom line. It is further argued that leaders who are 
authentic are better able to achieve institutional goals because they are transparent in their 
dealings with others. Together with their ability to be unbiased, authentic leaders lead in 
accordance with their values, and remain steadfast to their principles.  
In addition, four positive psychological components are perceived as relevant to authentic 
leadership. These components are confidence, hope, honesty and resilience. Confidence 
ensures that a leader has the belief that they can accomplish tasks successfully. Hope 
means that leaders have the capacity to inspire others through their willpower. Optimism 
ensures that they can overcome obstacles, while resilience allows them to recover from 
adversity. Furthermore, a leader’s positive behaviour encourages a sense of institutional 
belonging amongst employees, which leads to higher levels of hope and trust. 
Furthermore, what constitutes right thinking about leadership seems more to do with 
what we currently perceive as positive thinking. The following statement by William 
Gardner et al. serves to illustrate my point in that they maintain the core components of 
authentic leadership are “self-awareness, positive self-regulation, positive self-
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development and a positive moral perspective.”
27
 Here we see that there is a strong link 
made between positive psychology and authenticity in leadership. 
In their discussion of the relationship between authenticity and self-awareness, Avolio 
and others distinguish between adaptive and maladaptive self-reflection in authentic 
leadership.
 28
 Adaptive self-reflection means that a leader is aware of, and can critically 
assess their beliefs and behaviors in a constructive manner. Conversely, maladaptive self-
reflection is destructive, since too much rumination may generate negative emotions such 
as self-doubt or anxiety. It is only through what these authors describe as “positive 
developmental interventions” that leaders can make the right decision.29 This suggestion 
is worrisome, because it suggests that it is possible for leaders to take up the right amount 
of self-reflection. Thus the distinction between maladaptive and adaptive self-reflection 
may have more to do with conforming to dominant paradigms about what constitutes 
good leadership than being connected, in any deeper way, with authenticity.  
Recent breakthroughs in neuroscience offer additional techniques to gauge authenticity in 
leaders, according to Paul McDonald. He claims that neuroscience can provide scientific 
evidence to back up previous claims concerning the four major components of authentic 
leadership.
30
 For instance, McDonald argues that self-awareness has an internal aspect 
that is informed by introspection, as well as an external element since self-awareness is 
also affected by social factors. He further contends that neuroscience research suggests 
that we treat information in a different way depending upon whether we are told 
something by someone we know well, as opposed to a stranger. Another component of 
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authentic leadership – relational transparency - can be informed by neuroscience, since it 
appears that particular facial elements create a negative response in the amygdale, which 
affects how we judge people. What this means is that we judge some people as more 
trustworthy than others based on how they look. Those whom we find non-threatening 
are more likely to gain a positive appraisal, especially when we perceive them as similar 
to ourselves.  
Neuroscience research can also offer insight into balanced processing since, according to 
McDonald, the brain processes soft and hard data in the same way. As a result, the brain 
perceives rewards such as financial incentives or enhanced reputation in an equal manner. 
He suggests that this may be the reason why some people are willing to forego financial 
compensation for a better job title. Another component of authentic leadership is 
internalized moral perspective. From his research, McDonald states that people who are 
inclined to focus on negative experiences are less able to engage in self-regulation, which 
seems to reinforce Walumbwa and colleagues’ claim about adaptive versus maladaptive 
thinking. It appears that negative thinking adversely affects the ability to access the 
prefrontal regions responsible for self-focused thinking, and may cloud our ability to 
make balanced decisions.
31
  
In terms of moral thinking, neuro-imagining techniques can also offer insight into how 
we make ethical decisions. Apparently, each person has their own neuroimagining 
signature that operates independently from cognitive decision-making. In practical terms, 
this suggests that ethical decisions are spontaneous, rather than rule-bound. What this 
means in practice is that reason alone will not be enough to explain a person’s moral 
competence. If McDonald’s assessment of neuroscience research is correct, then it seems 
that we make ethical decisions in the moment. Such spontaneity is also relevant to how 
Arendt understands human action. It is through action that each of us brings forward 
something new into the world. No matter how much we may desire control, the 
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spontaneity of action exceeds our grasp, and this may have a detrimental effect on the 
outcome of what appear to be ethical decisions.  
Another aspect that emerges from the literature on authentic leadership is a connection 
between authenticity and greater efficiency. While I understand that it is important for a 
leader to be effective, there are times when I felt that this was taking precedence over 
ethical matters. It seems to me that current explanations of authentic leadership veer 
toward an instrumental way of perceiving relationships. This means-ends way of thinking 
can be seen in how scholars begin with the hypothesis that authentic leadership rests upon 
a particular set of characteristics. From this list of characteristics, scholars build survey 
instruments to gain empirical evidence to confirm their thesis. But all this does is to 
reaffirm what they already believed. Thus, I suggest that the diversity of human 
experience is covered over by this desire to quantify and measure things. What this body 
of evidence does is to produce a particular way of thinking about authenticity, but it may 
obscure other ways of thinking about this concept. While it is laudable that these scholars 
are concerned about ethical behaviour in leaders, I do not believe that ethical dilemmas 
will be solved through instrumental ways of thinking. I think there is a danger to connect 
questions of ethics with questions of efficiency, because it may result in the former being 
obscured by the latter. Efficiency understood by the language of performance 
measurement and outcome-based thinking serves to ignore contingency in favour of 
scientific explanations that privilege consistency.  
This predilection for measurable results in authentic leadership scholarship may be 
problematic, because it encourages a belief that truth is obtainable from data without fully 
acknowledging that leadership is context-dependent. Moreover, as Joanne Ciulla points 
out, there is often confusion in leadership accounts between description and prescription. 
This can lead to false assumptions being drawn. For instance, she states there is a 
“dichotomy between leaders who are morally good and leaders who are effective at 
11 
 
exercising leadership.”
32
 Ciulla refers to this as the “Hitler problem,” that is, a leader can 
sometimes appear efficient without in any way being ethical. Furthermore, she contends 
that leadership studies should be rooted in the human sciences, not least because when we 
study leadership we are looking at ourselves.
33
 Ever since the Enlightenment, however, 
scientific discourse has been afforded more cultural cache. Nonetheless, Ciulla maintains 
that stories can offer insights in ways that scientific theories cannot.  
When we think about what authentic leadership might mean, each of us will have 
different ideas, informed by the stories we read, the movies we watch and our 
experiences in the workplace and beyond. What characterizes an authentic leader in 
Antonio Marturano’s opinion will change over time and space, since each community has 
different values that are “embedded in social relations and institutions.”
34
 Certain traits 
have meaning within a particular community, he argues, rather than being rooted in a 
person’s psychology, as some leadership scholars maintain. Furthermore, Marturano 
claims that it is not so much that individual leaders possess charisma, but that others 
believe them to be charismatic. It is easy to become swept away by the rhetorical genius 
of charismatic leaders. These larger than life personas may prove detrimental to an 
organization, according to Amanda Sinclair, since their belief in themselves may override 
alternate viewpoints.
35
 From her work with leadership teams, she has observed a 
common tendency exhibited by senior managers toward dependency and obedience.
 
This 
manifests itself as believing that the leader is the only person who can solve a particular 
                                                 
32
 Joanne B. Ciulla. “Handmaiden and Queen: What Philosophers Find in the Question: What is a 
Leader?”  In Leadership Studies: The Dialogue of Disciplines, eds. Ronald E. Riggio and Michael 
Harvey (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2011), 59.  
33
 Joanna B. Ciulla, “Leadership Studies and the Fusion of Horizons,” The Leadership Quarterly 
(2008), 393. 
34
 Antonio Marturano, "Understanding Leadership: Is it time for a linguistic turn?" In Leadership 
at the Crossroads, Volume III, Leadership and the Humanities, ed. Joanna B. Ciulla (Westport, 
Conneticut: Praeger, 2008), 117-132. 
35
 Amanda Sinclair, Leadership for the Disillusioned: Moving Beyond Myths and Heroes to 
Leading that Liberates (Crow’s Nest NSW: Allen and Unwin, 2007), 81.  
 
12 
 
problem. As a result, the leader starts to perceive himself as omniscient. Too much 
emphasis on a leader’s capabilities may be a way for people to mask their own 
insecurities. This dependency on leaders may actually be an abrogation of personal 
responsibility. Ignoring these power relationships is a mistake, asserts Sinclair, since it 
does not help us understand how leaders may, at times, feel powerless to act while, in 
other circumstances, gain too much power over others.  
Until recently, much of the published work on authentic leadership was based either on 
conceptual ideas or quantitative research.
36
 In reviewing studies conducted on authentic 
leadership, William Gardner and others note that there is too much reliance on survey 
measurements to gauge authentic leadership. Of the ninety-one publications on authentic 
leadership published up to 2010, Gardner et al.
37
 contend that fifty-nine were conceptual, 
with fifty-five of these reflecting a positivist orientation while the other four were 
interpretive. Furthermore, 74% of the articles published come out of the fields of 
management or business studies in either Canada or The United States. What is required, 
they contend, is research that elicits thick narratives and explores ethical issues in greater 
depth. I’ll return to ethics later in the chapter. 
1.1.1 Alternative Perspectives on Authentic Leadership 
There are some scholars who adopt a different approach to authentic leadership as I 
indicated earlier. For example, in their exploration of authentic leadership, Boas Shamir 
and Galit Eilam see a connection with the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia.
38
 From 
their perspective, to be authentic a leader must act out of personal conviction so as to 
encourage others to share her vision. Similarly, Lester Levy and Mark Bentley argue that 
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to be authentic, leaders need to be true to themselves and act upon their beliefs for the 
common good.
39
  
What these definitions fail to acknowledge is that truth, like authenticity, is a contestable 
concept. Such an approach to the study of leadership does not account adequately for the 
myriad ways in which institutional bias and social prejudice adversely affect who gains 
access to leadership roles. Moreover, there are many times when a leader’s convictions 
may have appeared to be genuine, but have led to disastrous results. Here we may do well 
to remember Arendt’s claim that it is not whether leaders are good that matters; rather, it 
is whether their leadership is good for the world that is important. In fact, we need to ask 
ourselves: would a world populated by authentic leaders necessarily be a better one? I 
will return to this question in the conclusion to this chapter.  
1.1.2 Authentic Leadership and Narrative 
Authenticity does not arise out of the awareness of inner values, according to Raymond 
Sparrowe, but through narrative.
40
 He takes up Paul Ricoeur’s work on the narrative self 
to show the limitations of current leadership research. For example, Sparrowe is critical 
of the emphasis on the inner self, because he argues that it ignores our relationships with 
others.
41
 By viewing authentic leaders as constant with their beliefs, this abstracts them 
from their situational context, and ignores how past history are relevant to present events. 
Being authentic, states Sparrowe, does not necessarily mean a person will be moral. I 
think we can take this insight further, since to suggest that authentic leadership is 
inherently moral is to contend that we are all the same. Not only does this ignore how 
leaders act in narcissistic or duplicitous ways, it also overlooks each person’s unique 
mode of being. (We will return to the issue of narrative in later chapters.) 
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In thinking about the place of authenticity in leadership, we need to take into account 
how each of us understands the world in a singular but different fashion, because of the 
myriad experiences that make up our life. Context matters. But context is often missing 
from discussions into what constitutes authenticity in leadership. So, too, is any 
discussion of the body. The reason why embodiment is ignored by most authentic 
leadership scholars, according to Donna Ladkin and Steve Taylor, is due to the focus on 
the leader’s ‘true’ self.
 42
 Yet it is not a person’s inner thoughts that are important; rather 
it is through speech and action that leaders are judged.
43
 While Francis Yammarino et al.  
contend that authentic leaders can enhance overall workplace effectiveness,
 44
 because a 
leader’s honest approach will be received positively by others, Ladkin and Taylor express 
reservations. One of the underlying problems they perceive with the theory of authentic 
leadership is that it does not account for how a leader may act in what she regards as an 
authentic manner but still not be perceived as genuine by others. For instance, one of the 
main roles of a leader, state Ladkin and Taylor, is to embody “the identity story of the 
group.”
45
 In conveying the institutional narrative, a leader needs to evoke a rapport with 
her audience. Whenever leaders are unable to convey the institutional story in a 
meaningful way, they will not persuade others to share in their vision and effect change, 
something deemed critical to leadership success.
46
  
So we see that context is critical to understanding the role of authenticity in leadership. 
Yet, according to Alice Eagly, many authentic leadership scholars ignore the “fault lines 
that exist in communities between people who differ in gender, social class, education 
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and ethnicity.”
47
 What this means is that those who are not considered to be traditional 
leaders may have problems being seen as genuine. She points to tensions that may occur 
when a woman leader displays a lack of stereotypical feminine behaviour by being 
perceived as aggressive or autocratic. Because of her gender, rather than her action, a 
woman leader may be castigated for what would, from a male perspective, appear to be 
‘normal’ leadership behaviour. But it is not only gender that needs to be taken into 
account. Depending upon the particular situation, different axes of identity can be 
foregrounded. In some instances, a leader might be discriminated against because of her 
gender, while in another situation a male leader might experience discrimination because 
of his race or sexual orientation. In considering what it might mean to lead authentically, 
an array of intersectional factors have to be noted. 
I have surveyed some of the main theorists in the field in order to offer some background 
to current discussions. Now I want to look at what is perceived to be a fundamental 
component of leadership, that is, vision.  
1.2 Vision  
 Herminia Ibarra and Otillia Obodaru maintain that the one thing that is holding women 
back from leadership positions is vision.
48
 From their empirical research, they argue that 
while women are perceived as just as competent as men in the majority of managerial 
tasks, envisioning is the area where women leaders express unease and are also perceived 
to be less successful by others. If more women wish to lead organizations, Ibarra and 
Obodaru contend, it is necessary for them to become more comfortable with putting 
forward their own vision. In short, women need to stop dismissing vision, and become 
competent in this area of leadership.  
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The purpose of vision, state James Kouzes and Barry Posner, is to offer leader a blueprint 
to follow that serves as their guiding light for the future.
49
 They argue that some leaders 
have an image of what success looks like even before they embark on a project, much 
like an engineer builds a model.
50
 This clarity of image enables a leader to move forward 
provided they can enlist others to help them achieve their vision. Yet I suggest we need to 
be cautious when we think about leadership in such a predetermined manner. Such a 
planned approach to leadership may not always be sufficient. For example, as action 
constantly brings new problems, reverting to a blueprint will be of little use in times of 
crisis. Furthermore, this way of thinking seems to be based on the illusion that leaders are 
able to control what might happen, because they are able to plan everything in advance. 
Some scholars perceive vision as vital to authentic leadership. For example, R.W. Terry 
contends that a “truly visionary leader teaches, providing insight so that people 
understand.”
51
 But not all visions are positive for organizations. Indeed, if a person’s 
vision is disconnected from an ethical worldview, it may create problems. There are 
times when a leader’s vision may prove counterproductive. Moreover, too much 
confidence may encourage a leader to behave in self-indulgent ways. Indeed Terry Price 
argues that an “undue focus on issues of authenticity can actually promote unethical 
leadership.”
52
 In thinking about vision in relation to leadership, we must account for the 
fact that not every leader engages in an ethical way of behaving.  
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1.3 Authenticity and Ethics 
Ethical decision-making depends on the leader’s willingness, not only to listen to their 
conscience, but to act accordingly. In thinking about the place of authenticity in 
leadership, Chris Branson argues that “all ethical decisions are based on the interplay 
between rational objective knowledge and our subjective, interpretive knowledge.”
53
 The 
problem is that moral integrity can be compromised by our selfish desires. He maintains 
that we must ensure that the “the pure voice of the moral self is heard above the 
confusion and chatter that fills our minds.”
54
 Here, Branson seems to have fallen back on 
his own abstraction, since the purity of a person’s moral self is, at best, a dubious claim.  
It is only when leaders face an ethical dilemma, state Milorad Novicevic et al., that 
questions of authenticity become relevant in the workplace.
55
 In differentiating between 
personal and organizational responsibility, these authors claim that executives experience 
tension wherever their personal values collide with organizational expectations. In 
stressful times, it is important for leaders to hold on to their self-esteem, rather than be 
swayed by others as moral decision-making may be affected adversely by “group think.” 
One effect of this moral disintegration, contend Novicevic et al., is that executives refuse 
to accept personal responsibility for the organization’s ethical failures.  
At times of organizational crisis, Donna Ladkin suggests that Heidegger’s notion of 
dwelling might have much to offer leaders.
56
 When there is no easy solution, she 
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contends that dwelling with a particular problem can help leaders solve particularly 
intransigent issues because it enables them to see, not just from our own perspective, but 
also from the viewpoint of others.
57
 This way of orienting oneself to the world requires an 
open disposition, and a willingness to tarry. Such openness to the other, and to the world 
around us, is our way of showing we care. Furthermore, Ladkin contends that 
Heidegger’s notion of “coming into right relationship” may provide a more inclusive 
framework for dealing with ethical dilemmas. Thus, she suggests that leadership studies 
could benefit by adopting his notion of dwelling to address organizational problems. 
Hence, Ladkin argues that dwelling can offer new, creative solutions that allow a leader 
to stay with their own values, while at the same time, being willing to enter into a deep 
relationship with others. In practical terms, such openness requires the leader to be 
present-minded rather than future-oriented, and to be willing to create an environment for 
thinking through, rather than determining the right vision ahead of time. For this to take 
place, a leader needs to suspend their positional power so as to openly engage with 
others.
58
 This suspension of power requires courage and humility on the leader’s part, as 
well as a willingness to engage with the world and others.
59
  
Ethical action requires us to ensure that our decisions are responsive to other people’s 
feelings. We act ethically by offering a person, or a problem, our meaningful attention. 
This requires us to step back from our own concerns to be open to the particular situation. 
When we are open to experience, we allow things to come into appearance that otherwise 
we may not notice. In so doing, we become more receptive to the problem at hand. 
Sometimes, the decision a leader makes will be influenced by gender. Ladkin argues that 
Carol Gilligan’s notion of moral differences between men and women may reveal why, at 
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times, a woman leader may act differently from her male counterpart.
60
 This is because a 
woman’s “ethical action is centrally informed by relational values.”
61
 Gilligan’s work has 
been roundly challenged for what seems to be essentialist ways of thinking. But if we 
allow ourselves to be open to the notion that both men and women have the ability to lead 
in a caring manner, then her work may open up positive avenues for leading. 
1.3.1 Authentic Leadership and Spirituality 
It is noteworthy that underpinning some authentic leadership scholarship is a religious or 
spiritual foundation. For instance, Karin Klenke argues that spirituality is at the heart of 
authentic leadership.
62
 This spiritual dimension enables employees to gain meaning as 
they search for something transcendent to augment the paucity of their working lives. But 
there may be problems with too much emphasis on spirituality in the workplace. If we see 
spirituality as essential to authentic leadership, what happens to those employees who are 
agnostic or atheist? While spirituality may be beneficial for some, it may negatively 
affect those who do not conform to a particular belief system. Hence, Amanda Sinclair 
cautions that a spiritual approach to leadership may not be conducive to workers’ 
spiritual enlightenment, as it may mask structural inequities, and be adopted by 
unscrupulous leaders to coerce others into doing their will.
 
 
The current leadership craze regarding authenticity is, in Sinclair’s view, a response to 
the growing anxiety that we are losing our identity in the workplace. But the definition of 
authentic leadership currently proposed is troubling, because as she notes the “norms by 
which authenticity is judged have deeply social, economic, political causes.”
63
 As an 
example, Sinclair argues that performance measurement is likely to encourage leaders to 
be authentic within a framework that has little to do with Arendtian notions of 
uniqueness, and much more to do with conformity. In addition, Joanne Ciulla criticizes 
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“modern management for focusing more on trying to make one feel good than on creating 
a just workplace.”
64
 Management should be careful to resist any practices that border on 
psychological exploitation; instead employers should offer their workers respect and a 
decent wage.
65
  
To sum up, I have explored the main arguments by proponents of authentic leadership, as 
well as considering some of its detractors. The desire for an authentic leadership 
construct may result in inauthentic behaviour as leaders conform to this prescriptive 
model. In their haste to put forward a new theory, as Puck Algera and Marjolein Lips-
Wiersma have pointed out, leadership scholars fail to comprehend fully the ontological 
roots of authenticity.
66
 It is a mistake to look for methods and techniques before dwelling 
on the fundamental question of what it means to be authentically human. If authentic 
leadership becomes a management technique, then it may lead to valuing leaders in terms 
of their individual success, rather than engaging in an ethical relation with others. What is 
missing in many accounts, as Dominik Heil points out, is a deeper understanding of the 
connections between authentic leadership and a particular way of viewing the world.
67
 
Furthermore, there is a tension between ethical considerations and the desire for leaders 
to be more effective. Effectiveness is desired because it is assumed that leaders will be 
more successful. Increasingly, the way that we judge success is through profit or 
outcome-based measurements. There is nothing inherently wrong with wanting leaders to 
be more effective but when we focus on effectiveness we may move away from 
                                                 
64
 Joanne Ciulla, The Working Life: The Promise and Betrayal of Modern Work (New York and 
Toronto: Random House 2000), 229. 
65
 Joanne Ciulla, Working Life, 227. 
66
 Puck M. Algera and Marjorie Lips-Wiersma, “Radical Authentic Leadership: Co-creating the 
Conditions under which all Members of the Organization can be Authentic,” The Leadership 
Quarterly, 23, (2011): 118-231.  
67
 Dominik Heil, “Understanding and Leading Organizations: A Hermeneutic Phenomenological 
Investigation,” Philosophy Today (2010):14. In this article, Heil points to how a Heideggerian 
notion of attendance could help the authentic leader to articulate the connection between the 
organization and the world. 
21 
 
authenticity. When questions of authenticity are connected to financial and organizational 
success, it may be to the detriment of personal integrity.  
1.4 Leadership: An Overview 
I want to spend some time situating authentic leadership within the broader domain of 
leadership studies to see whether this offers us insight into why authenticity is regarded, 
by some scholars, as an important attribute for leaders. In 1978, James MacGregor Burns 
published a book entitled Leadership, widely regarded as a foundational leadership text. 
He viewed leadership as “a structure of acting that engages persons, to varying degrees, 
through the levels and among the interstices of society.”
68
 In his account, Burns 
differentiates between two types of leadership. First, transactional leadership points to 
how leaders act in an instrumental manner to achieve their goals. Second, 
transformational leadership refers to leaders who exhibit charisma, and are able to effect 
change by dint of their powerful personalities. Authentic leadership comes out of this 
belief in transformational leaders who can create organizational change. This change may 
not always be beneficial, however, since charismatic leaders sometimes wreak havoc on 
organizations, especially when a leader’s self-regard is narcissistic. Moreover, a leader’s 
excessive adherence to a particular vision may work to the detriment of the organization 
as a whole. To understand leadership, Burns argues that one must first comprehend the 
essence of power and realize that, ideally, leadership is formed in relationship, and 
connected to purpose.  
In the modern workplace, Burns argues that bureaucratic structures may work to the 
detriment of ethical leadership, because stability is prized over spontaneity. This desire 
for stability ensures bureaucracies take on a culture of mediocrity that permeates the 
organization, and functions to obstruct challenges to the status quo. Whether a person’s 
actions are virtuous or not matters less than that she comply with a particular mode of 
behaving. While subordinates may perceive bureaucratic authority as legitimate, they will 
fight against its constraints, sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, because it 
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fails to offer them a space whereby they are able to be the best they can. Spontaneity is 
also negatively affected by the language of job descriptions, goals, objectives and 
outcome-based measurements. People lose hope when the workplace is no more than an 
environment of conforming to policies, which they may find unsatisfactory or even 
unethical. Thus, we see how bureaucracy, in its desire for conformity, suppresses 
individual uniqueness. (I will return to problems with bureaucracy in chapter three.) 
A different approach to leadership was advanced by Peter Greenleaf in 1977, with his 
concept of “servant leadership.”
69
 His theory proved popular with people who desired a 
more communitarian approach to leading, and also for those looking for a spiritual 
dimension. Because of a lack of caring and an overwhelming desire for profit, Greenleaf 
contends that concern regarding human flourishing, understood as the well-being of a 
community, is becoming erased by the desire for profit. He further argued that one of the 
major problems in the modern workplace is that we place too much emphasis on the 
leader instead of seeing her as part of the organizational team. In exploring why it is 
important for leaders to serve their communities and act ethically, he points to some 
negative trends. One such trend in the modern workplace is that, increasingly, individuals 
with conceptual skills are sidelined in favour of those who are more operationally-
minded. But conceptual thinkers are needed, Greenleaf maintains, since these are the 
people who ask the most difficult questions. Without the input of those who are willing to 
question a leader’s action, a management team may become complacent.  
In his discussion of universities, Greenleaf notes that it is not sufficient for conceptual 
thinkers to be part of the faculty; they must also be part of the senior leadership team. 
Without the influence of conceptual thinkers, he argues that a university can turn into an 
uncaring institution, and lose sight of its deeper purpose. Larger questions are overtaken 
by economic imperatives, such as the belief that growth is necessarily good. Those who 
have the tenacity to reject this model will quickly find themselves out of place. When 
someone chooses to dissent, they are often regarded as disloyal, rather than perceived as 
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upholding personal beliefs. According to Keith Grint, those who dare to question are 
replaced by “yes” people who turn into irresponsible followers, precisely because they 
refuse to tell the leader she is wrong for fear of reprisal.
70
 What leadership needs most, he 
states, are “constructive dissenters” who recognize that leaders are not omniscient beings. 
In Grint’s opinion, we need to “abandon Plato’s question: ‘Who should rule us?’ and 
focus instead on Popper’s question: ‘How can we stop our rulers ruining us,’
71
 a 
sentiment with which Arendt may well have found common cause.  
I have provided this brief overview of leadership to situate authentic leadership within 
leadership studies. What emerges for me is the concern expressed regarding too much 
emphasis on leaders which may, in turn, lead to a lessening of bonds between people. We 
have also seen how instrumental ways of leading and bureaucratic structures place a 
greater emphasis on organizational effectiveness, which can be detrimental to ethical 
action. From this overview of leadership scholarship, we learn that authentic leadership 
comes out of the desire for transformational, charismatic leaders who can provide 
solutions to organizational problems. The desire for a strong leader may, at times, prove 
detrimental to an organization, not least because too much belief in a leader’s capabilities 
can lead to a lack of responsibility on the part of others, something I will discuss in depth 
in chapter three.  
I want to turn now to look at how various scholars perceive the benefits and drawbacks of 
leadership training, and how it relates to authenticity. 
1.4.1 Leadership Training 
Just as business schools can teach students management skills so, too, can leadership 
programs train people to be leaders, according to James Kouzes and Barry Pozner. To 
master the art of leadership, these authors assert, one must first develop ‘the instrument of 
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leadership,’ that is, the self.
72
 Other scholars believe that leadership programs can teach 
people to be authentic. For example, Adrian Chan contends that when leaders add 
authenticity to their leadership skills, it serves as a ‘leadership multiplier,’ which 
improves individual and organizational success.
73
 Yet this presupposes a person’s ability 
to know herself is a straightforward process, and that it is possible to train a person to 
become an authentic leader. I see two problems with this type of thinking. First, it is 
difficult to comprehend how such leadership training could be evaluated. Would program 
evaluation consist of the completion of a questionnaire where a leader ranked her 
‘authenticity quota’ before and after completion of a training course? Or would program 
success be judged on the perceptions of others prior to and after a leader’s makeover? 
Second, what complicates the idea of leadership programming, as it relates to 
authenticity, is that training someone to perform in a particular way would seem to run 
counter to a person expressing her personal views. Hence, my second concern is the idea 
that authenticity can be learned through the “right” education. If authenticity is perceived 
as an individual attribute, it seems paradoxical to train leaders to be authentic. In fact, 
training people to perform leadership authentically would seem to curtail individuality. 
On the one hand, it is difficult to see how something as deeply personal as an individual’s 
authenticity can be gained from specific training. On the other, if such a quality can be 
taught, then it suggests that Western notions of individuality are a myth.  
Indeed, Cecily Cooper, Terry Scandia and Chester Schriesheim argue that it is pointless 
to develop authentic leadership programs until there is agreement as to what the construct 
means.
74
 Moreover, it is unlikely that an adult’s ethical behaviour can be changed, these 
authors contend, since a person’s moral outlook has already been formed through social 
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and cultural processes. Bill George concurs, arguing that leadership training that consists 
of “lists of leadership characteristics that one is supposed to emulate”
75
 will not help a 
person develop their leadership strengths, or lead in a genuine manner. Rather, such 
training merely encourages people to construct what they consider to be an acceptable 
leadership image. George sees this image-making to be at the heart of the contemporary 
crisis of contemporary leadership, since it encourages inauthentic behaviour. He connects 
the current leadership crisis in corporate America with the narcissistic cult of personality 
that is endemic, not only to the corporate sector, but also in other arenas.
76
 Because 
leaders of Fortune 500 companies are perceived as possessing knowledge, wealth and 
prestige, it is not surprising in our status-conscious world that others may want to emulate 
them. If someone wishes to adopt the methods of a successful leader, perhaps they will be 
more effective. However, I fail to see how adopting another person’s style of leadership 
is, in any meaningful way, authentic.  
While some scholars maintain that they can develop leadership training programs that 
allow leaders to express themselves in an individual way, this is disputed by a recent 
Swiss study, conducted by Nada Endrissat, Werner Müller and Stephanie Kaudela-
Baum.
77
 In this study, twenty-six managers were interviewed and asked to give their 
opinions about leadership training. These managers expressed hostility toward leadership 
training, not least because they felt it forced them to act in a particular way, which they 
regarded as inauthentic. It would seem from this study that leadership training, far from 
allowing leaders to discover their own style, made them feel like phonies. So while some 
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leadership scholars see authentic leadership as a way for people to express their 
individuality, this is not borne out by this particular study. 
A significant problem with leadership training, according to Amanda Sinclair, is that it 
draws from positivist social psychology and the notion that it is possible to “track down 
the truth about leadership and train [people] in it.”
78
 Such training, as well as being 
prescriptive may, as Jill Blackmore points out, obscure socio-cultural differences.
79
 It 
appears that leadership training is often designed according to Anglo-American models 
which, she argues, do not necessarily mesh well with other cultural environments. 
Because different cultures operate out of different ideological frameworks, Blackmore 
suggests that people think about leadership in different ways. From a Western 
perspective, ideas about individuality may have relevance whereas in other cultures with 
different beliefs a focus on the self may be less salient. When local context is ignored, 
this results in leadership development programs failing to respect cultural diversity. 
Jackie Ford agrees with Blackmore, maintaining that there is a tendency for leadership 
training to mask its Anglo-American roots and to appear as if it is a universal idea.
80
 
Moreover, there is an implicit assumption, in Ford’s view, that leadership is necessary to 
an organization’s well-being. Yet this emphasis on leadership may evoke a sense of 
helplessness on the part of employees, who become convinced that leaders are essential 
for their organization to flourish.  
In examining some of the strengths and weaknesses of leadership training, we see how 
ideas about authenticity are culturally specific. Thus teaching leaders to be authentic may 
not translate well across cultures. What becomes apparent is that particular experiences, 
rooted in time and place, affect the ways that we think about leadership. In thinking about 
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the place of authenticity in leadership, it is important to consider cultural context, as well 
as social and historical factors. 
I want to turn now to consider what insights Arendt can offer. 
1.5  Arendt 
As I suggested earlier, thinking with Arendt can help us reconsider the role of 
authenticity in leadership in a manner cognizant of equality and difference. We have seen 
that while there are dissenters, the dominant motif is that authentic leadership is 
composed of four dimensions: balanced information processing, self-awareness, 
internalized moral perspective and relational transparency. In this section, I want to show 
why some of these claims are problematic from an Arendtian perspective.  
For Arendt, self-knowledge as the basis for understanding is a deeply flawed notion. 
Rather than self-knowledge, she maintains that it is through action and speech that 
humans “show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities.”
81
 The 
widespread belief in inner depth is, in her opinion, a fallacy. Thus, a person can never 
know herself in the way that proponents of authentic leadership suggest since, according 
to Arendt, the person who appears clearly to others remains partially hidden from the 
actor herself. It is because we can never know fully who we are that we cannot base a 
theory of leadership on the self. 
A central motif in Arendt’s work is an insistence that we fail to comprehend who 
someone is because we concentrate on their “whatness.” For instance, in Western society, 
when introduced to a new person, a common question is “what do you do?” People are 
judged, consciously or unconsciously, depending upon their response, as certain 
professions are regarded more highly than others. But someone’s profession fails to alert 
us to a person’s uniqueness. Rather,  
[w]ho somebody is or was we can know only by knowing the story of which 
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he is himself the hero…everything else we know of him, including the work 
he may have produced and left behind, tells us only what he is or was.
82
  
In The Human Condition, Arendt notes how the Greeks used the term “daimon” to refer 
to something that was intrinsic to a particular individual, not a fleeting quality like 
happiness. This distinctive identity is not the same as a person’s talents or shortcomings; 
these character traits tell us what a person is good, or bad, at doing. The daimon relates to 
“who” a person is. For the Greeks, a person’s essence could only be articulated after their 
death, at which point it was the role of the storyteller to recount a person’s life. Arendt 
asserts that no-one can be the author of their own life story, because it is impossible to 
fully grasp who someone is until after they are dead. Hence, an individual’s life-story can 
only be told, in its fullness, as a narrative delivered by another after their death. The 
purpose of narrative is to provide a powerful means of remembrance. Indeed, it is through 
the stories that we share that we obtain an understanding of the world.
83
  
In Arendt’s view, a person’s unique identity is always to be understood as both relational 
and embodied because each time we act and speak we do so within an already existent 
web of human relationships. Yet how we perceive ourselves is often different to how we 
appear to others. We do not appear to the world in the guise of an inner self; rather, we 
appear before others through self-display.
84
 In The Life of the Mind, Arendt notes that 
self-display has two meanings. The first meaning is to display ourselves in terms of being 
seen, heard or touched. The second meaning is to display our inner self. She concentrates 
on the former notion of self-display, since it is our outward appearance that others engage 
with. While we may try to manage our self-presentation, there will always be aspects that 
escape our control. Furthermore, Arendt contests the surface/depth idea of subjectivity by 
stating “our common conviction that what is inside ourselves, our ‘inner life,’ is more 
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relevant to what we ‘are’ than what appears on the outside is an illusion.”
85
 In the world 
of appearances, that is the world of others, we show ourselves through deeds and actions. 
In the world of the mind, that is the world of self, we reveal ourselves through the 
medium of thought. Simply put, it is through action that we reveal ourselves to others, 
while it is through reflection that we reveal ourselves to ourselves.  
In relation to leadership, Arendt argues that too much emphasis on self-knowledge 
contradicts the contingent nature of action. She maintains that a leader should not be 
judged on her achievements, the outcome of which can never be known in advance, but 
on her initiative, since it is impossible to plan for all eventualities because of action’s 
unpredictability. Such unexpectedness, although intrinsic to human existence, 
contravenes the rules and regulations a society puts in place to ensure law and order. In 
The Human Condition, Arendt traces the desire for self-control back to Plato who, she 
contends, disliked the vagaries of action. He regarded men as mere puppets on a stage, 
controlled by the invisible hand of fate, and preferred poeisis (making) to praxis (action) 
because the former had a predictable outcome.
86
 It was because Plato wanted to give 
human affairs solidity that he argued that action, because of its capricious nature, should 
be separated from thought.  
Arendt maintains that Plato’s disillusionment with political life, as a result of the trial and 
subsequent execution of Socrates, was to have major repercussions on ways of thinking 
about leadership. Instead of the collective equality of the citizens of the polis, the new 
criterion for ruling was based upon a separation between leader and the led. In her words, 
The supreme criterion of fitness for ruling others is, in Plato and in the 
aristocratic tradition of the West, the capacity to rule one’s self. Just as the 
philosopher-king commands the city, the soul commands the body and reason 
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commands the passion.”
87
  
Here we see that the Platonic notion of leadership is based on a hierarchy of values. In 
laying a political foundation based on law, Plato argued that action, because of its 
unpredictability, must be separated from thought. Over time, knowledge became linked to 
commanding others, whereas action is connected with obedience and the execution of 
orders. With this decisive split between beginning and ruling, Arendt maintains that Plato 
led the way for a conception of ruling that was anathema to human freedom because 
plurality was denied in favour of sovereignty.
88
  
Arendt is critical of the way Plato conceived of public leadership as akin to that of the 
head of the household. In ancient Greece, the head of the household was like a tyrant, 
since he had total power over all who lived in the household. Basing a theory of 
leadership on the master/slave relationship of the household ensures that communal 
action is usurped in favour of a supreme hierarchy between the head of the household and 
everyone else. This form of leadership as mastery undermines the role of action in 
leadership, because the ruler is seen as the person who initiates action while others carry 
out his orders. In Arendt’s view, this separation between the one who envisions 
something and the one who carries out that task brought about a hierarchical 
understanding of rulership, which served to debase an “authentic understanding of human 
freedom.”
89
  
In time, the separation between thinking and action led to the rule of the few over the 
many, and “the fallacy of the strong man who is powerful because he is alone.”
90
 Yet the 
notion of the strong, isolated leader is a myth, states Arendt, as it is only through working 
together that action can be accomplished. She notes how the Greek word archein 
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originally meant to begin something, as well as to lead, whereas the Latin equivalent was 
agere, which means to lead by setting something in motion.
91
 These linguistic changes in 
the notion of rulership result in the importance of working collectively becoming 
forgotten. Instead, a leader is seen as someone who begins an action, which others 
execute on their behalf. This disconnection between the leader and others is potentially 
dangerous, since a leader’s isolation from others creates an atmosphere of fear and 
suspicion.  
In addition, in her exploration of the Athenian world, Arendt argues that to show oneself 
was essential to the Greek understanding of action. Excellence, known as arête in Greek 
and virtus in Latin, was limited to actions in the public arena. Thus, the political sphere 
was equated with the highest form of existence. The political realm was where a man 
could gain public admiration, so important to assuage individual vanity. Hence, the Greek 
polis represented a place to commemorate the deeds of great men. Initially, the word 
“hero” did not refer to someone who is courageous. Its original Homeric meaning was a 
free man who participated in the Trojan wars, and of whom a story could be told. It was 
through the storyteller’s words that a hero gained immortality, something that the Greeks 
desired above all else. In Homer’s retelling, everyone shows courage when they are 
willing to take action. Hence, poets like Homer had a political function, that is, to 
immortalize Greek action.  
The Greek polis was regarded as the exclusive realm of freedom because citizens came 
together to share their opinions and make decisions on public affairs. A willingness to act 
was perceived as the foundation of freedom; however, it required courage to devote 
oneself to public life because it meant that you had to be willing to share your views with 
others. For the Greeks, the word “public” had two meanings. The first relates to being 
seen and heard, and is the manner in which an individual appeared before others. The 
second meaning of public is world, which represents the sum of human activity. Arendt 
often refers to this as “inter-est,” meaning the space that resides between us, such as a 
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table that we sit around to share ideas. This in-between space constitutes the place of 
human interaction. As well, for the Greeks, a life lived at home was not regarded as a 
good life, because it meant that a man was not taking an active part in the polis. In fact, 
privacy originally meant to be deprived of something. Being outside the public realm, the 
fate of most men and all women in Ancient Greece meant that a person was not 
considered to be fully “human.” Although the polis was the exclusive realm of freedom 
for male citizens, for the majority, that is, women, slaves, as well as working men, this 
arena of liberty was closed.
92
  
In her later work, such as The Life of the Mind, Arendt argues that too much 
concentration on action ignores a critical function of leadership that is reflection, or what 
she calls the “stop and think.” She distinguishes between the thinking being and the 
acting self, arguing that when we act we take on a singularity of purpose, whereas when 
we think we engage in internal dialogue. Thinking alerts us to the fact that we are what 
Arendt, following Socrates, refers to as “the two in one.” In contradistinction to action, 
when we think, there is an interior dialogue that takes place between me and myself. 
Thinking enables us to understand, not in terms of knowledge, but in terms of meaning. 
Without the capacity for reflective thought, leaders may lose their ethical moorings since 
they will not be able to reflect upon their mistakes. Without this ability to reflect, a 
person may end up taking action that is harmful to others. Arendt underscored this fact in 
her examination of Adolf Eichmann, whom she regarded as evil because he was 
thoughtless. The “banality of evil,” which she saw as Eichmann’s signature, derived from 
his seeming inability to think about the effects of what he was doing, together with his 
refusal to take responsibility for his actions.
93
 What is clear is that leaders must not only 
be able to act, but to reflect on their actions.  
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1.5.1 Authority and Leadership 
To understand leadership, according to Arendt, it is necessary to comprehend the 
meaning of authority. In her essay “What is Authority?”
 94
she explores the different ways 
that belief in legitimate authority has virtually disappeared in modern times. The 
breakdown in authority is due to increasing secularism, and the ensuing lack of faith in 
traditional beliefs. The problem, in her view, is that there is a distinct possibility that 
modern society has chosen to stop learning from the past. But it is valuable to delve into 
history, Arendt asserts, because it enables us to understand ourselves through the stories 
that we share over time and space.  
In Arendt’s exploration of the meaning of authority, she tries to ascertain what we can 
learn from the past through an examination of legitimate versus illegitimate forms of rule. 
A central facet of her argument is that we no longer understand what authority means 
because we confuse authority with force. But she maintains that the use of force is 
indicative of a failure of authority. Conversely, authority is when both the person in 
power and her subjects regard this rule as lawful. For Arendt, authoritarian rule stands in 
opposition to forcible coercion, or persuasive argumentation, because it is based upon an 
implicit relationship between the one who commands, and those who obey. This form of 
rule represents a legitimate hierarchy since both the leader and the follower concur with 
the relationship. In her view, power stands in opposition to its negative counterparts, 
force and violence, which are emblematic of harmful ways of ruling. But Arendt 
contends that liberal thinkers fail to distinguish between these phenomena. As an 
example, she shows how the term “all power corrupts,” is a meaningless phrase, because 
it overlooks the crucial distinction between legitimate and illegitimate manifestations of 
power.  
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An illegitimate manifestation of power is that of totalitarian rule. Regimes based on 
totalitarian rule, as Arendt tells us, stand in opposition to human plurality, because “a 
polis belonging to one man is no polis.”
95
 Accordingly, any leadership regime that is 
conceived as deriving from a sovereign will is not conducive to good government. Hence, 
she vehemently disagrees with Rousseau’s notion of the government of one will because 
sovereignty denies the basis of human freedom, that is, the ability for people to share 
perspectives. This, for her, represents an illegitimate form of rule. Conversely, Arendt 
argues that leadership functions best when it arises out of individuals working together, 
rather than directed by a person in charge. A type of polis can appear at any time when 
people come together for a common goal. In our time, we can see an Arendtian-style 
polis emerge whenever there is concerted action taken by groups who are striving for 
justice such as Occupy Wall Street, the Arab Spring, or the Idle No More movement in 
Canada. When people come together over common cause, they discover the strength that 
comes from collective action. This is why Arendt contends it is possible for a small group 
of concerted individuals to overthrow a dictatorship. Collective power has a libratory 
quality because it is through the medium of collective action that a committed group of 
people can topple dictators.  
1.5.2 Social Conformity 
For Arendt, there is another form of rule that is contrary to human flourishing and that is 
social conformism, which results in an inability to respect and foster uniqueness. In her 
view, social conformism is a modern phenomenon that arose in the eighteenth century.
96
 
Rather than equality for all, it created a kind of no-man rule where society dictates what 
we do, and how we think. Within this framework, action became subservient to behaviour 
because we do what is expected of us. We obey and do our duty. In our desire for 
acceptance, we risk turning away from our personal values to embrace social standards. 
When this happens we become unclear as to our moral responsibility to take a stance 
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against injustice. For Arendt, “rules of uniqueness and exclusiveness are, and always will 
be, in conflict with the standards of society.”
97
 Seen in this way, individual freedom, 
understood as a right to uniqueness, is curtailed whenever we believe we are all equal, 
but fail to take into account that we are all equally distinct.  
For Arendt, the fundamental aspect of freedom is connected with the ability to speak and 
act in the public realm. I suggest, however, that social conformity is counterproductive to 
a deeper notion of authenticity since, rather than a world of unique others, what we have 
is a regulatory framework of policies and procedures. This we see constantly in the 
twenty-first century workplace as concepts such as risk management are put in place so 
as to tighten up institutional practices. In the introduction, I questioned why it is that 
authentic leadership has emerged as a topic of interest. Could it be that a guiding motif of 
our time is that of distrust, not only of leaders but of each other? A society of distrust 
emerges, in tandem with a penchant for instrumental modes of thinking, and may result in 
a lack of caring for others. But I am not sure that, in its current form, authentic leadership 
is able to offer us the guidance we need to create a more harmonious society.  
In this section, I have argued that thinking with Arendt reveals some of the negative 
implications with leadership theories that purport to be about authentic relationships but 
are based on quantitative measurement that ignore broader questions regarding care, and 
highlight the problems with conformity.  
We need to consider authenticity through a different lens in order to obtain a more 
rounded view of leadership. In the following section, I want to concentrate on women and 
leadership. 
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1.6  Women and Leadership 
 Arendt referred to herself as old-fashioned when it came to her views about women 
leaders. In response to an interview question from Günter Gaus, she stated: “It just 
doesn’t look good when a woman gives orders. She should try not to get into such a 
situation if she wants to remain feminine.”
98
 Her bias against women leaders is still 
commonplace in society, as a recent survey points out.
99
 It seems that even in the twenty-
first century a significant percentage of employees state their preference for a male boss. 
In this section, I want to explore feminist accounts that critique authentic leadership. 
Before doing so, I wish to briefly consider earlier feminist critiques of work.  
In looking at feminist critiques of organizational behaviour, Joan Acker contends that 
second-wave feminists “denounced bureaucracy and hierarchy as male-created and male-
dominated structures of control.”
100
An integral part of second-wave feminists’ desire for 
change in the workplace was, she states, the creation of organizations that would operate 
in non-hierarchical ways. Instead of a new kind of workplace, however, the results were 
more of the same, that is, a number of women leaders acted as badly as some of their 
male counterparts. Partly, this was because, as Dorothy Smith maintains,
101
 there were no 
models available for feminists to rethink organizational structures. Therefore, it was 
difficult to create an organization model outside of the normative framework.  
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These earlier feminist critiques are still pertinent to current problems. For instance, 
although gender segregation has altered, change is not the same across the workforce, 
according to Paula England.
102
 While middle-class women have made substantial gains 
in professions such as medicine and law there is virtually no change for women in 
traditional blue-collar jobs. She suggests that middle-class women chose to go into male 
professions so as to gain financial reward and status, rather than follow their mothers into 
more traditional feminine occupations, such as teaching. This has resulted in the 
continued devaluation of traditional women’s work.
103
 Moreover, in fields, such as social 
work or nursing, there has not been a notable increase in male students because social 
discrimination is greater for men who choose to pursue female professions. Those men 
who choose traditional female occupations are faced with a lack of status, financial 
rewards, as well as social disapproval. Hence England argues there is little incentive for 
men to change careers. One reason for this continuing gender segregation is that there has 
been no substantial change in social ideas regarding heterosexual relationships. Rather, 
the private realm reaffirms gender inequality, which has ongoing implications for the 
workplace in general, and women’s leadership in particular.  
Stereotypical ideas about gender also continue to affect women’s ability to reach equal 
pay, as well as hamper their advancement to higher positions. According to Linda Carli 
and Alice Eagly, in 2009 American women who worked full-time earned 80% of the 
male wage in comparison with 62% in 1979.
104
 In examining why this gender disparity 
still exists, they maintain that there is still demonstrable opposition toward women 
leaders at the higher echelons of organizational life. As an example in Europe, the United 
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States and Canada, women make up less than 20% of senior corporate executives.
105
 
Paradoxically, Carli and Eagly argue that women exert greater influence when they 
exhibit lower levels of competence than they actually possess. As a way of gaining 
notice, it appears that some women ask for help from their male colleagues when such 
guidance is not required. Moreover, while male leaders do well by being agentic, women 
must appeal to communal ideals to be seen as successful leaders. Hence, a relational 
approach may actually work against a woman leader, since it reinforces gender 
stereotypes.  
Eagly adopted the term “relational authenticity”
 106
 to describe how leaders can promote 
social values that followers buy into. Leadership depends upon encouraging others to 
share your vision so as to work together for shared values. While many leadership 
scholars have previously assumed that followers are persuaded by leader’s words, Eagly 
maintains that there is often contestation between a leader’s belief and a community’s 
willingness to buy in. Followers need to believe not just that the leader has values, but 
that these values will benefit the community as a whole. During the last decade, she has 
conducted a series of longitudinal studies on women and leadership. Her research 
findings suggest that when women are initially hired to lead an institution, they may act 
differently than their male counterparts because of their different value commitments. 
Over the long term, however, this gender difference tends to dissipate. So while female 
leaders may be more vigilant in regards to business ethics, this gender difference may 
disappear the longer a woman is in a position of leadership. This is a problem, since if 
women leaders take up similar ways of acting to men, then, while gender equity may be 
helped, organizations will not be transformed. Similarly, Barbara Kellerman and Deborah 
Rhode argue that “the great man” leadership model still acts as a significant barrier for 
                                                 
105
 A recent survey by Catalyst in June 2013 shows that while 47.5% of the Canadian workforce 
is female, only 5.5% are CEO’s or top earners. Other research by Catalyst in the United States 
confirms Eagly and Carli’s findings that after gains in the 1990s, there is little movement for 
women gaining access to corporate leadership. See their various reports at 
http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge, accessed July 5, 2013. 
106
  Eagly, "Relational Authenticity," 463. Her work was mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
39 
 
women.
107
 These authors concur with Eagly that placing certain women in powerful 
positions will not lead to the empowerment of women as a group.  
In striving for equality in the workplace what has happened is that women’s limited 
ascension to top leadership posts has been conceived in terms of representation when, in 
reality, what is needed is a troubling of organizational structures. This is one reason why 
Jill Blackmore and Judith Sachs state that although individual women may have 
benefitted from leadership opportunities on the whole, gender relations have remained the 
same.
108
 They call for new research on women’s leadership that shines a light on 
organizational practices. By considering structural issues, alongside gender relations, it 
may become apparent how bureaucracies are intolerant of difference. For example, in 
considering the changing educational landscape and the move toward entrepreneurialism 
within universities, Blackmore and Sachs maintain there is a greater emphasis on 
similarity in understanding, and an expected commitment to corporate goals, especially 
amongst senior management.
 
Practices of conformity are evident in the way people dress, 
in the rituals of meetings, and the symbolic use of space. Who is allocated the best 
location, or the biggest office, serves to reinforce institutional hierarchy, and offers 
spatial insight into power dynamics. Consequently, these scholars suggests that the 
“ongoing whiteness and maleness of educational, political, business, and community 
leadership is not about gender, but is a problem for democracy.”
109
  
Currently, in the educational sector, there is a massive push to corporatize higher 
education. Critics like Blackmore contend that such restructuring puts the emphasis on 
what are perceived to be masculine ideas of efficiency, accountability and outcomes, over 
less instrumental feminized leadership discourses. The problem, however, is that these 
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feminized versions, in turn, may serve to constrain women’s leadership, because women 
lead in different ways. As well, Louise Morley suggests that it is important to distinguish 
between women and feminists in academic leadership. She further argues that feminist 
leaders must be willing “to challenge unequal distributions and exercise of power, 
hierarchical structures and decision-making processes and discriminatory institutional 
practices.”110 In her view, it is the gendered world that is the problem. Yet I am 
somewhat uncomfortable with the idea that feminists lead in a particular manner. While it 
might be heartwarming to think in these terms, we need to remember that uniqueness is 
constantly covered over by social practices and ideological ways of thinking. And this 
includes some strains of feminism.  
One way to try and overcome structural challenges and gendered biases in higher 
education, according to Rita Bornstein, is for women leaders to monitor their own 
attitudes so as not to reinforce traditional stereotypes. As the first female Jewish president 
of Rollins College she knows, from personal experience, how difficult it can be to 
achieve presidential legitimacy. At the beginning of her tenure, Bornstein describes how 
she experienced a great deal of hostility. For example, one senior administrator stated that 
the College was not ready for a Jewish president, let alone a woman.
111
 She further 
contends that presidents face constant challenges to their moral leadership. For example, 
a president may have to suppress her personal views so as to uphold the values of the 
institution. But there is, in her view, a lack of information regarding the relationship 
between leadership, gender and ethics, which is vital if women leaders wish to address 
structural inequities.
112
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It is important to understand structural power dynamics, and realize that we have agency 
to resist institutional norms to some degree. The problem is that over time, social and 
cultural systems work to ensure women either do not get power, or do not believe that 
they possess it. According to Amanda Sinclair, feelings of “powerlessness are historically 
substantiated.”
113
 This is not to see women as victims, but to recognize how past 
injustices may influence present behaviour. She advocates blending the personal with the 
professional so as to obtain a deeper understanding of how one’s earlier education and 
family dynamics may help, or hinder, one’s leadership. Understanding personal history 
can be useful in explaining why so many senior leadership teams, rather than disagree 
with the leader, tend to be conformist in their attitudes.  
But there are other contradictions at work. For example, while people often say that they 
want to work in a caring environment, it appears that most people state a preference to be 
led by strong leaders who may posit non-caring attributes, since this is often perceived as 
successful leadership behaviour. This role incongruity works against women leaders in 
two ways. First, prejudice takes the form of perceiving women as being out of place in a 
leadership role. In general terms, she is perceived to have less agentic qualities because of 
her gender. Second, if a woman behaves in a manner that fulfills common expectations of 
leadership behaviour, for instance, by being assertive, she is evaluated in a negative way 
because her action is perceived as inappropriate, perhaps even inauthentic behaviour for 
women.
114
 For this situation to alter, Eagly and Karau maintain that there has to be major 
societal change, not only in the way that most people perceive gender relations, but also 
in how we conceptualize leadership. 
It appears that women leaders face a double-bind in that while employees say they want 
to work in a caring environment, they do not want leaders who exhibit a caring 
demeanour, because this is perceived as a sign of weakness. This equation of caring with 
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weakness reinforces the belief that we need strong, independent leaders. Yet, according 
to Paul Begley, it is only through caring for the values of others that authentic leadership 
can occur.
115
 But it may be difficult for men, as well as women, to lead in a way they 
perceive as caring. From her interviews with male and female presidents, Pamela Eddy 
illustrates how leaders have problems when they attempt to “transgress” gender 
appropriate ways of acting.
116
 She describes a situation where a male president espoused 
a team-based approach. Rather than seeing him as an inclusive leader, faculty perceived 
him as weak. Thus, Eddy suggests that people still judge success from an outdated, 
autocratic, model of leadership that makes it difficult for leaders to deviate from the 
gender norm.  
Another issue to consider relates to scholarship. For example, most research in 
organizational leadership, according to Jennifer Binns and Deborah Kerfoot, is “saturated 
with embodied masculinity.”
117
 But this is a particular kind of masculinity that views 
leadership as mastery, which merely perpetuates unequal power relationships. Similarly, 
Beverly Irby and others argue that leadership theory fails to include “feminine presence 
or voice.”
118
 Increasingly, however, there are challenges to this way of thinking about 
leadership. For instance, Yvonne Due Billing and Matts Alvesson argue that earlier 
feminist work reproduced gendered dichotomies by suggesting that women leaders lead 
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differently.
119
 Much of the scholarship on women’s leadership that was conducted in the 
1980s and 1990s, they argue, became mired in the nature/nurture dispute. Such an 
approach to leadership does not fully explain how normative assumptions regarding 
leadership reinforce gender prejudice. Instead, we need to rethink notions of masculinity 
and femininity as culturally created and reiterated bodily practices.  
In a similar vein, Michèle Bowring notes that leadership research that suggests that 
women lead differently from men serves to reaffirm dualistic thinking. All this does is 
reinforce dominant modes of thinking about gender relations. It is thus not enough to 
“lean in” and bring one’s whole self to work, as Sheryl Sandberg asserts, because this 
does little to explain how structural inequities work.
120
 Furthermore, her assertion that 
authentic communication is akin to that which takes place on Facebook serves to show 
how authenticity is often perceived in a superficial way. What we see here is a flattening 
of a deeper sense of authentic connection in favour of superficial forms of relating. What 
we need is a more nuanced theoretical approach that takes into account intersectional 
identity as well as lived experience.
121
  
One aspect that is not sufficiently critiqued, according to Jennifer Binns, is the notion that 
confidence is always a good for leadership. She contends that a leader’s desire for self-
certainty may negate ethical transformation, since creating ethical relationships means 
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being open to doubt.
122
 While confidence is perceived as vital to a particular kind of 
masculine leadership, being open to doubt can overturn the dominant leadership “script” 
by providing an openness to consider different perspectives, and create new possibilities. 
A relational approach to leadership allows a person to not only acknowledge, but learn 
from mistakes.
123
 Perhaps it is through an attention to relationships that combines a 
desire for equality and justice with mutual responsibility and care that we may work 
toward a different approach toward authenticity in leadership. By acknowledging 
contingency, as well as lived experience, we may be able to think further about the 
conditions for an ethical leadership praxis. Such an ethical leadership practice may run 
counter to the specific dimensions that represent authentic leadership. To think this 
further, we must be willing to engage in an open enquiry that is receptive to opposing 
views, and tries to take into account situational context. This is what I hope thinking with 
Arendt may provide.  
1.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have examined the concept of authentic leadership, and its relationship 
to gender. I have shown how this theory tends to focus on certain dimensions of leading 
that serve to preclude others. There is a desire to restrict authentic leadership to a 
discussion of four dimensions, namely, balanced information processing, relational 
transparency, internalized moral perspective and self-awareness. Moreover, there is an 
implicit assumption that authenticity is good for leadership. In their attempt to develop a 
universal theory of leadership, scholars privilege a particular kind of theoretical 
abstraction, which serves to deny the contingency of lived experience.  
Rather than arguing that authenticity in leadership is necessarily a good thing, we must be 
willing to interrogate the reasons why sometimes this might not be the case. This requires 
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us to critique prevailing power inequities rather than assuming that by adding authenticity 
to the mix, we will develop good leaders. Earlier, I posed the question - would a world 
populated by authentic leaders be a better one? While some leadership scholars presume 
that a world populated by authentic leaders would be a better one, history is littered with 
examples of leaders who have been certain they are right, only to be found terribly 
wanting by posterity when the untold suffering of their single-minded belief, and the 
untold suffering caused to others, is taken into consideration. Thus we need to be willing 
to question whether authenticity is necessarily good for leadership.  
I have suggested that thinking with Arendt may help to uncover some of the inherent 
problems with the discourse of authentic leadership, especially the ways in which a focus 
on leadership that privileges self-knowledge can be detrimental. I have argued that some 
scholars fail to interrogate the multifarious ways in which the intersections of identity 
have a bearing, not only on leadership, but on what it means to be true to ourselves. Put 
simply, a focus on the self can lead to a disconnection from the world, which may have 
negative implications for a pluralistic society. Moreover, ignoring the intersubjective 
dimension of everyday life can result in leaders becoming separated from everyday 
concerns, and acting in self-indulgent ways to the detriment of everyone else. Thinking 
with Arendt may illuminate some hidden consequences that arise from leadership that is 
self-oriented. In addition, her theory of uniqueness reveals how our relationships and 
forms of mutual responsiveness are central to existence. By seeing leadership in 
relational terms that weaves together diverse perspectives, her work opens up fruitful 
avenues of investigation. As such, Arendt provides us with an alternative ethical guide to 
considering the place of authenticity in leadership.  
I have also argued that social conformity and ideas regarding gender normativity 
negatively influence how we approach leadership. In trying to fit in, some women choose 
to assimilate to dominant styles of leadership. While assimilation may seem a sensible 
route, it may lead to a perpetuation of structural inequality. We need to comprehend how 
the many skeins of social, political, historical and cultural forces have a profound bearing 
on our thinking about leadership. If, as I argue, gender prejudice is embedded in the 
Western cultural imagination, then it may prove fruitful to turn to history to see what 
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effects this had on women’s ability to lead, as well as gendered notions of authenticity. 
This will be the main topic of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2  
2  Enlightened Virtue 
In a famous essay written in 1784, Immanuel Kant argued that it is only when a man is 
free to make his own choices that he can be said to be enlightened.
124
 In his opinion, 
“enlightened” freedom was composed of three components: the ability to think for 
oneself; the ability to think from the standpoint of others; and, lastly, the capacity to think 
and act in concert with one’s beliefs. In this chapter, I explore how these ideas about 
enlightened freedom relate to women, and look at the effect this had on notions of 
authenticity and leadership. I focus on Western Europe, since this was where modern 
ideas surrounding authenticity were initially formulated. In tracing authenticity’s modern 
underpinnings to the emergence of bourgeois selfhood, I show how women’s desire to 
lead was affected by notions of gender propriety. My main thesis is that Enlightenment 
notions of virtue worked to constrain women’s autonomy, and limited their ideas about 
their own possibilities. In examining Enlightenment ideas regarding the construction of 
the liberal subject, I argue that gendered notions of what constituted “right” conduct 
served to enhance men’s freedom while, simultaneously, restricting women’s agency. 
This is evident in a guiding bourgeois motif of the time that “the sons of reason should 
converse only with the daughters of virtue.”125  
Gendered ideas concerning what constitutes virtuous action served to instruct, and divide, 
men and women, and placed restrictions on women’s ability to regard themselves as 
leaders within the socio-political sphere. I argue that gendered notions of virtue were a 
way for bourgeois society to redefine its moral standards in opposition to their 
aristocratic counterparts, whom they considered to be immoral. These bourgeois attitudes 
toward virtue encouraged a separation of gender roles. While for a man virtue was 
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exemplified by his character, for a woman her social reputation was regarded as more 
important than her character. The effects of this gendered discourse regarding virtue, 
alongside women’s economic dependency and lack of political and legal rights, served to 
constrain women’s possibilities. Whereas bourgeois man viewed himself as a relatively 
free agent within an increasingly competitive public realm, bourgeois woman was 
defined by her marital and maternal roles. This had the effect of restricting women’s 
sphere of influence to the domain of the domestic, whilst men were able to develop a 
more expansive existence through the public sphere of action, ideas and adventure. These 
spatial differences between what was considered appropriate action and behaviour had an 
adverse effect on the way that women conceived of their agency. To an extent, as I 
argued in chapter one, these spatial restrictions still bear a trace on the cultural 
imagination, to the extent that many women do not perceive themselves as leaders. 
In the eighteenth century, as the rights of middle-class men were being espoused, 
women’s freedom became increasingly restrained by social conventions, as indicated by 
Rousseau’s popular phrase that women were “born to obey.”126 One way that this lived 
obedience manifested itself was through gendered ideas about caring. For women, caring 
for others, rather than the self, became regarded as the epitome of feminine virtue. As 
well, carefulness became the watchword for women, as they learned how important it 
was not just to be selfless, but to ensure that any pretension to talent was kept quiet. This 
dual legacy of obedience and selflessness impeded most women’s sense of possibility, 
and affected adversely their ability to see themselves, and be perceived, as leaders outside 
the domestic sphere. Taken together, these social and cultural restrictions served to limit 
most women’s ability to see themselves as leaders outside of the domestic realm. 
However, it would be wrong to suggest that these social dictates proved insurmountable. 
There were examples of women who were courageous enough to brave public censure in 
order to become involved in political debate, although these women remain the 
exception.  
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The historian Joan Scott contends that we need to examine gender in its historical context 
so as to see how, as a phenomenon, gender is “produced, reproduced and transformed in 
different situations and over time.”
127
 In order to obtain a fuller account of the 
phenomenon of gender as it relates to authenticity and leadership in the Enlightenment, I 
shall explore the life and work of particular thinkers, as well as the wider social, legal and 
political restrictions on women’s lives. As part of my argument, I compare the work of 
Enlightenment thinkers to gain a deeper understanding of the gendered discourse of 
virtue.  
After briefly laying out some pertinent historical information, I begin with a discussion of 
Montesquieu’s Persian Letters, which represents a veiled critique of the French court as 
well as an attack on social hypocrisy. Through his description of a changing Parisian 
society we observe how, due to the vagaries of modernity, people’s social roles were 
more fluid than in the past. This social flexibility produced not only a sense of hope, but 
also increased anxiety. Building upon this discussion, I turn to the 1760’s and Denis 
Diderot’s withering critique of Parisian society in Rameau’s Nephew. In this work, he 
captured some of the contradictions implicit in a moral versus immoral view of the world. 
Next, I consider the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. His writing heralds a new way of 
thinking about authenticity that places the emphasis on a gendered self. Rousseau’s 
writing was influential, not only in terms of the development of modern notions of the 
self, but also in regard to the formation of gender roles. For instance, he argued that 
“everything that men and women have in common belongs to the species, and [that] 
everything that distinguishes them belongs to the sex.”128 In his view, this gender 
difference should form the basis of moral relationships. Here we see a significant gender 
dichotomy in relation to questions of authenticity. On the one hand, what constitutes 
authenticity for a man was his strength of character. For a woman, on the other hand, it 
was for others to judge her authenticity, or lack thereof. In effect, a woman’s role was 
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performative, that is, she had to be seen to be virtuous. It was being perceived by others 
as virtuous that was the most important element of a woman’s claim to authenticity. 
In relation to gendered notions of virtue, I want to consider what happens when the 
Enlightenment challenge to think for oneself runs contrary to social mores. This 
predicament emerges whenever women try to gain a political voice so as to fight for 
gender justice. To explore this in more depth, I look at two women who exhibited 
leadership qualities on the political stage so as to demonstrate what happens when a 
woman’s political action is in opposition to society’s dictates regarding female virtue. 
The first woman I discuss is Mary Wollstonecraft, who came to be regarded as notorious 
because of her outspokenness and perceived lack of moral decorum. The second example 
of female leadership is that exemplified by Olympe de Gouges. During the French 
Revolution, she fought against the establishment of a political system that espoused 
liberty while restricting access for women to the political sphere.  
Any woman courageous enough to cross the gender divide was regarded in one of two 
ways. She was either treated as a figure of scorn, exemplified by Horace Walpole’s 
phrase “hyenas in petticoats,”
129
 indicating that her action was unbecoming to their sex. 
Or she was regarded as having a masculine mind and, thus being different from other 
women. This was the case with Mary Wollstonecraft, who was known affectionately, in 
her circle of acquaintances, only by her last name. She became, in effect, “one of the 
boys.” Olympe de Gouges was also called a “male woman.”
130
 But in her case, this 
masculine identification was an attempt by her detractors to show that her action was 
unfeminine. Whenever women were brave enough to risk public censure, they were 
accused of acting in a manner inappropriate to female conduct. This gender prejudice had 
a negative effect on women’s ability to speak and act in the public realm that, according 
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to Arendt, is crucial to freedom. But it is not just gender that is affected by social 
constraints. Later in the chapter, I examine Arendt’s biography of Rahel Varnhagen, 
where we see how Varnhagen’s desire for social assimilation was a result of ethnic and 
religious prejudice.  
In exploring issues relating to authenticity within a Western historical context, there are 
two interconnected threads that I perceive as worthy of attention. First, eighteenth-
century commentators expressed concern regarding what they viewed as a divergence 
between being and appearance, that is, the gap between what is and what seems to be. 
Second, rapid changes taking place in society led to confusion and anxiety over who one 
could trust. Whether a person was or was not who they purported to be was of increasing 
concern as traditional roles disappeared. Indeed, we cannot conceive of eighteenth-
century notions of authenticity without considering the effects of social hypocrisy. In this 
regard, I discuss Arendt’s insights into what she calls the rise of “the social.” The social 
realm that emerged during the eighteenth century was, for her, a sphere of inauthenticity 
because social dictates serve to encourage the standardization of human behavior. Rather 
than the agonistic nature of the Greek polis, which Arendt regards as a genuine space of 
appearance because citizens were able to enter into dialogue and debate, in the eighteenth 
century different mechanisms were used to contain the full range of opinion. One 
mechanism that suppressed public debate was the strict censorship enforced in France 
and Prussia, which worked to deny political and social alternatives to the absolute rule of 
the monarch. Another mechanism was the tyranny of social decorum, which privileged 
assimilation over the outward expression of differences of opinion. We will see how both 
aspects of tyranny negatively affect the realization of freedom, especially for women.  
During the Enlightenment, ideas about freedom fomented social and political dissent. But 
while the ability to speak and act was touted as fundamental to “enlightened” freedom, 
the problem was that, for the majority of the population, full access to the public sphere 
was denied. Through political and legal definitions, freedom was restricted to the 
fortunate few, that is, men of property. In addition, one of the harmful legacies of the 
Enlightenment, for Arendt, was that people thought about equality in abstract terms. This 
had a negative effect on anyone who did not fit the ideal notion of citizen. Herein lies 
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some of the contradictions associated with the notion of the equal citizen, since it is based 
on an abstract idea that does not take difference into consideration. Instead of being 
regarded as a unique “who” which, in Arendt’s view, is a necessary component of the full 
expression of human existence, people are regarded for what they are. We will see how a 
person’s social location, particularly their gender, could curtail their freedom. 
As I showed in chapter one, a person’s social role is but one component of what 
constitutes an individual. It is the sum total of a person’s experiences, together with their 
social location – their race, class, sexuality, gender, and so forth – that makes up who we 
are. Today, we recognize that social factors such as class, race, sexuality and disability 
play a part in influencing how a person is regarded by others, sometimes in a 
discriminatory way. In eighteenth-century Europe, however, such factors were deemed 
irrelevant to the public sphere. So while economic and social disparities make a 
difference to how a person may experience the world, these social distinctions often went 
unnoticed by others. In On Revolution, Arendt argues that while the Founding Fathers in 
America debated what constituted equality of rights for citizens, it never occurred to them 
to ask those whom they saw every day about their views.
131
 Here, I am referring to the 
working poor, slaves and women. The reason why their views were deemed irrelevant 
was that, unlike propertied men, they had no political rights. Since this is a large topic to 
which I cannot do justice, I omit important aspects such as ideas of empire and slavery 
from this discussion. Instead, I concentrate on the gendered discourse of virtue and its 
influence upon ideas concerning gender, authenticity and leadership.  
In the next section, I offer an overview of some socio-historical changes taking place at 
this time, and their effect on the emergence of new ways of thinking about morality. 
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2.1 Changing Values 
In 1750, London was the largest European city with 750,000 inhabitants, while Paris was 
the second biggest metropolis with approximately half a million inhabitants.
132
 Many 
middle-class inhabitants of these cities benefited from the wealth amassed from trade and 
commercial expansion. For the fortunate few, there was a greater luxury in terms of the 
quality and quantity of goods available.
133
 The power and prestige that resulted from this 
new wealth created through trade influenced both public and private life. With their new 
wealth, the middle-class gained enhanced social status and, over time, political 
legitimacy. As the middle-class in Western Europe gained greater political and social 
status, new ideas emerged concerning what constituted good taste.
134
 For example, rather 
than the large banquets of the past, smaller social gatherings became popular. These 
kinds of intimate gatherings complemented the emphasis on good manners and 
sociability, especially through polite and witty conversation, as we will see later in the 
discussion of the salon.
135
  
At the same time, the popularization of scientific discoveries began to challenge 
traditional ways of thinking, and undermine religious beliefs. In England, along with 
Protestantism, new religious sects, such as the Quakers and Methodists, placed an 
emphasis on the relationship between the individual and God. Self-understanding was 
seen as a private affair, which should not be regulated by priests. These social and 
political changes, as Charles Lindholm notes, brought about the “erosion of a sacred 
                                                 
132
 Richard Sennett, Fall of Public Man (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), 50. 
133
 Sennett, Public Man, 50. 
134
 Taste was also crucial to an understanding of judgement for Kant, which we will see in 
chapter three is important to Arendt’s thought, especially in relation to understanding. 
135
 My discussion here is informed by Sennett’s discussion in Public Man. When reading Sennett 
I saw similarities between his work and Arendt’s, thus I was not surprised to learn that he was a 
former student of hers. For more on this topic, see Finn Bowring, Hannah Arendt: A Critical 
Introduction (London: Pluto Press, 2011), 151. 
54 
 
hierarchy, the fragmentation of roles, and the sense of a loss of significance.” 136 Indeed, 
judging a person’s integrity, or lack thereof, became difficult as people’s social roles 
were less well-defined. Increased social mobility, as a result of urbanization and 
economic expansion, led to a greater anxiety regarding whom one could trust.  
Coincidentally, as Lionel Trilling points out, a desire for authenticity arose out of a 
perceived need for greater sincerity in social relationships.
137
 This search for authenticity 
was thus both a response to the vagaries of modernity and a way to define middle-class 
morals from those of the aristocracy. The middle-class sought to set themselves apart 
from the aristocracy, whom they regarded as irreligious and immoral. These bourgeois 
notions of morality were intrinsically connected to beliefs about gender differences. For 
example, the idea that middle-class women had a heightened, or more refined, sense of 
morality began to take root, and was to have a profound influence on a woman’s ability 
and desire to go against social “norms.” For women, individual action was curtailed by 
what was deemed appropriate social behaviour, with the result that, as Chris Roulston 
notes, the Enlightenment quest for self-knowledge was not “who am I?” but rather “who 
must I not be?”138 
Questions regarding role-playing became commonplace and observers noted how 
eighteenth-century city life in Paris and London resembled a stage. Richard Sennett 
contends that the metaphorical use of theatrum mundi served to acknowledge the 
operations of illusion within society.
139
 We can see the phenomenon of role-playing 
emerging through the eighteenth-century popularity with masquerades, and the 
enthusiasm with which the body was perceived as a mannequin to be adorned with exotic 
costumes. A fascination with role-playing was also apparent in the increasing appeal of 
                                                 
136
 Charles Lindholm, Culture and Authenticity (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 4. This is also 
pertinent to Arendt’s argument as I pointed out in chapter one. 
137
 Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 1972. 
138
 Chris Roulston, Virtue, Gender, and the Authentic Self in Eighteenth-Century Fiction: 
Richardson, Rousseau, and Laclos (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998), 187. 
139
 Sennett, Public Man.  
55 
 
the theatre. Indeed, the ability for an actor to transform himself into a character was 
regarded with wonder by philosophes, such as Diderot. He viewed great actors as having 
an exceptional ability to distill the essence of human feelings. But not everyone shared 
Diderot’s enthusiasm for the theatre. In fact, Rousseau saw theatres as having a 
corrupting influence because it encouraged artifice. For some middle-class 
commentators, a fascination with artifice was regarded as contrary to the proper, moral 
values of the emerging middle-class. For others, such as Immanuel Kant, this collective 
role-playing could prove positive for society, since although a person may start by acting, 
he thought that virtues would ultimately become part of an actor’s disposition.
140
  
Through this brief review of some of the emerging trends in eighteenth-century Western 
Europe, we begin to see a pattern emerging. As well as economic expansion, there were 
social and political changes occurring, as the aristocracy begins to lose its place to the 
middle-class, whose increasing wealth gave them a say in political affairs. However, 
these social and political changes differed depending upon each country. In the next 
section, I want to look at how three different writers - Montesquieu, Diderot and 
Rousseau - chart the changes that are taking place in France. 
2.2 Exploring Freedom – Montesquieu’s Persian Letters  
One of the first eighteenth-century writers to explore the connection between the artifice 
of social life and its effects on human nature was Montesquieu in Persian Letters, an 
epistolary work published in 1721. Putting Montesquieu’s work into historical context, 
we note that the early 1700’s were a time of social unrest in France. During this period, 
France was primarily an agrarian society. As a consequence of Northern Europe’s ‘little 
ice-age,’141 there was a series of poor harvests. Crop failures led to a devastating famine 
in 1707, and a peasant revolt ensued. While this revolt was quelled by government forces, 
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little assistance was offered to those people most devastated by the famine. This disregard 
for the plight of the poor was to have major repercussions later in the century.  
Until 1715, France was ruled by the conservative monarch Louis XIV. Together with the 
Catholic Church, the Monarchy kept a tight check on the spread of “radical” ideas. This 
State and religious censorship made it difficult for writers to disseminate their thoughts. 
In contrast to France, England and Scotland had a flourishing public arena, and had 
entered a period of scientific and artistic revitalization. Following Louis XIV’s death, 
Philippe d’Orléans, the new Regent in France, instigated major changes. An Anglophile, 
he wanted to bring a new spirit of learning to encourage artistic and scientific advances in 
France. As part of his desire for cultural change, the Court moved from Versailles to 
Paris, which became the centre of intellectual activity in France.
142
  
In Persian Letters, Montesquieu investigates how these changes in the political order 
were influencing social ideas. Through his comparison of two different locations – 
Parisian society in the early 1700’s and the fictional depiction of a Seraglio in Persia - 
Montesquieu explores how social pretensions can negatively influence human behaviour. 
He contrasts the static environment of the Seraglio, where everyone’s life is controlled by 
their fixed roles, with that of the fluidity of Paris, which is regarded as a place of 
transformation, not just of society, but also of the self. Montesquieu’s main characters in 
the book are two Persian visitors, the tyrant Usbek and his servant Rica. They act as 
dispassionate observers of Parisian society, which they find lacking in moral substance. 
In their letters, they comment on the differences between the Parisians they meet and 
their own society. They note the discrepancy between what people say and how they act. 
In one letter, Usbek comments: “I see people here arguing endlessly about religion; but at 
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the same time they seem to be competing over who can observe it the least.”143 What 
Montesquieu highlights here is the difference between what people profess to believe in, 
and how they actually act. In another letter, Rica describes how, when dressed in his 
Persian costume, he was the centre of attention. Adorned in Parisian garments, however, 
he finds himself ignored by the very people who had previously found him so fascinating. 
In questioning the relationship between a man and his outward appearance, Rica wonders 
what effect this might have on a person’s moral attitude. He comments, “if clothing and 
manners make the external man will the inner man change to follow suit?"
144
 Similarly, at 
a dinner party, Rica overhears two men conspire on how they can appear witty by 
laughing at each other’s jokes. Reflecting on their artifice, he contends that these men’s 
"performance displays conviction in the notion that only appearance is authenticity."
145
 
What becomes apparent to the visitors is an inconsistency in people’s words and deeds.  
In highlighting the false manners of a young woman, Rica says “her gravest concern is 
not to have a good time, but to look as if she’s having a good time.”146 Here Montesquieu 
points to the superficial nature of French society and how this woman acts in a way she 
thinks others will approve. In his letters, Usbek expressed disgust at what he perceives as 
the shamelessness of women’s dress and behaviour. Because of their perceived lack of 
propriety in dress and decorum, Rica quips that “Frenchmen hardly ever talk about their 
wives; they’re afraid to speak of them in front of men who know them better than they do 
themselves.”147 The women in French society are regarded as immodest; they are judged 
as promiscuous as a result of how they dress. In addition to observing the dubious morals 
of Parisian society, the Persian visitors are appalled at the profound social inequalities 
they witness. Usbek observes that for one man to lead the life of an epicure, a hundred 
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others must work to satisfy his desire for indolence.
148
 While he makes disparaging 
comments on the inequities of French society, Usbek refuses to examine the inequalities 
that exist in his own culture.  
Although various wives write declaring their passionate love for him, Usbek exhibits a 
growing anxiety that they might not continue to obey him. The longer he resides in Paris, 
the more Usbek realizes that a society based on obedience is devoid of genuine 
relationships because there is no personal autonomy. Yet this knowledge affords him 
little enlightenment, since he is reluctant to change the social order in Persia, even though 
his power affords him no contentment. What is common to both cultures is that women 
are perceived as the property of men.  
Paradoxically, however, through sharing information about the different social 
relationships that exist in Paris, it is Uzbek’s wives who, in gaining knowledge about 
different ways of living, choose to revolt against their own condition. Usbek is 
incredulous to learn of the emerging anarchic disorder in the Seraglio, and is especially 
distraught to learn that his favourite wife, Roxana, has committed adultery. In her last 
letter to him, Roxana explains that she is about to commit suicide by swallowing poison. 
Before she dies, however, she wants Usbek to know her real feelings for him. She writes: 
“How could you suppose me so credulous as to believe that the sole purpose for my 
existence was to adore your caprices? That while you refused yourself nothing, you had 
the right to frustrate every desire of mine?”149 Although it appeared that she was content 
to submit to his desires, Roxana had felt very differently. Her deceit enabled her to live as 
she chose which, in this case, meant taking a lover. Roxana maintains that her “mind has 
always remained independent.”
150
 While her external role was that of obedient wife and 
servant, her portrayal of modesty had been an act she adopted so as to obtain her own 
desires.  
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In the fictional Seraglio, each person has a fixed role, subject to one man’s rule. Social 
mores are dependent upon the ruler’s whim. Montesquieu sets up this spatial contrast so 
as to question whether the world of the Seraglio is really that different from that of Paris. 
He suggests that both societies are overly dependent upon the dictates of the ruler. In 
societies run by tyrants, it seems that people are more inclined to do what they think they 
should, rather than what they wish to do. One way this is demonstrated is through the 
ways in which public opinion oscillates as “the French change their ways according to the 
age of their king.”151 But when people acquiesce to a leader’s desires, or to the dictates of 
social morality, they risk losing their capacity to think for themselves and, concomitantly, 
compromise their freedom. Here, as Marshall Berman notes, Montesquieu suggests that a 
ruler’s freedom depends upon his willingness to treat others in a caring manner.152 In the 
case of Usbek, however, to demonstrate his concern for his people would involve 
changing the power structure, something that he will not countenance, since it would 
mean relinquishing power. He prefers to rule by force and violence, even though he 
knows that his isolation as tyrant means that he is unhappy. 
To sum up, Montesquieu intimates that all people have a right to freedom.
153
 Those 
societies that refuse to offer their people freedom are tyrannies, not only for the slave, but 
also for the master. There can be no freedom for the ruler or servant in a hierarchical 
relationship. For Montesquieu, it is natural for people who have been oppressed to want 
to revolt. It is only by overturning the social order that both master and slave can achieve 
autonomy. While Persian Letters is often seen to be a satirical observation of the social 
mores that existed under the Regency of Philippe d’Orléans, it can also be read as a 
political allegory. The wives’ revolt serves a metaphorical function to show what may 
happen when a group organizes to defeat the social order. Montesquieu’s work was 
prescient, since the French tried to realise their freedom from political and social 
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repression through the French Revolution of 1789. In Persian Letters, Montesquieu 
makes us aware of two different kinds of tyranny: first that of autocratic rule and, second 
of social conformity. Both forms of tyranny can work to deny a person’s autonomy. We 
see that the potential for genuine relationships is constrained by what Arendt called ‘the 
no-man rule of society,’ and that of autocratic rule.
154
 In both instances, “we never see 
people as they are, but as they are constrained to be.”155  
I want to pause here to discuss this idea of social tyranny in more depth. In The Human 
Condition, Arendt maintains that the eighteenth-century concern with economics, 
together with the rise of statistics, encouraged the standardization of behaviour.
156
 Both 
monarchical rule and bourgeois capitalism lead to social conformism. The Enlightenment 
desire for an abstract notion of equality resulted in a denial of difference. Instead of 
dialogue and dissent between competing views, we see the move towards a social order 
where everyone is encouraged to behave in a particular manner. Arendt argued the 
modern world altered how people thought about the private and public realms. With the 
introduction of what she terms “the social,” aspects of what were previously deemed 
private concerns now appear in the public realm. She maintains that the bringing of what 
used to belong to the private, such as those activities that are part of the life process into 
the public realm, had a negative influence on the ability of people to excel. The bourgeois 
desire for conformity works to suppress excellence, and the type of action that Arendt 
argues is critical to human flourishing. When excellence fades from political life, in its 
place we have a standardization of behaviour, which serves to deny the full range of 
human experience and expression.  
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2.3 Rameau’s Nephew: An Exploration of Social Hypocrisy 
What constituted virtuous action was a topic of much contention in the eighteenth 
century. The philosophe Denis Diderot, for example, argued that it was the task of the 
artist to illustrate how vice is evil and virtue attractive.
157
 In the following discussion of 
his satire Rameau’s Nephew, we will see how the concept of virtue is explored through 
two very different perspectives. In this work, Diderot contrasts the virtuous man with the 
charlatan to illustrate contrasting ideas about the nature of virtue. The virtuous man is 
depicted in the character of “Moi,” while “Lui” represents a literary manifestation of 
selfishness.
158
 Published posthumously, Rameau’s Nephew is ostensibly based on a 
conversation between Diderot and Jean-Philippe Rameau, the nephew of a famous court 
musician. In brief, during the summer of 1761, Rameau lost his position as sycophant to 
the house of Bertinhus when, rather than lying, he chose to speak his mind.  
In their discussion, each character espouses a different opinion on virtue. For Lui the 
good life is about self-enjoyment, gained through wealth and prestige. For Moi, by 
contrast, virtuous living is defined through one’s relationships with others, which he 
regards as more important than social status or material goods. Lui and Moi disagree on 
most topics, including the value of Socrates dying for his beliefs. Moi argues that the 
judges erred when putting Socrates to death, showing that not all legal and ethical 
pronouncements stand the test of time. Lui counters by declaring that Socrates’ 
willingness to die for his principles was a futile act. What matters is to be rich and 
successful, and use whatever means necessary to obtain what you want, regardless of the 
cost to others. While Moi concurs with Lui that life’s pleasures are wonderful, he argues 
that there is an intrinsic difference between happiness and virtue. A virtuous life is 
preferable, Moi contends, since it is fulfilling to act morally, and to care about the welfare 
of others. In Lui’s opinion, such virtuous conduct is downright dull. In fact, he derides 
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the notion that there can be a one-size-fits-all notion of the good, which he regards as an 
eccentric idea, common to philosophers, but not applicable to eighteenth-century society. 
Instead, being immoral is the way to get ahead, declares Lui, and this is the reason why 
he is willing to play the dual role of sycophant and jester. As he observes: “Supposing 
virtue had been the road to fortune, either I should have been virtuous or I should have 
simulated virtue as well as the next man. But people wanted me to be ridiculous, and so I 
have made myself that way.”159 Lui justifies his sycophantic action as essential for social 
success. As he contends, “I say to myself: Be a hypocrite, by all means, but don’t talk 
like a hypocrite. Keep the vices that come in useful to you, but don’t have either the tone 
or the appearance, which would expose you to ridicule.”160 In adopting these diverse 
personae, Lui suggests that “I remain myself, but I act and speak as occasion requires.”161 
Indeed, he maintains that there is only one man who is free to do as he pleases - that is, 
the King. Everyone else, he argues, just strikes up a pose.  
Lui is a perfect example of a Machiavellian character who justifies his actions according 
to his desires, irrespective of their effect on others. Yet while Diderot depicts Lui as a 
man without scruples, he is also portrayed as an astute observer of social mores. For 
example, in their debate on education, Moi declares his intention to teach his daughter 
ethics. Lui derides this suggestion since, he asserts, ethical instruction is pointless for 
girls because it is only their attractiveness that counts in a society where beauty has far 
more cachet than virtue. Instead, he argues that if you want your child to succeed, you 
should offer them a modern education, and train them in the art of deceit. In bypassing 
moral instruction, Lui allows his son to develop naturally and observes, with fatherly 
pride, that his progeny “is already greedy, smooth, a thief, a waster and a liar.”162 This 
amoral education befits the times far more than Moi’s moral instruction.  
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In Rameau’s Nephew, Diderot shows how the trickster may have more insight into 
society, not least because the virtuous individual fails to comprehend how people can be 
tempted by vice. We see that, in a society based on self-interest, what passes as virtue 
may actually be its mirror opposite. Paradoxically, then, it is the inauthentic individual 
who sees through social pretence, and offers a deeper understanding of human nature, 
since he brings to light things that the good man misses. Rameau’s Nephew was to have a 
major impact on Romantic thinkers. For example, Hegel was so enamoured with 
Diderot’s exposé of social mores that he made use of this fictional account in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, where he inverted the commonplace notion of what is noble 
and what is base.
163
 For Hegel, Lui represents the triumph of the human spirit over moral 
orthodoxy in that he sees through social pretence.  
The concern with hypocrisy is a recurring trope in the eighteenth century. One reason 
why hypocrisy was so manifest in French society, according to Arendt, was because 
rulers preferred their nobility to engage in court intrigue, rather than letting them take an 
active role in affairs of state. These intrigues fostered an atmosphere of deceit which 
pervaded society. In her exploration of hypocrisy, Arendt notes that the Greek root of the 
word ‘hypocrite’ is play-actor.164 As we have seen, this focus on role-playing was often 
commented upon. She asks why it was that so many writers remarked on the problem of 
hypocrisy, which seems to be a far lesser evil than, say, violence. What makes hypocrisy 
so bad, Arendt suggests, is that “integrity can indeed exist under the cover of all vices 
except this one.”165 Hypocrisy can lead us astray in our judgments of others, since those 
who profess honest motives may hide dishonourable intentions. But she acknowledges 
that an emphasis on virtue is also problematic since it “transforms all actors into 
hypocrites; the moment the display of motives begins, hypocrisy begins to poison all 
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human relations.”166 A hypocrite, states Arendt, “is too ambitious; not only does he want 
to appear virtuous before others, he wants to convince himself” of his incorruptibility.167 
While no-one can be completely sure of their motives, the hypocrite convinces himself 
that he is above ambiguity which, as we will see later, can have devastating results.  
2.4 The Gendering of Authenticity in the Work of Rousseau 
While Montesquieu and Diderot celebrate the liveliness of Paris, Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
detested the polite veneer of Parisian society. He especially disliked the rich aristocrat 
who, he argued, was corrupted by vanity. The rich acquire possessions, he insists, not 
because they need them but because their sense of who they are is related to what they 
own. The superficial facade of polite society masked the fundamental prejudices that 
existed. For instance, Rousseau despised how the rich treated others, arguing that they 
were “pitiless and hard toward all the rest of the world.”168 Social inequalities between 
rich and poor were entrenched, not only by wealth and pleasure, but in terms of how 
people regarded each other. The poor were not perceived as individuals, but as a 
homogenous, expendable group. Rousseau believed that it was only those who had 
known suffering who could understand the plight of others. Indeed, it was his 
mistreatment by a Countess when he worked as her valet that convinced Rousseau of the 
need for social change. As a servant, he was disregarded, and judged “less by what I was 
than by what she had made me.”169 Echoing an earlier sentiment expressed by 
Montesquieu’s character, Rica, Rousseau notes that, in Parisian society, a person’s outfit 
is perceived as a marker for the self. That is, it is dependent upon a person’s status as to 
whether or not they are perceived to have a worthy opinion. Yet, he argues, a person’s 
social role was no indication of their moral worth. The problem, however, is that 
inequality was deeply embedded in the fake morality of Parisian society. In a society 
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where falseness is the norm, Rousseau contends, like Diderot’s Lui, it is in each man’s 
interest to be a dissembler.  
In The Social Contract, Rousseau maintained that there can only be genuine relationships 
among people if men are equally free.
170
 Neither the position of master nor slave enabled 
a man to be autonomous. He argued that it was each man’s duty to rebel against this 
unnatural state of affairs by refusing to don the mask imposed on him by society. 
Rousseau declared that it was only by pledging allegiance to a State, rather than to a 
specific leader, that men could ensure their equality. In uniting individual will with the 
public will of all, moral freedom would be realized. As part of his argument, he 
differentiated between man in nature and man in society. For Rousseau, man in nature is 
neither virtuous nor corrupt. While man can be happy in his natural state, he cannot be a 
moral being. To be moral, a man must be part of a society. The problem was that the 
competitive nature of Parisian society encouraged inauthentic behaviour so that 
relationships between people were often false. True intimacy was debased because, 
instead of love, which Rousseau maintained was necessary for virtuous conduct, people 
engaged in superficial affairs. Furthermore, while society could offer a person 
innumerable examples of beauty and taste, each new desire, instead of bringing 
satisfaction, created a greater sense of anxiety. It was by recognizing the reasons why 
anxiety occurred that, he suggested, it might be possible for people to recognize the 
superficiality of their existence.
171
  
In order to gain a more authentic way of life, Rousseau asserted society must change. In 
contrast to John Locke, he declared that laws should be less concerned with property, and 
more concerned with building a just society. One way that he envisaged such a just 
society being developed was through rethinking the role of women. Through their 
maternal role and virtuous natures, he maintained that women could provide a civilizing 
counterforce to the competitive nature of men. What was needed to encourage human 
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flourishing, according to Rousseau, was not just reason, but sensuous reason. One way to 
obtain this delicate balance between the sensuous and reason was through moral 
education. In Emile, for example, he described how, rather than learning through 
competition or being taught by rote, a child must learn through experience. With this 
knowledge, he could begin to judge for himself, and guard against falling prey to the 
prejudices of others. In so doing, a child would be able to realise his full potential. 
Moreover, if a person was taught how to be flexible, then they would be better able to 
deal with changing circumstances while, at the same time, sustaining their core identity.  
It is important to note that Rousseau’s position on the education of girls was diametrically 
opposed to the instruction that he thought boys should receive, as his depiction of Sophie 
in Emile illustrates. Unlike her future husband, Sophie is offered little opportunity to 
develop her talents, other than through domestic knowledge gathered from her mother. 
These domestic skills were all a woman required, he argued, for it was her proper place to 
take care of the home and teach her children to be virtuous. Even when a woman had 
genuine talent, Rousseau contended that her dignity required that she keep such talents 
unknown, since her glory came from her selfless devotion to her husband and children.  
This notion of selfless action as integral to a virtuous woman’s role in life creates 
dissonance in that, for a woman to believe in herself, she has to go against society’s 
dictates about what constitutes virtue during this period. One of the ensuing problems 
with this ideology is, as Roulston states, that “the ideal feminine self cannot be articulated 
through the public sphere - hence the fundamental contradiction in Rousseau’s social 
vision.”172 The ideal feminine self that he admired was an abstract concept that no 
woman could attain.  
In her discussion of the connections between virtue, authenticity and selfhood in the 
eighteenth-century novel, Roulston contends that sentimental narratives depict a 
character’s desire for self-revelation as a departure from artifice.173 This self-confession 
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is somewhat dubious, however, since this declaration is always affected by the moral 
strictures of society. Rather than revealing a ‘true’ self, Roulston maintains that the self 
revealed through the language of virtue may be just another form of masquerade.
174
 The 
fictional desire to establish a feminine, modest self is intrinsically connected with 
bourgeois constructions of identity. Within the domestic realm, common to most novels 
of this period, she argues that “privacy, femininity and authenticity serve as mutually 
reinforcing markers”
175
 that serve to restrict a woman’s autonomy. We see this clearly in 
Rousseau’s famous novel entitled Julie, or the New Héloïse,
176
which we will now 
discuss. 
 The novel’s central character, Julie, is a young upper-class woman who has an affair 
with her penniless tutor, Saint-Preux, and becomes pregnant. Horrified at his daughter’s 
lack of propriety and her besmirching of the family honour, her father beats Julie so 
severely that, shortly afterwards, she loses her child. Caught between the opposing 
dictates of familial duty, and her desire for love, Julie asks Saint-Preux to try and 
comprehend the hopelessness of her predicament, as follows:  
Consider the situation of my Sex and yours in our common 
misfortunes and decide which of us the more to be pitied is? To feign 
insensibility in the throes of passions; to appear joyous and content 
when prey to a thousand woes; to have a serene appearance and a 
troubled soul; always to say something other than what one thinks to 
disguise everything one feels; to be false for the sake of duty, and lie 
for the sake of modesty; such is the usual situation of any maiden my 
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age. One’s finest days are thus spent under the tyranny of propriety.177 
In this extract, Julie rails at the ignominy of her position that requires her to act in a 
manner contrary to her desire. Social propriety tyrannizes young women, she argues, 
since they are not allowed to show their true feelings. Instead, they must disguise their 
desires and behave in a duplicitous manner. Here, we see how the dictates of social 
decorum negatively affect a woman’s autonomy. Julie’s ability to do as she wishes is 
restricted by societal constraints and familial duty.  
Since her father will not allow her to marry the man she loves, Julie acquiesces to her 
father’s request to marry his friend, Baron de Wolmar. During the marriage ceremony, 
Julie undergoes a kind of spiritual transformation. She decides that from now on she will 
become a paragon of virtue, and forego her erotic longings for Saint-Preux. Together 
with her new husband, Julie builds a community called Clarens. In this community, each 
spouse takes on a role that illustrates Rousseau’s ideals regarding appropriate gendered 
behaviour. Wolmar’s role is that of the stern, rational leader, while Julie plays the part of 
dutiful wife and benevolent matriarch. In doing so, they act in compliance of the gender 
norms which society expects of them.  
But the community is not quite the idyll it appears to be on the surface. For example, the 
servants who work for the Wolmars are brought into service when they are very young. 
These girls and boys come from peasant families in rural villages, since the Wolmars 
believe that their lack of knowledge of society will make these children more pliable as 
servants. From the day these young people begin work at Clarens, they are not allowed to 
visit their families. Instead, the Wolmars act as their parental overseers. To maintain 
order, each servant is encouraged to spy on her fellows. When servants do wrong, they 
are punished in one of two ways. Wolmar reprimands them in a cold, rational manner; 
these stern admonishments are designed to maintain control. Julie takes a different 
approach to punishment in that she reproaches the wrongdoer by taking away her love for 
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them. Rousseau writes that while the servants may fear Wolmar, they are emotionally 
distraught at the thought that Julie may cease to care for them.  
At Clarens, Julie endeavours to live her life as the model of middle-class female virtue. 
She is a faithful wife to Wolmar, and loving mother to her children. Yet, it is only by 
sublimating her desire for Saint-Preux that Julie is able to play the part of virtue.
178
 Some 
years’ following their marriage, Wolmar invites Saint-Preux to visit them so that he can 
see how virtuous Julie has become. In a letter to her former lover, Julie writes of her 
perfect life and her contentment with her role as wife and mother. After Saint-Preux visits 
Clarens, Wolmar decides that Saint-Preux should become the tutor to their children. But 
Julie is unhappy with her husband’s decision, which she perceives as a way for him to 
exercise his control by forcing her to be in close contact with her ex-lover while 
maintaining her decorum. Julie tells Saint-Preux that she does not want him to live at 
Clarens for she is concerned with what might happen between them. But Saint Preux is 
delighted that Wolmar regards him as having sufficient character to resist temptation. 
Julie starts to feel a growing anxiety as she questions whether her virtuous life may have 
been as rich an existence as she had previously thought. This causes her to feel unhappy 
without understanding why. As she writes to Saint-Preux: 
Will another woman be more sensible than I? Will she love her father, 
her husband, her children, her friends, her circle better? Will she be 
better loved by them? Will she lead a life more to her liking? Will she 
be more free to choose another? Will she enjoy better health? Will she 
have more resources against weariness, more attachments to the 
world? And yet I live in it with a heart ill at ease, which does not 
know what it lacks; it desires without knowing what.
179
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In this extract we see how Julie’s growing anxiety results in a questioning of her choice 
to forego sexual desire in favour of marital duty. It seems that her previous justifications 
are no longer enough. Shortly after writing this letter, one of her children falls into the 
lake, and Julie jumps in to save her child. While she is not seriously injured, Julie’s 
health deteriorates. Rather than continuing to live a life of masquerade, and deal with the 
constant tension between duty and desire, it appears as if she chooses to let herself die.  
For Rousseau, it is a woman’s duty to be selfless; her personal desires must always be 
sublimated in favour of her submission to her husband. In the figure of Julie, Rousseau 
provides us with an ethical dilemma regarding the sublimation of passion and the 
limitations of a virtuous life, which is resolved only through Julie’s death. The way to 
deal with the dilemma, and stay within the bounds of propriety, is for Rousseau to kill off 
the heroine. And yet there seems an ambiguity in his portrayal of Julie in that he not only 
shows her difficult choice, but also does so in a manner that is sympathetic to her 
plight.
180
  What we see in Rousseau’s portrayal of his heroine’s predicament is that 
authenticity consists of the pull of contradictory forces. According to Marshall Berman, 
what Julie wants is to be what society dictates. Ultimately, this is self-defeating because 
her desire stands in the way of her wish for social conformity.
181
 
 In his reading of Rousseau’s concept of authenticity, Alessandro Ferraro sees three 
interconnected threads: sincerity, autonomy and intimacy.
182
 Sincerity is the avoidance of 
being false; autonomy means acting in accordance with one’s ethical principles; finally, 
intimacy in relationships is necessary if we want to foster personal authenticity. While an 
ethics of autonomy tries to contain these inner deviations, regarding them as unworthy 
and undignified, an ethics of authenticity recognizes that these deviations originate in 
emotions and feelings. What is important about Rousseau’s notion of authenticity, then, 
is that it is derived from genuine action founded on sincere relationships. But, as the 
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fictional experiences of Julie illustrate, genuine action is difficult - even for fictional 
heroines - because it is necessary to repress desire in order to submit to social dictates 
regarding what is proper for a woman. There is a inherent paradox in Rousseau’s sense of 
authenticity as inner truth, and his insistence that a woman pay heed to her reputation. 
For Rousseau, as Lisa Disch observes,
 
it is a woman’s reputation rather than her character 
that matters.
183
 The problem with Rousseau’s ideas about social relations is that a 
woman’s perceived virtue is more important than her character. How that virtue is 
perceived is dependent upon the perspectives of others.  
If authenticity is about the self, then the notion that a woman’s reputation is more 
important than her own conscience points to an inconsistency in Rousseau’s thinking 
about this topic, which may stem from gender prejudice. His belief that the viewpoint of 
others was more important than a woman’s own conscience serves to undermine his 
argument about the importance of thinking for oneself. In the eighteenth century, it was 
only masculine minds that were judged to have the capacity to reason and, thus, to be 
able to decide what was right. Women, by contrast, had to conform to social standards 
concerning what constituted appropriate conduct, even when this might mean a deviation 
from their own conscience. While a man needed to have the strength of character to 
enable him to go against public opinion when it contradicted his way of thinking, a 
woman was obliged to adhere to society’s dictates even when they went against her own 
beliefs. Because a woman was perceived as being without reason, these social rules 
became more important than her own conscience. This gender contradiction was one that 
Mary Wollstonecraft sought to expose. 
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2.5  Wollstonecraft:  A Revolution in Manners 
In Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Mary Wollstonecraft declared that the kind of 
reasoning Rousseau displayed was not really about virtue, but rather designed to keep 
women in their place. Contra Rousseau, she contended that a woman’s sense of self was 
negated by the emphasis on her reputation rather than her good conscience. In her view, it 
is the latter that should constitute the basis of a woman’s rightful place in society. Thus, 
for Wollstonecraft, only a revolution in manners and education could bring about human 
progress in the way that the Enlightenment philosophes desired. Moreover, she argued 
that when women are treated differently from men, this created an environment where 
false morals rule, leading to social hypocrisy. Such gender distinctions “corrode all 
private, and blast all public virtue.”
184
 While Rousseau maintained that women should be 
educated to please men, Wollstonecraft contended that this kind of reasoning ensured that 
women had limited opportunity to develop their reasoning skills. Turning his argument 
upside down, she asserted that if women were more virtuous than men, then they should 
be able to reason effectively. She challenged Rousseau’s assertion that the extent of a 
woman’s aspiration should be to obey.185 It is not the passive, submissive woman who 
makes an ideal partner, states Wollstonecraft, but a woman who is willing to be a friend 
to her husband as well as a teacher to her children. In her opinion, women will never have 
the same abilities to reason unless they are afforded the same opportunities as men.  
Furthermore, she brought to light the hypocrisy that occurs when women are seen as 
social pariahs. Wollstonecraft rails against the double standard whereby some aristocratic 
women insult others while being notorious in their own adultery.
186
 Not only is this 
hypocrisy morally wrong, she argued, it encouraged a superficial assessment of a 
woman’s character. What she desired was a new moral sensibility that would herald 
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opportunities for women to achieve their full potential. The establishment of ‘true 
sensibility’ would encourage a more caring attitude towards others.187 It is only in this 
caring attitude that the harmful repercussions of social hypocrisy can be negated. 
Wollstonecraft’s work represented a radical critique of social mores that reworked 
Rousseau’s insights into the nature of authenticity with a political argument for women’s 
rights. Hence, she illustrates the negative effects of living in an unfair, morally corrupt 
society, as well as highlighting the potential for change.  
In her work, Wollstonecraft is informed by Rousseau’s ideas in terms of complementary 
gender roles. But she wanted to carve out a much broader social and political role for 
women. By transforming society into one based on reason and virtue rather than 
superficiality, Wollstonecraft asserted that men and women could participate actively and 
equally in improving human existence.
 
If a nation wanted women to be good citizens, 
then alongside political representation women needed to receive a liberal education on 
par with men. This meant the eradication of the notion that the only purpose of female 
education was to equip a woman “for a single future, marriage.”188  
At this time, most people argued that educating girls to participate in public affairs was 
unnecessary, since their responsibilities lay in the private realm. In general, there was 
great disparagement shown towards women who engaged in intellectual pursuits. Such 
intellectual endeavours were perceived to be inappropriate for their future roles as wives 
and mothers. Indeed, the language of most eighteenth-century educators in England 
revealed a clear distinction between how middle-class girls and boys should be taught. 
Boys were given instruction that would help them prepare for the demands of a 
competitive society. While competitive activities were seen as preparing boys for their 
future careers, educators regarded these forms of action as wholly inappropriate for girls 
since, as the educator and moralist Reverend Bennet declared, a girl’s delicate nature 
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would be harmed by “this scorching method of exposure.”189 As Michèle Cohen asserts, 
“the very notion of competition was distasteful in women.”190 The main instruction girls 
received, as I showed earlier with Rousseau’s fictional example of Sophie, was how to be 
a dutiful wife. This supporting role, reinforced by political and legal restrictions, 
encouraged women to be submissive rather than to take the initiative and lead. Simply 
put, men were taught how to take charge while women were instructed in how to be 
selfless. Neither of these gendered modes of being was going to bring about an 
enlightened society. 
While Rousseau stated that without virtuous women there could not be a virtuous society, 
Wollstonecraft revealed how his ideas were contradictory. For example, she disagreed 
with his argument that the female mind was distinct from that of the male mind. The 
distinctions that seem to exist are not natural, she declared, but rather a result of the 
restrictions society placed on women’s agency. While many regarded the cultivation of a 
woman’s mind as inappropriate, Wollstonecraft maintained that if women’s education 
continued to be limited, this would be a problem for society as a whole since, without 
their full participation in public life it was unlikely that enlightened attitudes would 
flourish.
191
 She argued that it was vital for women to speak out against societal ills.
 
Otherwise, the pervasive false morals would never change. Without alterations to the 
social, economic and political order, women would never be able to reach their potential. 
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Moreover, as women were the educators of their children, Wollstonecraft contended that 
their lack of understanding would set back the cause of progress for society as a whole. 
One curious thing concerning Enlightenment discourses about gendered spheres of 
responsibility is that there were many women ruling countries and empires. During the 
eighteenth century, these rulers included Catherine the Great in Russia, Queen Anne in 
England, Maria Theresa in Austria, Queen Christina of Sweden and Maria I in Portugal. 
While there was much discussion regarding the relationship between a ruler and her 
subjects, the fact that there were female monarchs did not seem to challenge prevailing 
wisdom about prescribed gender roles. In noting this discrepancy, Joan Scott suggests 
that when Queens are the predominant rulers, most political commentary focuses on 
masculine and feminine ways of being.
192
 Hence, the presence of a woman ruler tends 
not to affect the political discourse of the day because female monarchs are regarded as 
anomalies. Women rulers were either trivialized if they were perceived as weak (as in the 
case of Queen Anne) or regarded as “mannish” women if they were effective (such as 
Queen Christina of Sweden). In 1779, William Alexander pointed out this incongruity: 
In Britain, we allow a woman to sway a sceptre, but by law and 
custom we debar her from every other government but that of her own 
family ... We neither allow women to officiate at our altars, to debate 
in our councils, not to fight for us in the field; we suffer them not to 
be members of our senate, to practice any of the learned professions, 
nor to concern themselves much with our trades and occupations.
 193
 
While some commentators noted the incongruity between having a female head of state 
and not allowing the vast majority of women the ability to voice their political opinions 
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or the freedom to work in most professions, this did little to alter public opinion about the 
rightful place of women.  
2.6  Speaking Out Against Gender Injustice - Olympe de Gouges 
I want to turn now to explore the life of a French woman who, like Wollstonecraft, was 
willing to speak out against gender injustice. Olympe de Gouges was a playwright, 
courtesan and working-class woman who actively worked for social change, especially 
during the initial events of the French Revolution. As Joan Scott notes, Gouges sought to 
expose the contradiction that it was natural for men to be leaders while it was unnatural 
for women to be so.
194
 She argued that revolutionary demands for equality which denied 
difference went against the laws of nature. Dividing humans into two groups makes no 
sense as each human being displayed both male and female qualities. To illustrate her 
point, Gouges described herself as a courageous woman, as well as a timid man. In 
playing with ideas about gender, she highlighted the hypocrisy of denying women a place 
in the political realm. As a result of her political action, Gouges was branded a male 
woman. While this was intended as an insult, she regarded this label as an indication that 
a woman could reason just as successfully as a man.  
Like Wollstonecraft, Gouges maintained that a nation could not be deemed virtuous when 
it denied political representation to most of its people. Indeed, if human progress was 
desired, she argued that it was essential that all people have the opportunity to share their 
ideas as to how to improve society. She used the platform of speeches and petitions to put 
forward ideas about women in politics. By arguing that women could have an active, 
rather than a passive imagination, Gouges undercut Enlightenment distinctions regarding 
what constituted the proper roles for women and men. In Declaration of Women, 
published in 1791, she argued that social and political change in regard to women’s rights 
was necessary if the Revolution sought to bring about a just society. If the Age of 
Enlightenment was to be the Age of Reason, Gouges asserted, antiquated notions of 
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sexual hierarchy needed to be overturned. She maintained that women were not just a 
homogeneous group, but individual persons who could think for themselves, but this was 
the kind of incendiary idea that was not to prove popular with the new political 
establishment. 
Freedom from the tyranny of the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV did not result in liberty 
for all. Once the Girondists (of which Gouges was a member) lost to the Jacobins, a 
different form of tyranny emerged. When the Jacobins took control of the National 
Assembly under the leadership of Robespierre, those who dared to disagree with the will 
of the Nation, like Gouges, were branded as traitors to the Revolutionary cause. Her 
statements became increasingly inflammatory as she railed against the Jacobin 
government, asserting that there was no logical reason to deny women political status and 
legal recognition. But Gouges’ arguments had little sway as the new French constitution 
upheld gender divisions. When she further declared that it would be better to live under a 
benevolent monarch than under the Republic, Gouges had gone too far. In 1793 she was 
arrested, imprisoned for treason, and guillotined. 
The suppression of voices like Gouges was to be emblematic of what has become known 
as Robespierre’s “Reign of Terror.” In On Revolution, Arendt argues that his tyrannical 
leadership was, in fact, a “terror of virtue,” in part a reaction to the lack of concern for the 
plight of the people, emblematic of Louis XIV’s autocratic rule.
195
 Robespierre’s 
Jacobins, influenced by Rousseau’s political philosophy, put the cause of virtue above all 
else, demonstrated initially through their compassion for the malheureux. Yet 
Robespierre’s rule became tyrannical as his search for the truth and the rooting out of 
hypocrisy took hold. By trying to unmask hypocrisy, and to bring the suffering of the 
masses to light, it was rage rather than virtue appeared on the political stage. Those who 
tried to put forward alternative perspectives were singled out, and declared traitors to the 
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Republic. By speaking out against gender oppression, Gouges was one of the many 
casualties of this “virtuous” leadership.  
For Arendt, one of the key aspects of political life is the ability for citizens to act and 
speak freely. The problem is that absolute goodness, like absolute evil, may prove 
devastating to the political realm, since goodness (like evil) cannot be altered by dialogue 
and debate. What we have instead is the suppression of plurality in favour of the one 
voice of the State. Those women who tried to take on a public role in Enlightenment 
politics faced humiliation and danger. In the eighteenth century, women risked their 
reputations and, at times, their lives to gain a voice on the political stage. Olympe de 
Gouges was one of many individuals who paid such a price. Wollstonecraft and Gouges 
are examples of women who tried to change the social order through political action. In 
their desire to be heard, they exemplified Arendt’s notion of virtuosity, in that they tried 
to bring something new into the world by having the courage to share their ideas with 
others, and speak out against gender injustice.  
I want to turn now to a discussion of a different phenomenon that appeared in the 
eighteenth century, the salon, so as to show how women were involved in this new arena.  
2.7 The Emergence of the Salon 
In spatial terms, the eighteenth century created new opportunities for people to meet and 
share ideas. As the century progressed, there was a flourishing of public spaces. Public 
life was enriched by discussion in different venues. What was distinctive about the 
bourgeois public sphere, according to Jürgen Habermas, is that it represented “the sphere 
of private people that comes together as a public.”196 Each European city had diverse 
examples of these new public spaces. For example, at the height of their popularity, 
London had 3,000 coffee houses, each with its own regular patrons.
197
 Discussions were 
wide-ranging, and included topics from art to politics. Women were denied entry to many 
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of these coffee houses, however, thus limiting their ability to speak out in the public 
realm. This lack of female inclusion contrasts sharply with that of another eighteenth-
century phenomenon, the European salon.  
The salons began to emerge in France during the seventeenth century and continued to 
flourish throughout the eighteenth century. Most salons were located in Paris and were 
run by upper-middle class women. For a short period, the salon also flourished in other 
European cities, such as Berlin. Most salons allowed for a mix of people such as the 
upper middle-class, prominent artists and intellectuals, as well as members of the 
aristocracy. In France, the rise of the salon had much to do with the strict censorship that 
I discussed earlier. It was because philosophes like Diderot had no political voice that the 
salons became, according to Dena Goodman, the “civil working space of the 
Enlightenment.”198 In Paris, the salons provided an intimate setting for authors to test 
their ideas publicly.  
Women had an integral part in organizing the salons. Some of the prominent salonnières 
were Madame Geoffrin (1699-1777) Mme de Staël (1766-1819), and Julie de Lespinasse 
(1732-1776), whose guests included the philosophes, D’Alembert and Diderot. But not 
everyone was happy with women’s dominant roles in the organization of the salon. In his 
“Letter to D’Alembert,” Rousseau maintained that salons were run by immoral women, 
such as Madame de Staël.
199
 He lamented that, due to social etiquette, men were forced to 
pay attention to women. According to Rousseau, such behaviour was demeaning, since 
false gallantry was emasculating. His negative assessment of the salonnières seems to 
have stemmed from the fact that he perceived women’s presence as a distraction from the 
vigour of masculine discussion. Yet while Rousseau regarded the rarified atmosphere of 
the salon as restrictive to intellectual debate, Goodman contends that the salonnières 
created intellectual venues. Furthermore, the women who ran them were highly 
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intelligent, and exhibited that “flexibility of tongue” that Rousseau believed gave women 
an edge in conversation, albeit not in intellect.  
2.8 Rahel Varnhagen: The Inauthenticity of Assimilation 
During the period 1780-1806, according to Deborah Hertz, Berlin salons provided a 
venue for the aristocracy and middle-class intellectuals to mingle.
200
 I want to turn now to 
consider one particular Berlin salon run by Rahel Levin Varnhagen. What is especially 
notable about the success of her salon was that she was Jewish. Central figures of 
German Romanticism, such as Friedrich Schlegel and Friedrich Schleiermacher, were 
frequent guests of Rahel Levin’s salon. Her guests were impressed not only by her 
sensibility, but also by her intellect. One admirer described Levin as “the most 
intellectual woman on earth.”201 While her salon was famous for its witty conversation, it 
is noteworthy that women guests had to remain silent so as not to disrupt the elegant flow 
of philosophical dialogue.
202
  
But the flourishing of the Berlin salons was short-lived. Life in the city was to change 
dramatically following the defeat of the Prussian army by Napoleon in 1806. Jews were 
no longer welcome in Prussian society. Previous acquaintances began to ignore Levin, 
who despaired of her social isolation.
203
 To combat the risk of becoming a social outcast, 
she changed her surname from Levin to Robert, and wrote to her brother that “the Jew 
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must be extirpated from us.”204 The erasure of her ethnic identity and religious 
background was, in her view, the only way of regaining a place in society.  
Levin desired social acceptance above all else. After several unsuccessful love affairs, 
she married August Varnhagen, a match that enabled her to take up a place in polite 
society. Her husband enjoyed moderate success as a diplomat, and discovered he was 
related to some minor nobility, thus further improving the couple’s social standing. In 
1813, Rahel Varnhagen joined her husband in Prague where, for the first time, she 
experienced what she describes as a sense of belonging because people regarded her as 
German, rather than a Jew. Paradoxically, Rahel Varnhagen was more at home in an alien 
country since, in that city, her ethnicity did not wholly define who she was. Upon their 
return to Berlin, the Varnhagens hosted a new salon, and established a Goethe cult. At 
last, Rahel Varnhagen had acquired her twin goals of rank and marriage, but she found 
herself discontented. As the wife of a government official, her role was “to represent 
something in respectable society.”205 Rahel Varnhagen realized that she had sacrificed 
her freedom for the sake of social acceptance. The society in which she lived regarded 
her as a mere appendage to her husband. Social assimilation had not afforded her the 
expansive existence of which she had dreamed. It was only at the end of her life that she 
began to regard her Jewishness as something integral to her sense of self, and not 
something of which she should be ashamed.
206
  
In her examination of Rahel Varnhagen’s life, through the use of diary extracts and 
letters, Arendt explores the ethnic and religious prejudices that existed in Prussian 
society, and how the Jewish intelligentsia sought to belong to a society that despised 
them. Because of this prejudice, they were often at the margins of society, and only 
allowed to work in certain occupations, such as money-lending or the law. The only way 
to become accepted socially was to be regarded as an ‘exceptional’ Jew. One person who 
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was accepted into society as an exceptional Jew was the philosopher, Moses 
Mendelssohn. He regarded Jewish assimilation as a logical extension of Enlightenment 
ideals of progress and equal rights. If such rights are possible, he maintained, there was 
no logical reason for such rights not to be extended to Jewish people. Over the long-term, 
assimilation was a good idea, he contended, since ethnic prejudice would be lessened 
when Jews showed what good members of society they were. The trouble with 
Mendelssohn’s argument, for Arendt, is that being accepted into society as an exception 
to one’s ethnicity forces a person to reject an integral part of who they are. It is only 
when she is willing to recognize her Jewish identity, Arendt argues, that Rahel 
Varnhagen is able to find peace with the world.  
In her account of Rahel Varnhagen’s life story, Arendt discusses the self-absorption that 
was a dominant motif of Romanticism. The Romantic preoccupation with inwardness 
was a negative quality for Arendt. For the Romantics individuality, instead of being 
displayed in the public realm, shifts to the interior world of the self. This private 
isolation, according to Seyla Benhabib, encourages a “concern with the uniqueness, 
authenticity, and psychic harmony of the self”
207
 to the detriment of an engagement with 
the world. Arendt argues that one of the gravest mistakes that humans made was to allow 
things that are private to appear in the public realm. In her view, the rise of the social 
realm, that is, the bourgeois public sphere, had the negative effect of making people 
conform to social expectations rather than to excel. Instead of virtue, understood in the 
Greek sense as excellence, we see the rise of a particular form of behaviour that teaches 
people what they should and should not do. This standardization of human behaviour has 
the effect of negating spontaneity. Hence, for Arendt, a homogenization of social 
standards is detrimental to individual freedom. As we have seen, this is especially the 
case for women who are supposed to behave in a manner that conforms to prevailing 
social mores, rather than individual desire.  
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Arendt illustrates what can happen when a woman’s life is overly determined by social 
expectations. How Rahel Varnhagen defined herself, and how others saw her, was 
affected negatively by ethnic and religious prejudice. It seems to me that there are 
similarities here between the fictional world of Rousseau’s Julie and the experiences that 
Rahel Varnhagen records in her diary. Both women had to deny a part of who they were 
to comply with society’s dictates. In the fictional account, Julie resigns herself to a 
loveless marriage so as to comply with familial duty and the expectations of middle-class 
society. In Rahel Varnhagen’s case, her desire to be accepted in Prussian society required 
her to renounce her ethnic background, and live her life pretending to be other than who 
she was. But there was a negative cost to this desire to belong. Ultimately, it was by 
recognizing the absurdity of social rules that Rahel Varnhagen was able to perceive the 
hypocrisy of the society that she once venerated.  
Arendt contends that Rahel Varnhagen’s destiny was constrained by gender prejudice, 
not least because there is often a “discrepancy between what men expected of women in 
general and what women could give or wanted in their turn.”
 208
 What Rahel Varnhagen 
was capable of, and what she was able to accomplish, was restricted not only by her 
ethnicity but also by her gender. Her solution, as Benhabib notes, was to seek romantic 
affairs and marriage to a gentile in order to take her place in society.
209
 But the problem 
is that Rahel Varnhagen never does quite fit into the society to which she desired entry. 
At times, Arendt despairs of the political naivety that encouraged Rahel Varnhagen to 
believe that social assimilation was the answer to prejudice. In her comparison of the 
parvenu and the pariah, Arendt argues that the human cost “demanded of the pariah if he 
wishes to become a parvenu is always too high.”210 The problem with assimilation is that 
it can never overcome prejudice, since social acceptance meant “assimilating to anti-
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Semitism.”211 Social assimilation is too high a price to pay for giving up one’s heritage 
because, in doing so, a person has to give up something of herself. That is why, in 
Arendt’s opinion, it is the only the social pariah who is able to remain true to their ideals. 
Being on the margins of society offers insights, according to Arendt, because “the pariah 
instinctively discovers human dignity in general long before Reason has made it the 
foundation of morality.”212 Through her study on Rahel Varnhagen, Arendt points to the 
ethical dilemma that ensues when people try to assimilate into a society that despises 
them.  
2.9  Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have considered how authenticity became gendered. In the eighteenth 
century, notions of propriety, together with educational differences, defined feminine 
ways of behaving in contrast to masculine ways of acting. I have argued that gendered 
notions of virtue worked to enforce particular kinds of female behaviour, such as 
obedience and submissiveness, which had the negative effect of constraining women’s 
belief in what they could accomplish. Gender differences about what constitutes right 
conduct had an effect upon the ways in which authenticity and selfhood are 
conceptualized and experienced. For example, Dena Goodman sees a correlation between 
female timidity in the eighteenth century and Iris Marion Young’s contention that women 
lack trust in their own bodies, the result of which is that women lack the necessary 
confidence to carry out their projects.
213
 This lack of self-belief in their talents is a 
response to social dictates that encourage women to be submissive, rather than to lead. In 
the eighteenth century, prevailing gender prejudice, together with a lack of educational 
training, meant that women lacked the necessary skills to take up a dominant role in the 
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public sphere. But despite those drawbacks, we have seen that there were some women 
who were courageous enough to fight for gender justice. 
In the eighteenth century, authenticity was related to gendered ideas of virtue. Social 
wisdom decreed that the opinion of others was more important than a woman’s own 
sense of self. We have seen in the course of looking at the Age of Enlightenment that 
there were social barriers that affected women’s ability to think for themselves, especially 
in regard to the widespread belief that women should obey their fathers and, later, their 
husbands. If obedience is seen to be the most important facet of a woman’s life, then 
being willing to take a leadership role is likely to feel less comfortable. Being authentic, 
according to Arendt, depends upon our willingness to express ourselves in words and 
deeds. However, the gendered nature of social life barred women from seeing themselves 
as uniquely able to do so. While there were exceptions, as my discussion of Mary 
Wollstonecraft and Olympe de Gouges shows, nevertheless, when a woman has been 
inculcated to believe that her foremost duty is to be obedient, it will be more difficult for 
her to find the courage to freely express herself within the political sphere.  
Bourgeois ideology privileged some bodies over others. It allowed middle-class men to 
view themselves as unique individuals while a middle-class woman’s sense of self was 
confined to their wifely or maternal role. Thus, the Enlightenment sets up a paradox in 
terms of gendered notions of freedom and authenticity. For Arendt, like Kant, one of the 
most fundamental aspects of the human condition is the ability and the courage to think 
for oneself. For male citizens, new ways of thinking about freedom engendered an open 
attitude toward their potential possibilities. Conversely, for the majority of people 
without political rights, the public realm was experienced in a very different manner. 
Women who tried to break through such gender barriers were often held up to ridicule. If 
authenticity is connected with one’s ability to think and speak for oneself, then being 
ridiculed may negatively affect a person’s wish to be part of the social order.
214
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Furthermore, if freedom and human excellence derive from being able to be seen and 
heard in the public sphere, as Arendt maintains, then being unable to take a commanding 
role in the public arena will have future repercussions, especially for women’s leadership.  
In 1933, Arendt reviewed a book on contemporary women’s issues, where she notes that 
while women were afforded the same legal rights as men, “they are not valued equally by 
society.”215 This gender inequality is evident, not only in the fact that women receive 
lower wages, but also because the professional woman often had primary care of her 
household and children. In her view, “a woman’s freedom to make her own living seems 
to imply either a kind of enslavement in her own home or the dissolution of her 
family.”216 While I am not suggesting that Arendt had feminist inclinations, she was 
astute enough to recognize that the gendered conditions of women’s lives had a negative 
influence on their ability to flourish in the public realm. In this chapter, we have seen 
how social conformity results in the vast majority of people concurring with dominant 
ideologies without thinking about their full implications. There are vestiges of these 
historical inequities regarding gendered roles in our current society in how we think 
about leaders, and the ways in which we may overestimate the talents of some while 
underestimating those of others. Prejudice toward women leaders was and still is 
embedded in the cultural imagination, and has ongoing ramifications in regard to notions 
of gender, authenticity and leadership.  
In writing this chapter, I have begun to realize the extent to which authenticity is 
connected to ideas about freedom, not just in the sense of realizing one’s own dreams, but 
also in the sense of envisaging social change. When people are not allowed to share their 
visions of a different community that would be fairer to the majority of humanity then 
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their voices become erased. Enlightenment thinkers, as Charles Taylor contends, believed 
that rational individuals possessed dignity.
217
 Yet the Enlightenment motto: “Sapere 
Aude! Have courage to use your own understanding,” was thought not to apply to women 
since they were not regarded as rational, thinking beings.
218
 So while I concur with 
Taylor’s sentiment that “authenticity requires that we discover and articulate our 
identity,” 219 what we have seen in the eighteenth century is that the restricted gender 
roles available to women limited their opportunities for self-expression in the public 
sphere. Thus, while men were able to take up positions of leadership, many women who 
were just as eloquent and intelligent were denied that opportunity.  
If we define who we are through dialogue and debate with other individuals who respect 
our point of view, then we can continue to flourish and grow from these interactions. In 
this chapter, we have seen some of the ways in which gender prejudice served to limit 
women’s potentiality for intellectual and personal growth, since women have had to 
define themselves against abstract notions of virtue. This legacy of gender prejudice still 
has traces in our own society. Furthermore, it cannot be through one voice – whether that 
of the ruler or that of society - that we can effect a fairer world but through the 
recognition and respect for diverse viewpoints. This necessitates a willingness to listen, 
and to respect opinions that differ from our own. When we conceive of authenticity 
solely in terms of self, we lose an ethical dimension that allows us to take into 
consideration the views of others. If we do not attend to the connections between self and 
world, the result can be devastating, as I shall demonstrate in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3  
3  Authenticity, Ethics and Leadership 
In the last chapter, I concentrated on gender and its relationship to authenticity and 
leadership. In this chapter, I want to continue this discussion by focussing on authenticity 
as it pertains to ethical responsibility. In particular, I compare the work of Martin 
Heidegger with that of Hannah Arendt. I shall begin by outlining Heidegger’s concept of 
authenticity since his work is often referred to by authentic leadership scholars.
220
 
Concentrating on Being and Time, I show how his notion of authenticity as resoluteness, 
or inner purpose is one that may, at times, privilege self over others. Following on from 
this discussion, I return to the work of Arendt. I contend that her concept of uniqueness 
builds upon Heidegger’s notion of authenticity in a radical existentialist manner. While 
Heidegger gestures toward the importance of relationships with his concept of Mitsein 
(being with), I suggest that his conception of authenticity has a tendency toward being 
self-oriented. Conversely, Arendt enriches his notion of Mitsein to reveal how mutual 
responsiveness is central to a caring human existence. This responsiveness requires a 
willingness to think from different perspectives than one’s own, so as to better 
comprehend the world.  
As part of this discussion, we will consider how personal morality is affected by the 
extreme experience of living in a totalitarian regime. I compare specific actions that 
Arendt and Heidegger took during the Nazi period in Germany. I suggest that 
Heidegger’s foray into leadership is clouded by his vision of bringing about a change to 
university education. His action was not an ethical response to the crisis of the time 
though it may, from his view, have been authentic. In his desire to promote his vision, 
Heidegger seems to have forgotten that Mitsein requires us to care for one another. By 
contrast, in her actions, Arendt demonstrates her courage and commitment to others in 
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her attempt to fight against a totalitarian regime. As we saw in chapter one, she highlights 
the difference between leadership, understood as a collective endeavour, and leadership 
as mastery. To explore this distinction further, in the final part of this chapter, we will 
consider the connections among bureaucracy, ethics and leadership.  
3.1 Heidegger 
In Being and Time, Heidegger’s overarching purpose is to understand the nature of being. 
By disclosing the ways in which we live in the world, he contends that we will be able to 
discern the nature of existence. Critical to Heidegger’s thesis is to demonstrate how we 
have failed to grasp the truth of being primarily because of a focus on metaphysics. 
According to Heidegger, metaphysics, or an inquiry into what is, has led philosophers to 
misunderstand the nature of truth, and focus instead on “scientific” or theoretical proof. 
But a metaphysical desire for certainty concerning the nature of existence serves to 
privilege what can be perceived or measured rather than what actually is.
221
 To 
comprehend the essence of truth, therefore, we need to uncover what has been obscured 
by metaphysics through a hermeneutic, existential analysis.  
Contra metaphysical claims Heidegger contends that the nature of being can only be 
understood if we consider the question of who we are existentially and ontologically. In 
order to question being, therefore, we need to ask who we are in relation to being in 
general. His hermeneutic approach represents a continual back and forth between the 
question of being and the question of being as beings, that is, between how we appear to 
ourselves (ontic) and how we connect this appearing to being (ontological).
222
 The 
difference between an ontological enquiry and fundamental ontology may be construed 
as follows. In an ontological enquiry, as Brett Davis contends, we might ask why the 
                                                 
221
 As I showed in chapter one, some scholars contend that authentic leadership is comprised of 
four components that can be measured in a quantifiable way. Yet, this desire for proof through a 
quantifiable approach is not able to show us how authenticity manifests itself in its fullness.  
222
 For an informative account of the ontic and ontological in Heidegger’s work, see Tom 
Greaves, Starting with Heidegger (Continuum Books, 2010), 25-31. 
90 
 
being of a plant is different from the being of an animal. By contrast, fundamental 
ontology questions why anything exists at all.
223
  
It is because man’s essence is grounded in existence, and is inherently temporal, that 
Heidegger suggests that we should be able to gain insight into the question of being by 
discerning “who Dasein is in its everydayness.”
224
 According to Tom Greaves, 
Heidegger is trying to distinguish between the ‘existentiell,’ which I understand to mean 
the way we interpret our lives, and the ‘existential,’ that is, the self-understanding that 
arises from this interpretation.
225
 Hence, the ‘existential’ is concerned with the manner in 
which we choose to take up specific projects. Heidegger’s account works on two levels. 
On the ontic level, he describes what is observable in everyday life. From these 
observations, he tries to ascertain how the ontic phenomena he perceives relate to their 
fundamental ontological structure. For Heidegger, phenomena exist as surface and 
ground which constitute ontic and ontological. In his exploration of being, he considers 
both the ontic and ontological as, together, they underscore the conditions of possible 
existence and the variety of ways in which we exist in the world.
 
 
As part of his phenomenological investigation, Heidegger is trying to destruct (his term) 
common notions of subjectivity. In order to do this, he argues that we need to 
comprehend how what we commonly think is “I” is, in fact, a “not I.”
226
 Heidegger 
contends that, in the past, philosophers erred when they argued that the “who” of Dasein 
meant the same as oneself. So while philosophers like Descartes thought it was self-
evident that ‘I’ is the same as Dasein, Heidegger is emphatic this is not the case. This is 
principally because by focussing on the subject, we have failed to address the 
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phenomenological question of ‘who.’ This is what his phenomenological investigation 
aims to accomplish. 
For Heidegger, what constitutes the ‘who’ of Dasein does not change throughout a 
person’s life experiences; rather, there is a core essence that stays the same throughout a 
person’s life. Yet, for the most part, we live in the world, not as an authentic ‘who,’ but 
as someone who fits in with others. Thus, we take up the views of others while believing 
that each decision we make is solely our own. Heidegger juxtaposes Dasein, (his term for 
the authentic self) with the term ‘the they,’ which refers to our everyday inauthentic 
mode of existence. He suggests that Dasein is both fascinated with and absorbed by the 
world. Because of this fascination, on an everyday level, we often act without thinking. 
This is not an authentic mode of existence because it is focused upon conforming. What 
happens is that “[e]veryone is the other, and no one is himself,”
227
 and this becomes my 
way of knowing the world and myself. In practical terms, what this means is that we 
carry out everyday activities without stopping to think about them, and live our lives by 
compartmentalizing what we do. Such compartmentalization leads to a failure to 
understand, or even question life’s overall purpose. The end result is that we lose our 
ability to comprehend fully who we are, since our distinctive identity is obscured by the 
‘they’ self. This loss of individual agency ensures that people lead inauthentic lives 
without knowing or, in some cases, caring.  
Such inauthentic modes of existence can be traced back to instrumental reason, states 
Heidegger, and the way that humans perceive the world as a collection of things. In this 
instrumental mode of being, we fail to make connections between different entities. For 
example, in daily life, we encounter objects without noticing, and become oblivious to 
our surroundings, or we may walk past a colleague without stopping because we are late 
for an appointment. Instead of caring about what is nearest to us, we turn our minds to the 
next activity. Ultimately, this leads to viewing the world as a means to an end, which 
constitutes an inauthentic mode of being as it encourages us to see people and things as 
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objects to be used and discarded at will. If, instead of viewing objects for their use-value, 
we allow entities to be as they are, he suggests we might begin to comprehend being. 
Instead of acting in such an instrumental fashion, we need to take a more open approach 
to the world. One way to obtain such an open stance is by tarrying with things. Such 
tarrying shows that we care about the world and one another, and awakens us to the 
possibility of leading a more authentic existence.  
3.1.1 Care and Authenticity 
Fundamental to Heidegger’s overall argument in Being and Time is that “Dasein’s Being 
reveals itself as care.”
228
 He maintains that the primary purpose of care is to bring 
humans back to their essence.
229
 Through an acknowledgment of care, we can engage in 
the world in a manner that tries not to dominate others. However, we must guard against 
confusing authentic care with inauthentic semblances such as “will, wish, addiction and 
urge.”
230
 For example, an inauthentic mode of being might be to neglect to do something, 
and this neglect would constitute a deficient mode of care. Conversely, accomplishing a 
task is an authentic mode of care. Heidegger outlines solicitude in a similar manner. An 
inauthentic form of solicitude involves ‘leaping in’ and taking over from someone. In 
doing so, we limit the other person’s sense of autonomy. This is an inauthentic act 
because the other person is forced to become reliant upon us. As well, showing empathy 
is an inauthentic instance of solicitude. The reason why he suggests empathy is negative 
is because it leads us to project our own desires onto others. Authentic solicitude, by 
contrast, seeks to restore care in a genuine manner. An example of authentic solicitude is 
listening to someone’s predicament without giving advice, asking appropriate questions, 
and allowing that person to resolve her own problem by talking it through together. In so 
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doing, a person is able to make up her own mind, and determine her future actions 
without being led by another. Thus, caring means allowing others to be as they are.  
What it is critical to note is that, for Heidegger, no-one is authentic in the manner in 
which some leadership scholars interested in authenticity suggest. Rather authenticity 
represents “an existentiell modification of ‘the they.’”
231
 What this means is that we do 
not live our lives as either authentic or inauthentic persons. As Brett Davis contends, 
there can be no authentic existence if what that implies is an existence that “takes 
complete ownership of itself or completely disclaims itself.”
232
 Furthermore, Davis 
maintains that authenticity is only possible for those people who differentiate between 
authenticity and inauthenticity, since Heidegger contends that there is another mode of 
being-in-the-world, and that is the mode of indifference.
233
 Indeed, it is this mode of 
indifference that may represent the most problematic way of being, states Carmen Taylor, 
since it constitutes a lack of care.
234
 This lack of care for others can be seen in how some 
people act in an apathetic manner towards others. Such apathy is one reason why 
Heidegger contends that it is important to understand the function of mood.  
3.1.2 Mood 
A critical component of Heidegger’s phenomenological investigation into the nature of 
being is the function of mood. He argues that our moods are the way in which we live in 
the world. It is through mood that things show up in a particular manner. We are always 
in a mood of some sort, and this influences how the world appears to us. In the mood of 
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anxiety, for example, we may express discomfort but not know why. There is a profound 
difference, he contends, between the moods of fear and anxiety, since anxiety is not 
caused by anything specific. To demonstrate the distinction between anxiety and fear, he 
shows how our approach to a situation changes but in different ways. Fear is always a 
fear of something. In the mood of fear, for instance, one may become bewildered. 
Heidegger offers the example of how people in a burning building pick up what is nearest 
rather than what is important because, in their disorientation, they focus on what is close 
at hand. Conversely, what threatens us in anxiety cannot be found in a particular place. 
Rather, anxiety reveals itself through a vague feeling that we may describe as “uncanny.” 
When this anxious feeling occurs, we may exclaim that we feel “out of sorts” or “we do 
not feel at home.”
235
 Hence, mood affects how things appear to us. 
Another example of this anxious unease is when, on entering a place for the first time, we 
experience a feeling of déjà vu - a sense that we has been there before. Rather than trying 
to understand what is happening, people dismiss these feelings since they have no 
rational explanation. This is a mistake, according to Heidegger, because these 
experiences offer us a glimpse of something valuable. What these uncanny feelings 
reveal to us is a sense of otherness, perhaps of authentic possibility.
236
 These uncanny 
experiences are worth paying attention to, because we may obtain insights into the 
comprehension of Dasein. If we focus on the ways in which anxiety shows itself, we may 
gain understanding about authenticity, and, in turn, a greater comprehension of what it 
means to exist. To sum up, unlike fear which can be understood as a fear of something, 
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anxiety is a response to nothing in particular. But this nothing is more important than it 
might first seem to suggest.  
In Heidegger’s view, it is only in those intense moments when we recognize the 
inauthenticity of our lives that we may gain a glimpse of what it means to be authentic. It 
is through what he describes as the Augenblick (anxious moment of vision) that we can 
attempt to transcend our everyday life, and begin to live in a more authentic way.
237
 The 
purpose of these angst-ridden insights is to awaken Dasein to its future possibility. This is 
the mode of existence he refers to as resoluteness. For Heidegger, resoluteness is the most 
primordial truth of Dasein because it is an individual response to the call of conscience. 
In his words, “resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than 
Being-in-the-world.”
238
 What is most authentic to Dasein, for Heidegger, is its resolute 
response to the silent call that emanates from within.  
For Heidegger, anxiety represents the ontic manifestation of the ontological state of 
authenticity, since how we perceive anxiety offers insight into what it might mean to be 
authentic. Yet, for authenticity to be unique to each person, he contends that the call of 
conscience must remain unsaid.
239
 He insists that it is not through speech but via silence 
that we comprehend Dasein. To hear the call, it is necessary for each person to listen to 
her inner voice. Heidegger shows that there are three distinct ways in which we can hear 
or ignore the call of conscience. The first way is when we receive a call that we are guilty 
of something, the second is when we obtain a warning as to the possibility of being 
guilty, and the third is when we obtain an affirmation that we are not guilty.
240
 It is 
                                                 
237
 Heidegger, Being and Time, 387-8. 
238
 Heidegger, Being and Time, 348. 
239
 This notion of a silent call of conscience has a long history in Western philosophy. As Arendt 
points out, Socrates spoke of the daimon which was similar to Heidegger’s notion of Dasein in 
that it was unique to the self. See Arendt, Human Condition, 179. 
240
 Heidegger, Being and Time, 281. An example of being guilty is when we owe a debt for an 
action that has deprived another person in some way. Another instance of being guilty is by being 
responsible for causing something negative to happen. Conversely, it can be a lack of action that 
96 
 
because we can hear the call of conscience that he contends we know that we are guilty 
before we undertake a misdeed. However, the call’s purpose is not to be critical of 
Dasein’s action, but to remind Dasein of its potentiality for being. This does not 
necessarily imply that we want to have a good conscience, but rather that we are open to 
receiving the call of conscience. When the call of conscience arrives, it is often 
unexpected and, sometimes, unwanted. Moreover, it is possible for the call of conscience 
to be misinterpreted by the “they” self. Nevertheless, the call of conscience is a vital 
component of authenticity, in Heidegger’s view, since it is through this desire for a 
conscience that Dasein is able to realize its own potentiality.  
Heidegger also contends that language is critical to comprehending being. He states that 
there can be no “home” for humans outside of the realm of language, since the latter 
represents “the house of being.”
241
 We make sense of our lives through the medium of 
language. The significance of an experience, and the meaning we attest to it, arises 
through how we speak or think about the event. It is because of language that Heidegger 
argues that humans dwell in the world in a different mode than other entities, such as 
animals or things.
242
 Furthermore, he notes that language, like life, is constantly 
changing. This is why Heidegger contends that we cannot comprehend the fullness of 
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language if we consider words to be “like buckets and kegs from which we scoop a 
content.”
243
 Rather words are “wellsprings” whose meaning shifts over time and space.  
The meaning of words alters. This is one of the problems that I see with the way in which 
some scholars want to pin down the meaning of the “authentic leadership.” In doing so, 
we ignore the fullness of meaning. For instance, if we trace the etymological roots of the 
word “authentic,” we discover that it has different meanings that have been forgotten. For 
example, one meaning of “authentic” (now obsolete) is "authoritative," which derives 
from the Middle English "autentik." The word also derives from the Greek “authentēs,” 
meaning author.
244
 Perhaps if we were to translate these different meanings of the term 
into modern-day English, we could say authenticity refers to that which seems to me to 
be both authoritative and true. What this suggests to me is that a person’s sense of 
authenticity will differ depending upon her particular standpoint. 
In addition, it is only possible to live an authentic existence, according to Heidegger, 
when we come to terms with our own mortality. But facing up to our own death may be 
difficult within a social world where people who talk about death are considered 
mawkish. Instead of accepting death’s inevitability, he argues that the “they” transforms 
anxiety about dying into fear. Such a refusal to accept death represents an inauthentic 
mode of existence, since it is only possible to face death authentically by owning up to its 
eventuality. Once we accept our own mortality, this enables Dasein to release itself from 
the illusions of the “they.” Consequently, it is through our determination to be true to 
ourselves, which involves coming to terms with mortality, as well as our desire to take 
responsibility for our actions, that we can move toward a more authentic mode of being. 
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A crucial component here is recognizing our own finitude; only then can we begin to live 
an authentic existence. 
3.1.3 Destiny and Time 
For Heidegger, there can be no being outside of time because being and time form co-
determining ways of existing in the world. In his view, temporality, or our lived 
experience of time, is intrinsically related to being. Hence, we cannot think about what it 
means to be authentic without accounting for how temporality influences existence. Each 
moment of our lives is an amalgam of past, present and future. When we think about 
time, therefore, a residue of the past influences current thinking, such that previous 
knowledge and attitudes have a bearing on present situations. The present moment also 
includes the future because we are always-already oriented beyond the present moment 
toward a future act. The problem is that, at times, we become so focussed on the future 
that we can forget the present. This is why we need constantly to see time as in a sense of 
flux. Our understanding of temporality means that we are able to comprehend past 
actions, present circumstances, and decide on future possibilities. This is why he argues 
that “being” and “time” are fundamentally linked.  
Consequently, there is no “now” except in this oscillation between past, present and 
future. Time is not to be understood as in a series of “nows,” but as a constant to-ing and 
fro-ing. Here, as Simon Critchley asserts, Heidegger is contesting the Aristotelian belief 
that time occurs “as a uniform, linear and infinite series of now-points.”245 This linear 
model of time has been the mainstay of philosophy from the Greeks through to Hegel. 
Yet, according to Heidegger, this is not the way that we experience time in everyday life. 
Neither is it correct to think of time as in a Christian form of eternity. We see this 
connection between temporality and being in language in everyday phrases such as 
‘there’s no time like the present,’ or ‘time waits for no man.’ These common sayings 
reveal our implicit awareness of the interconnection between personal mortality and time. 
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This is what Heidegger refers to as a “reckoning;” he views this reckoning with time as 
elemental.  
In exploring the ontological conditions through which people relate to history, Heidegger 
differentiates between the word “fate” that relates to an individual, and the word 
“destiny” that relates to a people. In his view, inauthentic historicity manifests itself in a 
lack of steadfastness, which shows itself when people evade choosing their future. He 
contends that “[o]ur fates have already been guided in advance … Dasein’s fateful 
destiny in and with its generation goes to make up the full authentic historizing of 
Dasein.”
246
 This historical component of Dasein is intrinsically connected with time. 
Here Heidegger is suggesting that a people’s fatefulness is within their grasp. But they 
must choose not only their destiny but also their hero.  
As I will show later, it is possible that Heidegger’s initial support for National Socialism 
was because he perceived this regime as a way to awaken the German people to their 
destiny. In his infamous Rector speech, Heidegger suggests that an important aspect of a 
people’s destiny, and an indicator of Dasein’s authenticity, is its resolute loyalty to a 
particular leader. This resolute loyalty is in direct contrast to Arendt’s contention that we 
must always be on the alert against the dangers of absolute loyalty, since it may lead to a 
lack of questioning, as well as to a refusal to be responsible for one’s actions.  
I have discussed Being and Time in some detail because Heidegger’s work is 
fundamental to debates about authenticity. Similar themes resonate in Arendt’s writing, 
either in the sense of negating Heidegger’s claims about the separation of being and 
appearance, or as an ongoing dialogue as in the case of what it means to think. In the next 
section, I will contrast Arendt’s approach with Heidegger’s.  
3.2    Arendt 
I suggest that Arendt re-envisages Heidegger’s concept of authenticity through her 
discussion of uniqueness and plurality. She demonstrates that uniqueness, expressed in 
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deeds and words, is important, not only in our relationships with one another, but also in 
relation to what it means to exist. As I pointed out in chapter one, for Arendt, a person’s 
unique identity is to be understood as both relational and embodied because each time we 
act and speak we do so within an already existent web of human relationships. In her 
work, she fleshes out Heidegger’s notion of Mitsein to show that human existence is 
inherently relational, as well as temporal.  
Further, Arendt rethinks Heidegger's concept of authenticity to show that it is natality, not 
finitude, which is central to understanding existence.
247
 Her emphasis on natality stands 
in direct contrast to Heidegger’s belief that it is by coming to terms with death that a 
person can realize her potential for authenticity. Natality refers to how, with each act, we 
“insert ourselves into the world.”
248
 Each action is like a second birth since through each 
act we bring something new into the world. While Heidegger sees authenticity as 
emerging from silent resolution, for Arendt, uniqueness lies in actions. In her view, it is 
through amor mundi (love of the world) rather than a resolute carpe diem (seize the day) 
that we can work toward a more inclusive way of thinking about existence.
249
 
Arendt was no naive admirer of Heidegger.
250
 For instance, in “What is Existential 
Philosophy,” written shortly after the Second World War, she is harshly critical of his 
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philosophical approach. Here, Arendt contends that the reason he adopted the term 
Dasein, rather than man, was to avoid a discussion of Kantian definitions such as 
freedom, dignity and reason.
251
 She argues that the Heideggerian self “is a concept of 
man that leaves the individual existing independent of humanity.”
252
 A self without 
others is a meaningless concept, however, since we live together within a common 
world.
253
 Moreover, Arendt contests his claim that it is through a resolute acceptance of 
personal mortality that people learn to be authentic.  
As I mentioned in chapter one, Arendt contends that we have a desire for self-display. 
She distinguishes between self-display, which she sees as something beyond a person’s 
control, and self-presentation. Self-display is not the same as self-presentation, not least 
because appearances can be manipulated. Arendt observes that if we attempt to unveil the 
“true” identity of an animal that may have changed colour to better adapt to its 
surroundings, what we would perceive is not the truth of that creature, but another 
semblance. Similarly, when we unmask a hypocrite, this unmasking may destroy the 
deception but it does not “discover anything authentically appearing.”
254
 Thus, for 
Arendt, there is always a possibility of a deliberate manipulation in that a person can 
choose to appear in the “guise of seeming, pretense and willful deception.”
255
 The 
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problem as it relates to the question of authenticity is that we cannot know whether a 
person is being a hypocrite or not.  
Our outward appearance is not the same as showing our innermost self. As she states 
“appearance is by no means the outward manifestation of an inner disposition, if it were, 
we probably would all act and speak alike.”
256
 Arendt maintains that we do not have 
access to an internal, stable self. An ‘inside self,’ if it exists at all, never appears to either 
the inner or the outward sense.”
 257
 Rather what we perceive, she states, are inner 
sensations. These sensations present themselves to us through our emotions and moods. 
Here we see a similarity with Heidegger’s account of mood.  
A central distinction between Heidegger and Arendt, however, is her emphasis on action. 
It is how we act in the world that matters. Thus, it is not knowing who we are that matters 
but appearing to others as we would wish to appear to ourselves. In others words, it 
behooves each person, if they wish to act ethically, to be consistent in word and deed. 
She argues that whenever we appear in the world, being and appearance coincide.
258
 
Because being and appearing are the same, she states there can be no two-world theory 
that bifurcates the depth of being and the surface of appearing. Hence, we cannot go 
beyond appearances to the thing itself. Further, she maintains that scientists and 
philosophers are in error in their “relentless search for the truth behind mere 
appearances,”
259
 for it is not possible to move beyond the boundaries of perception to the 
inner sanctum of truth.  
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For Arendt, the world is like a stage upon which we arrive and disappear. Within that 
world, each person perceives things from her own particular standpoint. At times, we act 
as spectators and in other moments as actors. With each act a person differentiates 
herself. Yet such differentiation depends upon one’s ability to belong.
260
 At different 
times, the rights of people to belong to society have been denied for a variety of reasons. 
Yet it is only when each person feels that they belong that humans may flourish. In a just 
society, each person needs to be recognized and respected for who and not what they are. 
It is the focus on the “who,” understood as the unique way in which each person 
orientates herself to the world, that we are able to recognize and distinguish one another.  
The problem in modernity is that individual distinctiveness, understood as the ability to 
speak and act, is covered over by social norms and prejudices. As we saw in chapter one, 
Arendt argues that we are inclined to focus on the “whatness” of a person, that is, what 
they do rather than who they are. In becoming a “society of jobholders,” she argues that 
we have lost a deeper sense of connection with one another. In modernity, this lack of 
connection between people, together with a focus on self, has led to an increase in 
loneliness. The breakdown of communal ties allows for the emergence of totalitarian 
regimes.  
As I pointed out in chapter two, Arendt is critical of the Enlightenment’s stress on 
equality because it is often perceived in the abstract. Within such an abstract framework, 
there is little respect for difference. This is her chief objection to what she termed ‘the 
rise of the social’ in the eighteenth century, and the focus on correct ways of behaving 
rather than on individual action. Thus, for Arendt, an emphasis on equality, understood as 
sameness, is not conducive to plurality, because it is based on an abstract way of thinking 
about human relations. Moreover, too much emphasis on equality obscures the fact that 
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only some individuals are perceived as equal. For example, she argues that what makes a 
tyranny distinct is that everyone is equal with the exception of the tyrant who dictates the 
lives of others. For Arendt, human flourishing is based on the ability for each human 
being to exist in an environment that allows both equality and distinctiveness to appear. 
But, in modernity, human distinctiveness is covered over by abstract notions of equality. 
As we saw in the discussion of the pariah and the parvenu in the previous chapter, is not 
who we are, but who we are allowed to be.  
Furthermore, social conformity can be dangerous for those who are not perceived as in 
compliance with social dictates. If a person does not conform, this may result in isolation 
and loneliness and, in extreme situations, conformity may threaten the very basis of 
humanity. In its most sinister form, as in totalitarian regimes, absolute orthodoxy can 
result in a denial of a people’s right to exist. In her preface to Men and Dark Times, 
Arendt observes that Heidegger’s observations of ‘the they’ were uncannily precise. She 
writes: “[i]n his description of human existence, everything that is real or authentic is 
assaulted by the overwhelming power of “mere talk.”
261
 Hence, Arendt perceives 
Heidegger’s account of the “they” as prescient, given what was to transpire in Nazi 
Germany, and the destruction of a plural society.  
In this section, I have shown how Arendt’s work both complements and contradicts 
Heidegger’s approach to authenticity. She demonstrates how important it is to take into 
account self and world. Furthermore, a plurality of perspective is something that runs 
contrary to what she terms the Leader Principle, as I will now show. 
3.3 The Leader Principle 
In chapter one, we saw how the problem with the separation of leadership into those who 
think and those who act brought about a hierarchical way of thinking about human 
relationships. What happens in modernity, according to Arendt, is the emergence of 
totalitarianism and the success of “the Leader Principle,” which leads to the willful 
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destruction of pluralistic society, since it is based upon total obedience. In her study of 
the origins of totalitarianism, Arendt sees a connection between the beginnings of this 
destructive force and nineteenth-century imperialism. For instance, she contends that 
empire building has always been concerned with hierarchies of raced and sexed bodies. 
Arendt shows how, in the nineteenth century, many democratically-minded European 
nations were complicit in the creation of race-based thinking. Chief amongst these was 
England’s desire to create an empire based upon trade, no matter the cost to others. She 
perceives a link between the colonial mentality and the rise of totalitarianism. 
Nineteenth-century expansionist policies sacrificed others’ lives for greed and profit. This 
instrumental way of acting, coupled with a complete disregard for human life, opened the 
way for totalitarianism to emerge in the twentieth century. Hence, for Arendt, the 
destructive exploits of nineteenth-century imperialism led the way to the rise of 
totalitarianism.  
Phenomenologically, a significant feature of totalitarian rule is that there is no personal 
responsibility for any act, other than that of the leader. Arendt sees this lack of personal 
accountability as symptomatic of the failings of modernity. She maintains that totalitarian 
leaders like Hitler led in a different manner from a tyrant. One main difference is that 
while tyrants use people as scapegoats to maintain power, in totalitarian regimes, 
everything is conducted based on the will of the leader.
262
 For example, in Nazi 
Germany, all acts were carried out in the name of the Fuehrer. The Leadership Principle 
decreed that Hitler’s word superseded written law.
263
 In effect, this meant that Hitler was 
personally responsible for all official action. In practical terms, this way of leading 
resulted in each official acting as the living embodiment of the Fuehrer in obeisance to 
his every command. What happens when a Leader claims total responsibility in this 
manner is that there is a lack of personal accountability on the part of everyone else.  
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Furthermore, because of this centralized power in the hands of one man it seems to the 
outside world as if the only person who knows what is happening is the leader. Thus, 
Arendt is in agreement with Hitler's statement that without him, Nazi Germany could not 
exist.
264
 The main problem with the “Leader Principle” is that these regimes undermine 
the public realm. People stop taking responsibility for their actions and at first are willing, 
and then forced, to give up their freedom in favour of what appears to be strong 
leadership. Another salient feature of the totalitarian state is mobility. Constant changes 
of direction by the Leader ensure that people are kept off-guard. Thus, members of the 
elite are constantly changing. These alterations in personnel enabled Hitler to ensure rival 
factions did not obtain too much power. In this way, the Leader proves that he is not only 
infallible, but indispensible. While there is mobility within the system, for the majority of 
citizens, freedom of movement and speech is constrained. 
Arendt often conceives of politics in terms of spatial metaphors. For instance, she likens 
constitutional government to a space where the law is like a hedge placed between 
buildings. The space provided by this metaphorical hedge allows for dialogue and debate 
which, in turn, enables human flourishing. Conversely, Arendt argues that tyranny is akin 
to a desert where the tyrant’s will to dominate functions like a sandstorm that overtakes 
travelers. Conversely, totalitarianism has no spatial topology because it acts “like an iron 
band of terror”
265
 that compresses people together until it appears as if there is no 
opposition, since everybody speaks with one voice. In reality, differences of opinion are 
contained by this concentration of power. What seems, on the surface, to be an equality 
of voice is, in fact, the destruction of different viewpoints by means of force and 
violence.  
In Arendt’s view, it is not the totalitarian leader’s personality that is important, but his 
organizational skills. Thus, she maintains that Max Weber was incorrect to perceive 
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charisma as necessary for leadership success.
266
 Arendt observes that both Stalin and 
Hitler were able, prior to coming to power, to build around them a group of people who 
were totally loyal since they owed their appointment to the leader. Unquestioning loyalty 
by followers is central to any totalitarian leader’s success, since it ensures that no matter 
what a leader requests there will always be followers willing to carry out the orders.
267
 It 
is this unquestioning loyalty that is so dangerous, because it ensures that someone will be 
willing to do what the leader says.  
What also distinguishes a totalitarian state from other forms of rule is that the regime is 
based on the Leader’s infallibility, whose success, in turn, is built upon fabrication. Lies 
are necessary so that people, whether members of the ruling elite or the mass, see the 
Leader as intrinsic to their future well-being. The Leader's absolute command and total 
sense of assurance brings with it a false sense of security. After the defeat that Germany 
suffered following World War One, Hitler’s leadership appeared to offer an alternative to 
past humiliations. Arendt contends that while most of the German population admired 
Hitler’s leadership, these sympathizers did not know the full extent of what was taking 
place. Only the inner elite were apprised of the Leader’s objectives. The naive followers 
express their loyalty to the Leader, while the elite carry out criminal activity in a cynical 
way. Moreover, each totalitarian regime adopts a distinctive ideology to obtain its long-
range goal of world domination. In the case of the Nazis, their vision was based on Aryan 
supremacy. Because the realization of world domination cannot take place within a single 
lifetime, what makes leaders like Hitler able to retain power is partly because their 
pronouncements cannot be defeated by rational argument. Factual truth is denied in 
favour of the totalitarian leader’s vision, which is based on lies and delusions. Whether 
the leader is morally right or wrong becomes irrelevant. Under such conditions, 
knowledge is disconnected from truth since claims to factual truth are no longer 
considered necessary. 
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In this section, I have examined Arendt's thinking on the emergence of totalitarianism, 
and its historical antecedents. I wanted to offer some historical and philosophical context 
for why totalitarianism emerged in the twentieth century. Now I want to turn to questions 
of ethical responsibility and leadership.  
3.4 Morality in Dark Times 
In the interviews I conducted, the connection between questions of ethics and the notion 
of personal authenticity in leadership emerged. While most interview participants stated 
that authenticity was important in regards to leading ethically, not everyone agreed. In 
one interview, for example, Olive argued that the problem with theories like authentic 
leadership is that they fail to account for the "ancient problem of dirty hands." I want to 
look more closely at this question of “dirty hands” by exploring the connections among 
authenticity, morality and individual responsibility.  
In her essay “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” Arendt argues that the 
controversy that ensued over the publication of her book on the trial of Adolf Eichmann 
raised moral issues that she had not anticipated.
268
 Her detractors argued it was wrong for 
Arendt to judge men like Eichmann, since each one of us might have been morally 
culpable under similar circumstances. While her critics maintained she was wrong to 
judge, Arendt insists that judging is crucial to an ethical worldview. Moral judgments are 
necessary because without a willingness to judge, the world alters without us noticing. To 
illustrate her argument, Arendt describes how when she was growing up in Germany in 
the early part of the twentieth century, there was little attention paid to moral issues 
because ethical conduct was assumed. In hindsight, she sees this early moral 
disintegration in German society as a prelude to the abominations that were to follow.  
In the 1930s and 1940s in Germany and Russia, Arendt argues that established moral 
standards collapsed. This moral decline was more heinous in Nazi Germany, she states, 
because there was a tacit acceptance from all strata of society to accept a new way of 
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thinking about morality. The German people knew what the Nazis were like because 
Hitler did not hide his intentions. In her view, the true moral crimes were not carried out 
by the Nazis, who acted out of some perverted sense of commitment to Hitler, but by 
ordinary Germans. For Arendt, morality collapses when ordinary people choose to go 
along with a regime they find morally repugnant. It is precisely when people choose to 
acquiesce with the majority and refuse to make individual judgments that ethical conduct 
is found wanting. One way this moral disintegration can be seen, she states, is that at the 
moment of Nazi defeat, German morality changed once more. What the world witnessed, 
therefore, was a total collapse of a “moral” order not once but twice, which begs the 
question of how is it possible for society to change its ethical standards so abruptly. 
Arendt contends that this ethical disintegration reveals morality’s true meaning “as a set 
of mores, of customs and manners, which could be exchanged for another set with no 
more trouble than it would take to change the table manners of a whole people.”
269
 She 
further maintains that the first people to accept this new set of values were respectable 
members of society. What this demonstrates is that polite society is not the best judge of 
moral standards.
270
  
The problem when we conform to social mores is that at times of crisis we no longer 
know how to act. But, if not to moral standards, then where should a person turn at times 
of crisis? Well, according to Arendt, not to religious doctrine. In Nazi Germany, for 
instance, religion proved of little assistance in guarding against moral failings because a 
person’s religious beliefs were regarded as a private matter. And while moral philosophy 
may teach us how to act in times of peace, it is not sufficient in a crisis. At such critical 
junctures, she maintains that the Socratic way of thinking is “the only working morality 
in borderline situations.”
271
 Socrates argued that the reason why it is better to suffer than 
to do wrong is because it is preferable to disagree with others, “rather than that I, being 
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one, should be out of tune with myself and contradict myself.”
272
 From this perspective, 
the reason not to commit evil is because it would be hard to live with oneself. This, in 
Arendt’s view, is our best defense against evil. 
In her discussion of moral responsibility, Arendt considers how other philosophers have 
thought about ethical conduct. For instance, Kant argued that it was necessary to have an 
imperative to keep the will (an individual facet that she argues was unknown to the 
ancients) in harmony with reason.
273
 This is why he argued that every inclination, both 
good and bad, were temptations that led one astray. From Kant’s viewpoint, people do 
evil things because of temptation. Contra Socrates, he argued that self-contempt was not 
enough to guard against immoral acts because a man can lie to himself. For Kant, moral 
conduct is an internal matter.
274
 Thus, his categorical imperative serves as a moral 
compass that helps individuals guard against human frailty. To obey the Kantian 
categorical imperative means to obey reason and, in doing so, remain in harmony with 
oneself. With the laws of nature one has no choice but to obey; therefore, Kant 
maintained it made no sense to say that a person obeys the laws of nature. Conversely, 
with moral law, each person is obligated to obey the laws of the land. When a person 
obeys the law of the land, he accordingly obeys himself. (Unintentionally, Arendt 
suggests, Kant divorced moral philosophy from religion when he argued that man, not 
God, was the basis for the law of morality.) In placing the duties a man has to himself 
above those responsibilities he has towards others, this leads to a contradiction whereby it 
is love of the self, rather than love of others, that compels us to do right. The problem 
with this viewpoint is that it turns the self into the ultimate standard of what is morally 
good. As the self can lie, it should never be the sole arbiter of morality. Instead, we must 
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look for a more worldly and intersubjective activity, which Arendt argues exists through 
our most plural faculty, judgement.  
Originally a theory related to aesthetics, Kant’s notion of good taste serves as the basis 
for the Arendtian notion of judgement. Arendt regards judgement as exemplary because 
of its intersubjective nature. Through the act of judging a person can take not only her 
own perspective into account as she does in solitary reflection, but also consider the 
views of others. In the act of judging, Arendt states, one must attempt to come to a 
potential agreement with the company of others who may or may not agree with one’s 
position but with whom eventually one needs to fashion some kind of concord. Being 
willing to consider an issue from different perspectives is why she argued that judgement 
is the most essential activity to ensure the flourishing of the world. Having the confidence 
to judge for ourselves is vital if we are to save humanity from totalitarian-like ways of 
thinking. Being willing to disagree with others is critical if one intends to take a 
principled stance.
275
 This is especially important in times of crisis where there is no 
moral guidebook to follow because the situation is novel. Hence, Arendt asserts that, in 
periods of moral upheaval, it is neither heroes nor saints that are needed, but ordinary 
people who are willing to take a moral stance, which entails judging for oneself.  
For Arendt, “an individual’s personal quality is their ‘moral’ quality.”
276
 This she terms 
the moral standard of the self. But this standard is not wholly sufficient. In addition to 
this personal characteristic, it is important that there be a moral standard of the world. To 
understand this more fully, we need to turn to another thinker. Arendt regards 
Machiavelli’s famous statement in The Prince that rulers have to be taught “how not to 
be good”
277
 as astute because he recognized that it is not whether a person’s conduct is 
good that matters, but whether that person’s conduct is “good for the world he lives 
                                                 
275
 Here we might remember Keith Grint’s idea of the constructive dissenter that I mentioned in 
chapter one. Constructive dissent is important because it enables us to think for ourselves, rather 
than going along with the majority.  
276
 Arendt, “Some Questions of Moral Philosophy,” 79. 
277
 Arendt, Human Condition, 77. 
112 
 
in.”
278
 For Machiavelli, in ruling the standard is always political, and, as such, always 
worldly. From this perspective, wrongdoing is a necessary evil for leaders. To return to 
the issue of dirty hands, I introduced earlier, perhaps we can argue that a leader 
sometimes has to make decisions that may negatively influence others. Ultimately, what 
is important is whether one’s leadership conduct is good for the world.  
Self and world must be taken into consideration if leaders wish to be ethical in their 
decision-making. Without taking self and world into account, there can be disastrous 
consequences. For example, we saw in chapter two how Robespierre’s apparent goodness 
wreaked devastation on the French people, as he tried to root out hypocrisy wherever it 
could be found. For Arendt, goodness has no place on the political stage, since once 
goodness shows itself it becomes corrupted.
279
 As she explains in On Revolution, we can 
never be certain of a person’s good intentions because we cannot see into the depths of 
the human heart. Furthermore, as Dana Villa argues, a demand for authenticity can turn 
leaders into fanatics.
280
 This is why Arendt, states Villa, is fiercely opposed to a politics 
of authenticity, because it transforms actors into hypocrites.
281
 He sees a difficulty with 
Arendt’s desire to separate action from morality is that celebrating a Machiavellian 
concept of virtu can cause amoral attitudes in leaders. But also the political actor cannot 
always distance himself from the fact of “dirty hands.” Sometimes, it may be necessary to 
choose the lesser evil.  
But how do we guard against leaders committing evil on a regular basis? Is evil 
indicative of a lack of forethought? This connection between evil and thoughtlessness is 
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Arendt’s main thesis in her study of the trial of Adolf Eichmann, where she argues that 
evil arises when leaders fail to reflect upon what they do.
282
 Rather than being radical, as 
Kant contended, she argues that evil arises through banality, and is often a result of 
putting oneself first. Arendt suggests that acts of evil occur whenever there is an absence 
of thought. By contrast, when a person engages in thinking, she is grounded in memory. 
Because of this internal memory, it is impossible for a thoughtful person to do evil 
because “knowing that he has to live with himself, there will be limits to what he can 
permit himself to do.”
283
 Here we see again the Socratic basis of Arendt’s thought on 
questions of moral responsibility. A lack of forethought demonstrates a failure to care. 
Moreover, to refuse to question a leader’s orders is, over time, to destroy one’s moral 
sensibility. Arendt insists that limitless evil is possible only when reflective thinking is 
absent.  
In considering questions of guilt and innocence, Arendt maintains that these attributes 
can only be applied to individuals. This is why she is fundamentally opposed to the 
notion of collective guilt as it can result in a feigned equality. In her view, collective guilt 
may lead to a lack of personal responsibility on the part of those individuals who commit 
immoral acts. Arendt maintains that “it is as wrong to feel guilty without having done 
anything specific as it is to feel free of all guilt if one actually is guilty of something.”
284
 
She argues that collective guilt is a misnomer, because “no moral, individual and 
personal, standards of conduct will ever be able to excuse us from collective 
responsibility.”
285
 When it comes to moral questions, Arendt contends that an ethical 
response “concerns the individual in his singularity.”
286
 She sees a connection between 
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legal and moral issues since when someone is brought to justice, they always appear as an 
individual. In a courtroom, the answer that someone carried out an act because he was 
following orders is never sufficient, because it does not address the question of why, as 
an individual, a person chose to respond in a particular manner. 
Yet Arendt maintains that most Nazis brought to trial denied that there was anything 
personal about their actions, contending that they were merely following orders. This was 
the argument that Eichmann used at his trial, to her dismay. This refusal to take 
responsibility for one’s actions is, from an Arendtian perspective, an immoral act. But 
many Nazis officers maintained that it was their duty to obey, rather than think for 
themselves. The Nazi fallacy about obedience can be traced back to the Platonic notion 
that a body politic consists of the ruler who commands, and the ruled who obey orders. In 
her view, obedience leads to a lack of personal responsibility. Contra Kant, Arendt 
contends that the word “obedience” has no place in a legal or moral framework. It is 
those who refuse to obey, and act out of personal conviction who demonstrate true 
leadership in Arendt’s view. Their actions express a willingness to become personally 
involved in the public sphere. In contrast, blind obedience to a regime shows a lack of 
personal responsibility. 
In this section, we have seen how judgement is critical to a person’s authenticity, 
especially in times of crisis. In totalitarian regimes, being willing to judge for oneself is 
necessary if the regime is ever to be overthrown. One of the problems that Arendt 
highlights is the way that people went along with the Nazis, out of some perverted sense 
of belief that such a regime could bring about a fundamental change in society. 
Moreover, the changes that are wrought by totalitarian regimes serve to suppress human 
flourishing in favour of a belief in the certainty of an ideology that is connected to the 
Leader Principle that worked by valorizing one person’s vision over all others. As such, it 
is contrary to human freedom since one person’s sovereignty negates plurality. 
3.5 Authentic Visions? 
Previously, I stated that Arendt’s views on uniqueness and plurality are important to 
counterbalance notions of leadership that put too much emphasis on the self. As an 
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example of her argument, it might be useful to consider Heidegger’s unsuccessful attempt 
at putting his leadership vision into action. In April 1933, he was elected Rector of 
Freiburg University. In his Inaugural Address, he stated that the purpose of the Rectorate 
is to provide “spiritual leadership” to students and faculty.
287
 Heidegger contended that 
the “essence” of a German university could only be revealed if and when leaders are 
committed to its mission. To realize this mission, what was required was “leaders and 
guardians [who] possess the strictest clarity of the highest, widest, and richest 
knowledge.”
288
 Each leader must hold fast to their vocation. This is not due to a desire 
for power, but rather that in keeping to a resolute stance a leader finds strength of 
purpose. In his address, he called for a transformation of the university system from a 
“technical organization-institutional pseudo-unity” into a genuine place where learning 
will occur. A battle needs to be fought between professors and their students who 
collectively would transform the university into an environment where students would 
receive discipline and preparation for “the highest service.” But Heidegger was not given 
the opportunity to develop a different kind of university because his leadership was to 
prove unpopular with faculty and students. He was to fall out with the student leadership 
because of their desire to post the “Jew Notice.” His initial refusal to allow the Reich 
Student Leadership to post this notice led to a reprimand by the Nazi hierarchy. In April 
1934, Heidegger resigned from his post.
289
   
Reflecting upon his brief leadership experience, Heidegger states that his unpopularity as 
a leader was because he had little interest in the minutiae of institutional life.
290
 He 
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describes his initial reluctance to become Rector. It was his predecessor, Wilhemn von 
Mollendorf, dismissed because of his left-leaning politics, who had encouraged 
Heidegger to put his name forward. In describing his term in office, Heidegger explains 
that it was his spiritual vision that propelled him forward. It appears that he had no 
interest in everyday matters; what mattered to him was to return the German university to 
its true “historical vocation in the Western world.”
291
 Forging positive relationships was 
less important than establishing a modern university based on platonic ideals. Through 
his leadership, he hoped to create “a gathering of what is German unto the historical 
essence of the West.
292
  His purpose in becoming Rector was to try to instill his authentic 
vision onto an institution, and he saw in the Nazi movement the potential to bring this 
transformation about. In remembering this period, Heidegger admits to being impressed 
with the glory of National Socialism. He explains that his decision to join the party was 
one he did for the good of the university.
293
 Furthermore, Heidegger suggests that it is 
only those who do not reflect sufficiently on the matter who would see his Rectorial 
Address as being in support of National Socialism. 
Heidegger’s explanation and initial support of the Nazi regime suggests to me that he saw 
strong leadership as important to the well-being and destiny of the German people. But 
he severely misjudged Hitler’s megalomania. What Heidegger shows is a lack of 
judgement, together with an unwillingness to admit he was in error.
294
 In his defense, 
Heidegger maintains that he adopted Nietzsche’s will to power in his speech as Rector to 
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show how there was a deficiency in the world that had been caused by secularism. He 
describes himself as being “not so wise” as to realize where Nazism would lead.
295
 What 
Heidegger’s disastrous foray into leadership suggests to me, however, is that strong 
personal visions, when they do not take the world into account, can lead to self-delusion 
and a lack of good judgement. This is why leaders cannot rely solely on self-knowledge 
as their guide.
296
  
By contrast to Heidegger, Arendt did not view herself as a leader. Indeed, as I pointed out 
in chapter one, she argued that leadership was unbecoming to women, since it was 
unfeminine.
297
 Yet when we review her actions both before and during the Second World 
War, I suggest that she demonstrates courage and leadership. In her interview with 
Günther Gaus, she describes herself as apolitical during her early adulthood.
298
 With the 
rise of National Socialism and the burning of the Reichstag in 1933, she argues that it 
was impossible to remain a bystander. At the age of twenty-six, Arendt began to engage 
in political activity at some risk to her own safety. At the request of Kurt Blumenfeld, 
President of the Zionist Organization, she began attending different events in various 
clubs in Berlin, as well as reading professional journals, to build a collection of what the 
Nazis were doing. Because of her activity, she was arrested by the police. During her 
eight days in prison she was interrogated by a police officer. In order not to give herself 
and or her comrades away, she spun him many stories about what she was doing. In the 
meantime, her Zionist colleagues obtained a Jewish lawyer to help her case. However, 
Arendt decided to send the lawyer away because she trusted the police officer, because he 
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had an honest face. When she is released, she and her mother make their escape from 
Germany first to Prague, and later Switzerland. Finally, Arendt made her way to Paris 
where she was to spend the next eight years before emigrating to The United States.
299
  
In the same interview, Arendt states that what disheartened her most about what took 
place in Germany before and during the Second World War was the way in which people 
co-operated with the Nazis. Arendt’s dislike of intellectuals arises from observing people 
she knew voluntarily step in line. It is of note that she believed that there is something 
about intellectuals that encouraged this activity. For example, she argues that “I still think 
that it belongs to the essence of being an intellectual that one fabricates ideas.”
300
 What 
was worse was that some intellectuals actually believed in Nazism, partly because they 
were trapped by their ideas.
301
 It is hard not to read a condemnation of Heidegger’s 
actions in her comments.  
In the correspondence between Karl Jaspers, her doctoral supervisor and friend, Arendt 
expresses her anger at what she saw as Heidegger’s betrayal of Edmund Husserl. In 
accordance with Nazi instructions, and in his role as Rector, Heidegger did end up 
signing a letter dismissing all Jewish professors; this act created an irrevocable rift 
between him and Husserl. She contends that Husserl would have been indifferent if the 
letter had been signed by someone else. Because Heidegger personally signed the letter 
dismissing his former mentor, this was a deep shock to Husserl. For both Jaspers and 
Arendt, he had a choice in that he could have resigned, rather than signing the letter 
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dismissing the man who had been his mentor.
302
 In his desire to promote his vision, 
Heidegger failed to take into account his own philosophy, namely that care is 
fundamental to being in the world. Without care, which shows itself in the manner in 
which we act towards others, leadership lacks Mitsein.  
In this section, I have tried to show how differently Arendt and Heidegger dealt with the 
difficult circumstances of the Second World War. What we see in their different actions, I 
suggest, is a greater willingness on the part of Arendt to consider both self and world. 
Heidegger’s authentic vision was so all-encompassing that it led him to forget our 
personal responsibility to care for others. I think that Arendt provides us with a deeper, 
more relational understanding of the way in which ethics, authenticity and leadership 
connect. I want to turn now to explore the question of ethics in relation to how their work 
has been interpreted by different scholars. 
3.5.1 Questions of Ethics 
The Platonic model that Heidegger was attracted to, according to Julia Kristeva, is 
diametrically opposed to Arendt’s emphasis on intersubjectivity.
303
 This difference has a 
profound effect on the way these thinkers view questions of ethics.
304
 An Arendtian 
notion of ethical action is founded upon a commitment to others. In The Human 
Condition, Arendt argues that we demonstrate this loyalty to one another through 
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promise-making and forgiveness.
305
 It is important to keep to our promises because this 
is the only way to compensate for the vagaries of action. We forgive each other because it 
is the right thing to do. While we can never forgive a heinous act, we can pardon the 
wrongdoer. It was because of her belief in the power of forgiveness that Kristeva argues 
that Arendt forgave Heidegger for his Nazi involvement. Such acts of forgiveness are 
fundamental to the Arendtian notion of plurality because they enable each of us to start 
anew.  
Joanna Hodge argues Heidegger’s lack of judgement in connecting himself with Hitler’s 
regime makes it hard to decouple his philosophy from his politics. Yet Heidegger’s 
political failings need not outweigh his philosophical insights into the problems of 
metaphysics. By questioning the place of ethics in metaphysics, Hodge argues he opens 
up the possibility to rethink ethical relations. For instance, in his critique of instrumental 
ways of being, Heidegger shows how, in modernity, we privilege abstract thinking over 
the ways in which we live in the world.
306
 The problem we face is that ethics has stopped 
being concerned with thinking about human flourishing. Instead, ethics becomes linked 
to particular issues. Current versions of ethics that proliferate in medical, educational and 
political environments are not what Heidegger meant by ethics. As an example ethics is 
sometimes linked to specific outcomes, which I suggest obscures a deeper understanding 
of ethics as care.  
Furthermore, in modernity, questions of ethics have become subordinated to technology 
as opposed to being rooted in an understanding of human flourishing. But ethics is 
fundamentally about responsiveness. Indeed, Jacob Golomb argues that an ethics of 
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authenticity seeks to provide the conditions of a genuine morality.
307
 While Heidegger 
badly misjudged the political climate of Nazi Germany, he does have much to offer in 
terms of a critique of instrumental reason. For example, he shows that acting in terms of 
having predetermined ends is unethical, since it subordinates human relations to 
instrumental ways of relating. The trouble with instrumentality is that it limits human 
expression. Moreover, when language becomes instrumental, it loses significance. By 
viewing the world in instrumental ways, we objectify things, and truth, rather than being 
a question, becomes a matter of certainty. Hodge argues that any ethical investigation 
requires reflection on “ethical questions of action, responsibility, evaluation and 
judgement.”
308
 This may not always be central to Heidegger’s project, but it sounds very 
pertinent to Arendtian thought. 
In his brief discussion on ethics, Heidegger contends that ethics is under the sway of 
metaphysics. In Letter on Humanism, for instance, he maintains that thinking stopped 
with the foundation of ethics, logics and physics.
309
 In his view, morality and ethics are 
part of a metaphysical way of thinking that from Plato onwards has barred us from the 
truth of being. Despite his claims to the contrary, many critics search for an ethics in his 
work. For example, Tom Greaves contends that Heidegger’s work is profoundly ethical, 
since his writing encourages us to make a distinction between those actions we undertake 
in a genuine way, and those acts we take up because everyone else does.
310
 As well, 
Mariana Ortega suggests that you can discover an ethics in Being and Time.
311
 Rather 
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than being anti-ethical, she claims that due to its ontological structure, “Dasein has the 
possibility of being ethical.”
312
 Ortega further contends that Heidegger connects his 
phenomenological findings with ethics in his account of authenticity as properness and 
resoluteness. In doing so, he equates living a moral life with the call of conscience. While 
it is true that in his discussion of guilt, Heidegger shows that it must be possible to detach 
individual notions of what it means to be authentic from moral notions of right and 
wrong, it is Arendt who reveals why conventional ways of thinking about morality have 
the potential to be damaging to human relationships. This is one reason why it is vital to 
critique an understanding of leadership as sovereignty or mastery. I suggest, therefore, 
that Arendt provides us with a more ethically enriched way of thinking about leadership, 
which I will now consider in more depth. 
3.5.2 Leadership 
As we saw in chapter one, Arendt argues that the notion of the strong leader is a myth 
since it is only through working with people that actions become accomplished. She 
considers Nietzsche to be the first philosopher to understand fully how men gain pleasure 
from control over others. It is by association with authority that she contends that a 
person begins to experience a “feeling of superiority which comes from wielding 
power.”
313
 Arendt is adamant that leadership should not be identified with a role but is 
context specific - that is, whenever a group converges, a leader will emerge. This is an 
organic way of thinking about leadership rather than one that is founded on hierarchy. It 
stands in contrast to commonplace notions of leadership, which are based on a profound 
unfairness which, as she demonstrates, serves to privilege the few over the many. But the 
notion of the exceptional man or woman is incorrect because no-one can control the 
outcome of her actions. We all need others to help us. For Arendt, it is the courageous 
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act, rather than the person who enacts it, that is deemed worthy of greatness. 
Accordingly, heroism means having the courage to take a stand publically. This is 
something that everyone is capable of rather than the heroic few.  
Arendt suggests that leadership functions best when it arises out of collective action 
rather than being directed by a person in charge. Rather than a leader setting something in 
motion for others to carry out, the leader’s success depends upon the assistance of others. 
Seen in this light, a leader is no more than “primus inter pares, the first among his 
peers.”
314
 It is not leadership that is dangerous to plurality, but leadership in the form of 
mastery. It is important to note that for Arendt there is nothing wrong with power per se. 
The problem is that we confuse the productive nature of power with the negative effects 
of violence. Hence, power is always about potential, and derives from the collective 
action of people.
315
 Conversely, tyranny arises whenever people are denied the basic 
form of political organization - that is, speaking and acting together.  
Seyla Benhabib distinguishes between Arendt’s notion of the agonistic and associational 
public realm. The agonistic public realm constitutes, in Arendtian terms, a place where 
excellence can be displayed. This competitive realm is one where people vie for 
recognition to ensure that moral valour and political pre-eminence come to the fore. The 
agonal space differentiates people. Benhabib makes the interesting observation that 
Arendt’s description of the polis is a domestication of the war hero in favour of 
Aristotle’s notion of the citizen who speaks and persuades. In so doing, Benhabib argues 
that Arendt performs a feminist transformation of the violent hero into reasoned citizen. 
In Arendt’s depiction of the associational public space, what is noteworthy is how 
humans come together. Within the associational realm, for a short time, places turn into 
sites of power, whenever people use speech and persuasion to consider future action, 
such as a kitchen table where dissidents gather together to discuss political activity.
 316
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In Arendt’s view, successful leadership is about collaboration through dialogue and 
debate, rather than ruling through command and control. But too often the systems under 
which we live are not conducive to human flourishing. We have seen how spontaneity is 
suppressed when a society expects its inhabitants to conform. I want to conclude by 
exploring ethical dilemmas involved within the modern context of bureaucratic life.
317
 
3.5.3 Bureaucracy 
In The Origins of Totalitarianism, as I indicated earlier, Arendt discusses the connections 
between race-based thinking and bureaucracy. What connects these seemingly disparate 
ideas is the disregard for uniqueness. Within a bureaucracy, uniqueness is threatened 
because each person is seen as expendable. Arendt regards bureaucracy as “the least 
human and most cruel form of rulership,” because leaders refuse to take responsibility for 
their actions, and encourage others to do likewise.
318
 There is a connection between 
systems of bureaucracy and totalitarian-like ways of thinking since both function to 
suppress plurality of viewpoints. Arendt also sees a negative correlation between 
obedience and bureaucracy because together they work to deny uniqueness in favour of 
conformity. Impersonal systems have a detrimental effect on those who attempt to 
humanize them. Such systematic approaches to social life reinforce inequality because a 
voiceless, autonomous way of life serves to deny, or suppress, individual expression.  
As we saw in Burns’ critique of bureaucracy in chapter one, what is demanded in 
bureaucracy is assent, not dissent. In response, people may feel alienated and refuse to 
take responsibility for their actions, preferring to hide behind corporate policies and 
institutional rules. One of the ways that we see this is with phrases such as “I’d like to 
help but...” or “This is the way that it’s done here.” This lack of ownership is indicative 
of how individuals lose their identity in the bureaucratic speech of the “they.”  
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Thus what Arendt calls the no-man rule of bureaucracy is damaging to plurality and 
uniqueness. Within the context of the work environment, plurality means not only that 
everyone is permitted to speak, but that they are encouraged to express dissenting 
opinions. In fact, the space of appearance can only be truly plural when people come 
together in the knowledge that their contributions will be received with openness. Yet 
such openness occurs infrequently within the modern workplace. This is partly due to the 
hierarchical nature of bureaucracy, whereby institutions prefer conformity to freedom of 
expression, but also because of a fear of reprisals on the part of many employees. 
Without the freedom to dialogue and debate with one another, genuine engagement may 
be curtailed. When the multiplicity of human expression is lost, so too is an ability for 
genuine interaction.  
For Arendt, each one of us has the capacity to reflect upon our actions. Yet, many times 
we choose not to take the time to do this necessary reflection. She was enamoured with 
the Socratic notion of the inner voice that guides us in the decisions that we make. This 
inner relationship is not always one of concord. Rather, this inner voice represents an 
internal dialogue that incorporates both thinking and judging. Not only does this mean 
having confidence in one’s view but also leaving room for doubt. Doubting is a necessary 
part of the thinking process because it enables us to bring to light alternative perspectives. 
In many organizational settings, it becomes easier to go along with whatever bureaucratic 
decision is made, rather than taking the time to figure out whether or not we agree. This 
is part of the problem when action usurps thinking. For a robust public space, both have 
to be in productive tension. But it also means that people must be willing to disregard a 
leader’s request if it is considered unethical, and be willing to take a stand. Only then will 
we be able to create more caring and thoughtful working environments that are not prone 
to the alienation, mistrust and obtuseness common in bureaucratic and political life.  
3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have compared the work of Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger as it 
pertains to authenticity, ethical responsibility and leadership. I have contended that 
Arendt enriches Heidegger’s concept of authenticity through her stress on uniqueness. 
She shows that it is plurality, not singularity that is central to understanding existence. 
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Arendt’s emphasis on natality demonstrates that it is life not death that is vital to 
comprehending human existence. Each person’s uniqueness is crucial to an Arendtian 
worldview. Such uniqueness has always to be tempered by a commitment to take self and 
world into account.  
For Arendt, a world built around the self is insufficient to ensure that we care for one 
another, and can lead to a lack of genuine responsiveness. By contrast, uniqueness and 
plurality represent the ethical foundation of our intricate web of human relationships. In 
order to be ethically responsible, it is necessary to be willing to put forward one’s 
viewpoint and, where necessary, make a judgement. If we do not, as Arendt shows us in 
her depiction of the moral disintegration that took place in Nazi Germany, our 
environment may alter without us noticing. When the public arena starts to disintegrate, it 
becomes easier for people to refrain from taking a particular stance and behave as if they 
were no more than cogs in a machine. This is dangerous because it leads to a lack of 
personal responsibility. In its most dire form, in totalitarian regimes, it results in the 
destruction of the common world. Without a shared, common world, there can be no 
caring relationships. Arendt regards caring as a relationship between self and world, 
defined by our respect for one another which we demonstrate through our actions. An 
ethical approach as it relates to authenticity and leadership requires not just an internal 
sense of purpose, but also receptiveness towards others. Part of this responsiveness 
necessitates being willing to think from different perspectives than one’s own, as I hope 
to show further in the final chapter. Before then, we will consider methodological 
approaches to questions of phenomenology. 
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Chapter 4  
4 Troubling Method 
In the last chapter, I concluded by suggesting that authenticity requires not just an 
internal sense of purpose, but also a responsiveness towards others. Such a responsive 
orientation necessitates being willing to think from different perspectives so as to enrich 
one’s understanding. Arendt described this activity as “thinking without bannisters,” 
which requires a person to move beyond the constraints of their own assumptions. As 
part of my attempt to ‘think without bannisters,’ and enhance my understanding of the 
connections among gender, authenticity and leadership, I conducted a qualitative study. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to explain my qualitative approach, which is in the 
tradition of existential hermeneutic phenomenology, coupled with a feminist orientation.  
I have entitled this chapter “troubling method,” because I find distinctions between terms 
such as “method,” “methodology,” and “theory” somewhat perplexing, as it is not always 
clear to me where one begins and the other ends. While social scientists try to distinguish 
between these concepts, I find it more difficult to do so. In thinking about this issue, I am 
also concerned with how gaining knowledge of a technique – in this case 
phenomenological methodology - informs my inquiry. Thus, troubling method is my 
attempt to comprehend how my feminist orientation may enhance or restrict 
phenomenological inquiry, and vice-versa.
319
  
In thinking about the connection with feminism and phenomenology, I tried to find a 
balance between these different perspectives. But this was no easy task. While feminist 
phenomenology has found its voice, Linda Fisher questions whether feminist inquiry is as 
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“noisy” as phenomenology.
320
 She suggests that feminists need to “amplify” their voices 
to critique and unsettle the phenomenological tradition. In this chapter, I hope to partially 
answer Fisher’s “call to action” for feminist researchers to push phenomenology further - 
in this particular case, so as to pursue the ways in which gender, authenticity and 
leadership intersect.  
When I first conducted my literature review, I discovered a paucity of research that 
examined women’s experiences of leadership in relation to authenticity. This discovery 
prompted me to conduct interviews as part of my overall inquiry. By examining 
descriptive accounts provided by the women leaders whom I interviewed, together with 
my socio-historical and philosophical inquiry, I hoped to provide a richer 
conceptualization of what it might mean to lead authentically. This sums up my original 
intent. In what follows, I discuss the actual unfolding of the qualitative component of the 
research. Two questions in particular concern me. First, what were some assumptions that 
I took for granted? Second, how does one’s epistemological orientation affect the manner 
in which one employs a particular methodology? This chapter represents a going back 
and forth between my original intent, my gradual understanding of phenomenology as a 
methodology, and interviewing as a method of inquiry.  
After reviewing my initial research intentions, I discuss theoretical and methodological 
contestations as to what constitutes phenomenological research. Following this, I explore 
feminist contentions regarding methodological inquiry. Throughout the chapter, I also 
discuss Arendt’s approach to methodology. My aim is to offer insights into my approach, 
and to discuss the ethical issues I encountered. In addition, I provide contextual 
information regarding the interviews and the research participants. In the conclusion, I 
circle back to ethical issues, and consider what I learned through the interview process 
regarding what it means to me to conduct a feminist, phenomenological inquiry.  
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4.1 Phenomenology as Research Methodology 
I chose to use hermeneutic, existential phenomenological inquiry as my methodological 
approach as it fit with my overall theoretical framework, which focuses on the situated, 
embodied nature of social life. In particular, I wanted to adopt the Arendtian concept to 
‘think without bannisters,’ which she also describes as “visiting.” For Arendt, visiting 
refers to the ability to try and think from different perspectives. This is not the same as 
stepping into another person’s shoes. Rather, it represents a gathering of diverse 
viewpoints to arrive at a more robust comprehension of the particular phenomenon under 
question. Visiting entails coming close to some things, while at the same time moving 
away from others. By visiting, one has to think from another place, and move beyond the 
comfortable boundaries of a singular perspective. In Arendt’s preference for visiting as a 
methodological approach, she has many intellectual companions. For instance, Arendt is 
influenced by the Kantian notion of judgement from his Critique of Judgement, which 
she regards as exemplary because it is based on a plurality of viewpoints.
321
 It is through 
a diversity of views that she maintains we will be able to comprehend a phenomenon in a 
fuller manner. The purpose of visiting, therefore, is to deepen one’s own perspective by 
taking into account the perspectives of others.
322
 In so doing, we should, hopefully, arrive 
at a richer understanding. 
The problem I face is that Arendt rarely discusses methodology. Neither does she 
explicate fully what she means by the term “visiting.”
323
 As I will show later, on the rare 
occasions when Arendt does try to explain her approach, the result is somewhat 
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contradictory, as I will demonstrate by looking at her response to the historian Eric 
Voegelin’s negative review of The Origins of Totalitarianism. As Seyla Benhabib notes, 
even in this response, Arendt’s description of her methodology is somewhat confusing.
324
 
This may be partly due to what Benhabib sees as two distinctive threads weaving through 
Arendt’s work. The first thread reveals the deep influence on her thinking of her friend, 
the essayist Walter Benjamin.
325
 Arendt was predisposed to his method of looking to the 
forgotten fragments of history in order to bring forth stories from the past that had been 
erased so as to dislocate and dislodge commonplace thought. The second influence in her 
work was that of phenomenological inquiry.  
It is possible that Arendt’s sparse comments regarding her methodological approach may 
be indicative of her claim that when we try to clarify what we are doing, we can only ever 
achieve a partial understanding. However, it makes it difficult to discuss her methodology 
adequately. Therefore, I turn to other theorists who wrote in the phenomenological 
tradition. In the next section, I offer an overview of the different approaches to 
phenomenological inquiry adopted by Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty to show how these initial proponents had differences of opinion as to the 
manner in which phenomenology should be conducted. As I will demonstrate, the 
methodological disagreements between Husserl and Heidegger, in particular, continue to 
divide scholars engaged in phenomenological, qualitative inquiry.  
4.1.1 Edmund Husserl  
Heidegger’s early work was indebted to his mentor and teacher Edmund Husserl, who 
opened up phenomenology as a form of inquiry. A former mathematician, Husserl was 
interested in how logical problems are affected by worldly conditions. One of his aims 
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was to distinguish phenomenology from other forms of scientific investigation. In Ideas 
Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to Phenomenological Philosophy, published in 
1913, Husserl maintains that researchers need to suspend their judgement so that the 
phenomena under question are allowed to appear as they are. By bracketing off what he 
describes as the natural attitude, Husserl argues it may be possible to grasp the essence of 
a phenomenon such that everything significant about it could be described. In her 
summation of Husserl’s approach in “What is Existential Philosophy,” Arendt describes 
his project as a way to reconnect being and thought so as to re-envision a home in the 
world for humankind from which they have become alienated.
326
 Central to Husserl’s 
approach, she states, is that there is an intentional structure of consciousness. What this 
means is that each conscious act is oriented toward something, that is, it must have an 
object. Husserlian phenomenology is a way to gather together the pieces of the world, 
and Arendt sees his project as providing a new foundation for humanism. What makes his 
methodological approach of particular importance, she states, is that it represents a 
rigorous attempt to free philosophy from the confines of Hegelian historicism. As such, 
Husserl brought a new manner of thinking about the world through his emphasis on the 
things themselves. The difficulty Arendt perceives with Husserl’s phenomenological 
approach is that it turns man into what he can never be, that is, “the creator of the 
world.”
327
  
4.1.2 Martin Heidegger  
In contrast to Husserl, Heidegger argued that it was impossible to bracket off one’s 
attitude from one’s research. Instead, he insists that our moods affect how we orient 
ourselves toward things. In Heidegger’s opinion, phenomenology is not a technique that 
serves to characterize the “what” of an object; rather, it is an explanation of the “how” of 
research. He maintains that phenomenology conducted in a hermeneutic manner must 
move beyond metaphysical distinctions toward a deeper understanding of what it means 
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to live in the world. Hence, phenomenological inquiry is a way to gain access to 
ontology, which Heidegger regarded as the primary philosophical concern. In his view, 
critical to the “methodological meaning of phenomenological description is 
interpretation.”
328
  
In conducting a hermeneutic phenomenological inquiry, a researcher must be able to 
“intuitively” grasp a phenomenon’s meaning. But this is no simple task since a researcher 
might fail to grasp the original meaning of a phenomenon. Sometimes, this is because 
semblances of a phenomenon are misconstrued as the phenomenon itself. For example, a 
sore throat might indicate tonsillitis, or it could be a viral infection, or something more 
serious, such as meningitis. Each symptom does not show the illness as “is,” but reveals 
itself only in semblances. Because of this revealing as semblance, researchers must be 
careful not to misconstrue the essence of something by assuming that what appears on the 
surface constitutes its “meaning and ground.”
329
  
Another way that a researcher may misconstrue phenomena relates to how what was once 
apparent might become concealed over time. An example of this concealment might be 
how eugenics, in the early twentieth century, was widely regarded - by intellectuals and 
members of the general public - as an indication of the superiority of the white race. 
Because of a change in what is deemed socially acceptable, there may be people who still 
believe in eugenics, but few who are willing to speak about their beliefs publicly. This 
kind of concealment is, in Heidegger’s opinion, most pernicious since there is a 
possibility of being misled by the false opinion of someone. It is also possible for a 
phenomenon to have once been regarded as genuine, but to have become commonplace. 
This is because, in Heideggerian terms, things get taken up by the "they.” As such, 
phenomena may lose their intrinsic, or unique, value.
330
 In addition, as I discussed in 
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detail in chapter three, Heidegger’s work led him to search for a fundamental ontology 
that would explain what it meant to be in the world. In his view, phenomenology is not a 
school where you can learn the right technique, but is rather an individual way of 
thinking. 
There are other major thinkers in the phenomenological tradition, as we will see in the 
case of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
4.1.3 Maurice Merleau-Ponty  
Blending an existential approach with phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty contends that the 
purpose of phenomenology is to put “essences back into existence.”331 In his early work, 
such as the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty was drawn to Husserl’s 
discussion of the Lebenswelt, or life-world. In his later work, such as The Visible and the 
Invisible, his thought is influenced by Heidegger.
332
 Truth, for Merleau-Ponty, cannot be 
separated from the world because “there is no inner man, man is in the world, and only in 
the world does he know himself.”333 Hence, we make sense of who we are through being 
in the world, not through self-knowledge. Further, his notion of embodiment is 
intersubjective, since it is through our actions within the world of others that we 
understand ourselves. Here we note a similarity with Arendt. Both scholars argue that 
knowledge of the world can be obtained from each person’s particular perspective. Such 
“unique” knowledge is always worldly. Where Arendt and Merleau-Ponty differ, 
however, is in the stress they place on different existential aspects of being-in-the-world. 
For Merleau-Ponty, the body provides us with a perceptual framework from which to 
better understand how interpretation is an embodied pursuit. For Arendt, the emphasis is 
on relationality, and how each individual manifests herself through action.  
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To sum up, for Husserl, phenomenology is a descriptive method that allows us to let 
things show themselves as they are. Alternatively, for Heidegger, phenomenological 
inquiry cannot be separated from interpretation. The central difference between 
Heidegger and Husserl relates to whether it is possible to bracket off one’s prejudices, as 
Husserl maintained, or whether interpretation is a fundamental aspect of phenomenology 
inquiry, as Heidegger suggested. By contrast, Merleau-Ponty was chiefly concerned with 
embodiment as the obscured ground of thinking.  
With this brief review of the main tenets of phenomenological thought, I now want to 
consider Arendt’s approach to methodology in more detail. Then, I will look at some of 
the ways that qualitative researchers have taken up these different approaches to 
phenomenological inquiry. 
4.2 Ethical Quandaries 
Arendt often stated that the reason she wrote was to understand. As part of her 
methodological approach, she was concerned with isolating specific phenomenon across 
different historical periods to show why a phenomenon emerged at a particular time, as 
we saw in her exploration of totalitarianism. Yet, as I mentioned earlier, it is only on rare 
occasions that Arendt discusses her particular methodological approach. One such 
instance is her “Reply to Eric Voegelin,” where she argued that questions of method and 
philosophical implications are interconnected.
334
 In his review of The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, Voegelin stated that Arendt’s book lacked conceptual unity. In her 
response to his review, she argued it was not her purpose to provide coherence. Rather, 
her aim was to reveal totalitarianism’s main aspects, and to analyse the components of 
totalitarianism historically.
335
 But Arendt found herself in an ethical quandary since she 
was bringing to light elements of a phenomenon that she found abhorrent. While she 
argues that the purpose of historiography is to preserve something for posterity, 
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preserving totalitarianism was the last thing she wanted to do. At the same time, she 
reasoned that to comprehend the full extent of totalitarianism, it was necessary to reveal 
how it was distinct from other forms of ruling. 
While Arendt concurs with Vogelin’s assertion that she is concerned with the 
philosophical implications of totalitarianism, she argues that her approach begins with 
facts. As we saw in chapter three, Arendt maintains that the rise in totalitarianism was a 
direct result of a loss of consent between people in modernity as a result of the waning of 
tradition, religion and authority. What distinguishes modernity from earlier times is that 
there are fewer common interests that gather people together.
336
 This gathering together 
results in common consent or inter-est, which has a dual function in that it connects 
people while, at the same time, distinguishes them from each other. What made 
totalitarianism so heinous was that these regimes attempted to destroy human freedom in 
a manner never witnessed before. While there had always been immense cruelty in the 
world, Arendt argued, totalitarianism is different in that it tried to eradicate humanity 
from people through organized means of terror, such as the concentration camps. In 
taking away a person’s dignity, totalitarian leaders were trying to show how some people 
were superfluous. Furthermore, the imposition of one perspective, that is the leader, 
aimed to deny plurality of perspectives. These aspects of totalitarianism, together with the 
aim of world domination, Arendt maintains, make it phenomenologically distinct from 
other forms of rule.  
In her response to Voegelin, Arendt also states that generalization is a problem for the 
historical and political sciences, since oversimplification results in phenomenological 
distinctions being covered over in favour of arguments about causality. Rather than 
seeing what is new about a particular phenomenon, scholars try to explain it by drawing 
analogies. She regards this practice as emblematic of a particular approach that confuses 
knowledge with understanding. The only way it is possible to comprehend phenomena, in 
Arendt’s view, is to investigate why they appear at particular times, and ascertain what it 
                                                 
336
 Arendt, “Reply to Eric Voegelin,” 406. 
136 
 
is that makes them unique. It is through the discernment of a phenomenon’s particularity 
that we will be able to make sense of it. This discernment requires us to use our 
imagination, which represents our “inner compass.”337   
In reasoning why she approached the topic of totalitarianism in such a passionate manner, 
Arendt maintains that passion was methodologically necessary given her subject matter. 
To describe what took place under totalitarian rule in a dispassionate way would, in her 
view, be comparable to explaining the abject poverty of the British working classes in the 
Industrial Revolution without showing indignation at human suffering. Similarly, by not 
showing righteous anger when confronted with the despicable conditions of the 
concentration camps, Arendt argues, would be akin to removing this phenomenon from 
its social context.”338 Rather than showing disinterest, this passionate approach 
underscores her belief that each one of us brings something new to our research. What we 
see here from Arendt’s discussion of her methodological approach is her belief that 
phenomenology requires a researcher to be willing to engage with passion in her topic. 
Furthermore, she shows us how important it is to differentiate seemingly similar events.  
Now that we have a sense of the different approaches to phenomenological research, I 
want to discuss how those different approaches are taken up in qualitative research.  
4.3 Qualitative Approaches to Phenomenological Inquiry 
While there is general agreement amongst qualitative phenomenological researchers as to 
the importance of providing rich descriptions concerning a particular phenomenon or 
aspect of lived experience, Linda Fisher argues there is great debate about how 
phenomenological research is carried out.
339
 She regards this debate as healthy, however, 
there are times when criticism turns into confusion, especially as it concerns what 
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constitutes “sound” phenomenological research. Much of this debate, according to Fisher, 
stems from the different approaches adopted by Husserlian versus Heideggerian inspired 
researchers. For example, a common disagreement concerns whether or not the individual 
researcher can “bracket off” their individual biases.
340
 When a researcher states that they 
have bracketed off or transcended their assumptions, and then uses hermeneutics as their 
approach, she regards their research as muddled because it combines two distinctive 
phenomenological traditions.  
A further disagreement concerns how explicit researchers should be about how their 
embodied subjectivity affects their work. This can be a problem for novice researchers 
who, according to Fisher, misunderstand how the Husserlian process of bracketing off 
represents an initial step whereby “subjective bias is acknowledged as part of the project 
to establish the rigor and validity of the research.”
341
 Thinkers in the Heideggerian 
tradition, conversely, regard openness to bias as an essential component of research. She 
argues that research can only be considered phenomenological if it offers an evocative 
description of lived experience that includes the researcher adopting an open attitude to 
her research. Fisher takes a practical approach to inquiry, arguing that researchers should 
tailor their approach to their specific audience, since it is only when the reader feels 
moved in some way by the research in question that it can be said to be  successful as a 
phenomenological exercise.  
Divergence of opinion can also be seen in the debate between whether phenomenology is 
connected with modernism or postmodernism. Fisher notes that while phenomenology 
was originally linked to modernism in that it is an exploration of human subjectivity, 
some researchers regard phenomenology as similar to postmodernist thought especially 
the notion that the meaning of any phenomenon is unstable and shifts across time and 
place. Fisher maintains that it really depends upon how one conceives of these terms. If 
postmodernism means critical reflexiveness, then phenomenology would fit into that 
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rubric. However, if it means that there is no self, only language, then this runs contrary to 
phenomenology’s focus on subjective, lived experience.  
An additional bone of contention amongst qualitative researchers relates to what it means 
to ‘read between the lines’ in a transcript. For instance, Husserlian researchers like 
Amedeo Giorgio contend that phenomenologists must focus solely on the descriptive 
account. He also maintains that an active imagination is crucial to Husserlian 
phenomenological inquiry.
342
 An inquiry into a particular phenomenon may arise from 
either a fictional or factual source. What is crucial is that the researcher describes a 
particular aspect of the phenomenon. In Giorgio’s view, what is important is that the 
descriptions are meaningful.
 343
 He suggests that a critical component of Husserlian-
inspired qualitative phenomenology is to focus on the descriptive account so as to gain a 
deeper understanding of a particular phenomenon.  
In considering the problems qualitative researchers face when trying to retain the richness 
of lived experience, Les Todres argues that the roots of this dilemma can be traced to 
Aristotle, who held that the form of something cannot be said to exist unless it can be 
perceived in a particular manner.
344
 There are two main problems that arise in qualitative 
research. On the one hand, there is a danger in focussing too much on the general 
structure of a particular phenomenon, because one may lose what is specific to individual 
experience. On the other hand, remaining too close to the idiosyncratic might obscure 
what is typical about a particular experience. Todres also contends that scholars position 
their research as a dialogue, and that researchers ground phenomenological inquiry in 
embodiment. (Here we see how much he is influenced by Merleau-Ponty.) By conducting 
phenomenology in an embodied way, Todres maintains that it may be possible to “evoke 
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the presence of human phenomena.”345 This kind of embodied inquiry is a way to move 
toward an open stance that is respectful of differences. 
What is critical is that a researcher’s description brings to mind something meaningful for 
the reader. Todres encourages researchers to bring “texture” back to structure as the 
“thicker” the description, the more the reader will be able to feel a sense of connection 
with what has been expressed. Such a rich description needs to work on different levels: 
it needs to be understood intuitively as well as being comprehended intellectually. Yet, 
because each reader is a unique individual, it is unlikely that every descriptive account 
will appeal to every reader. Just as writers have their own way of writing so, too, will 
readers understand in different ways. For instance, I may think that by sharing a 
particular description, I have provided the reader with insight into the notion of 
authenticity. It is quite possible that this description may open up questions of gender 
dynamics for one person, while another reader may find the account of little interest. I 
cannot know this ahead of time. This is where Todres’s idea that we should write “in a 
language that aims to elicit empathy and participation in the reader” 346 is somewhat 
problematic. Empathy is a term that Arendt, like Heidegger, took issue with insofar as 
both viewed an empathetic stance as a desire for control. One problem with empathy is 
that it suggests that we begin as separate selves and have to bridge this separation in our 
relations with others. But it is not always clear to me where a sympathetic stance ends, 
and an empathetic mindset begins.  
Hermeneutic research requires us to bring our prejudices into the open. Yet Liz Smythe 
contends that most academic discourse silences prejudices. In her words, “[i]n academia 
what is silenced, missing and taken-for-granted is all that is already in our thinking.”
347
 
Hermeneutic phenomenology requires the researcher to try, as much as possible, to 
outline prejudices prior to the research. By tarrying with things, as Heidegger might say, 
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one gains insight not only into the words themselves but also our own interpretation of 
them. The connection between understanding and qualitative inquiry is, according to 
Anne Kinsella, because researchers are interested in comprehending different facets of 
lived experience.
348
 As most qualitative researchers are concerned with questions of 
understanding and interpretation, Kinsella argues that such research is implicitly 
hermeneutic. In her view, qualitative research constitutes a co-mingling since a 
hermeneutic inquiry requires the researcher to be willing to think with head and heart so 
as to be open to questioning. She also suggests that when the researcher adopts an open 
stance, the reader may discover something about the researcher that the latter did not 
anticipate. The researcher cannot know ahead of time what they reveal to another since, if 
we agree with Arendt, we are unable to see ourselves in the way that others do. That 
being said, each researcher, in taking up the same methodology, will have a different 
manner of approach, because their life experiences will influence their work in some 
way.  
These issues are not only pertinent to phenomenology but also to feminist concerns 
regarding qualitative inquiry, as I will now demonstrate.  
4.4 Voicing our Opinion(s): Feminist Concerns  
The desire for a feminist method, in Sandra Harding’s perspective, arose from a need to 
correct distorted accounts produced by traditional methodologies.
349
 She maintains it is 
necessary to distinguish method from methodology. For Harding, method relates to a 
particular way of assembling evidence or a technique, while methodology is an approach 
to inquiry. In drawing these distinctions, she claims there are three categories of method. 
The first category is interviewing people; next is observing people’s behavior; and the 
final method is examining historical documents. Arguing against a specific feminist 
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method, Harding contends that preoccupation with method may overlook more important 
questions concerning how we live in the world. 
Methodology, in Harding’s view, represents a theoretical approach to the way in which 
research should be undertaken. She states that many social scientists, because of their 
training, do not consider the theoretical assumptions behind their methodological 
approaches. Rather, social scientists tend to perceive methodological issues in relation to 
specific methods. Thus, a common approach taken by social scientists is to address 
methodological issues when they teach methods courses. By contrast, philosophers tend 
to raise methodological and epistemological issues when they talk about scientific 
method. In her opinion, neither of these ways of thinking is robust enough; hence, it is 
necessary for feminists to devise different approaches.  
While there are valuable connections to be made among epistemology, methodology and 
research method, Harding suggests it is not by concentrating on the latter that we will 
ascertain what is distinctive about feminist research. When considering questions of 
epistemology, feminists have shown how theories of knowledge have often taken “man” 
as the arbiter of knowledge. This male-centeredness has led to a narrowness of thinking 
about how we live in the world. As we saw in chapter one, some leadership scholars 
maintain that disciplines like organizational studies are saturated with a particular kind of 
masculinity. Harding contends that feminist analyses can enrich methodological accounts 
by revealing how women’s ways of being in the world differ - not only from each other - 
but also from traditional male accounts of a particular phenomenon.  
New ways of thinking about methodology, such as that provided by Dorothy Smith’s 
sociology for women,
 350
 provide researchers with a different means of looking at aspects 
of lived experience that were previously ignored. She shows how women’s experiences 
of a phenomenon offer a different perspective, one which has often been obscured. As we 
saw in chapter one, Smith maintains that it is not enough for women to become leaders of 
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institutions, because it does not deal with structural limitations that affect a leader’s 
ability to connect with people in a caring manner. Instead, it is important to adopt 
methodological and empirical approaches that serve to destabilize existing organizational 
structures. In this way, we may obtain a richer comprehension of how hierarchical 
relations dominate our lives. For example, Smith’s conception of the ‘relations of 
ruling,’
351
 understood as the myriad ways in which organizational structures and systems 
of power are interconnected, offers a means to understand how gender relations are 
impacted in the workplace. It is noteworthy that few researchers have placed gender at 
the forefront of their inquiry into the relationship between authenticity and leadership. 
Yet a focus on gender may offer insights that are otherwise overlooked.
352
  
In the past, some second-wave feminist writers argued that all women’s voices have been 
silenced. This contention is somewhat misleading, however, since it fails to show how 
silence is experienced differently, depending upon a woman’s social location. As Linda 
Alcoff points out, it is important to develop research approaches that help mitigate power 
imbalances between the researcher and interview participant.
353
 Thus, we need to 
consider how the perspective of the situated knower influences how we conduct our 
research. For example, when interviews are conducted with a lack of understanding of 
cultural difference, this can lead to a distorted version of the experiences of others. In 
trying to alleviate power inequities, Lugones and Spelman suggest that researchers 
become friends with their interviewees for “only when genuine and reciprocal dialogue 
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takes place between ‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders’ can we trust the outsider’s account.”
354
 
When interviewing people, it is important for feminist researchers to try and develop an 
atmosphere of friendship and openness. In their opinion, a vital component of human life 
is talking about personal experiences, since being silenced is a form of oppression. It is 
vital, therefore, that researchers be cognizant of the power relations between researcher 
and interview subject, and how their methodological and theoretical approach may work 
to silence others.  
While I concur that a researcher must be responsible for her actions, the problem is that 
in the interview process things unfold in the moment. There is little time to reflect on 
one’s responses, other than giving oneself a metaphorical “kick in the shins” on those 
occasions when one interrupts someone. This is where practice and theory diverge 
because, no matter how good one’s intentions might be, there is an inherent 
unpredictability in the research process. There are times when things just go awry. I will 
return to this point in due course. But at this juncture I want to turn to consider 
interviewing in greater detail.  
4.4.1 Interviewing  
When researchers do not consider how theory influences praxis, according to Kathryn 
Roulston, it may lead to under-theorized and poor quality interview data.
355
 This is why 
she maintains it is important before embarking on interviews to consider how theory and 
practice interconnect. Theorizing about a particular methodology might involve 
considering how the data is to be collected, the role of the interviewer, which participants 
are chosen, the theory underpinning the interviews, and how the final conclusions may be 
judged.
356
 In Roulston’s view, theory is a process whereby we construct concepts and 
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ideas about the world. In relation to interviews, the purpose of such theorizing is to 
consider, ahead of time, what issues relate to one’s research design.
357
  
When conducting a phenomenological qualitative study, Sandra Thomas and Howard 
Pollio maintain that there are two important criteria in relation to eligibility. First, the 
participant must have some experience of the particular phenomenon being studied, and 
second, the participant must be willing to talk about the phenomenon.
358
 While some 
researchers argue for multiple interviews, Thomas and Pollio contend that this is not 
necessary providing that the interviewer has done preliminary interviews to test her 
questions, and become aware of her own presuppositions.
359
 In addition, they argue that 
the ideal number for a phenomenological study is between eight to twelve participants.
360
   
For Heideggerian-inspired researchers like Patricia Benner, interpretation is an 
inescapable component of the research process. She regards learning the 
phenomenological method as akin to literary criticism because the researcher is searching 
for different meanings that can be substantiated by the text in question.
361
 Benner argues 
there are three narrative strategies that need to be taken into account. These are paradigm 
cases; thematic analyses and exemplars. In paradigm cases, the interview is read for a 
global understanding after which certain topics or events are selected for a more detailed 
analysis. When you have the paradigm case, it is then necessary to test it against another 
                                                 
357
 Roulston, Reflective Interviewing, 3. 
358
 For a fuller discussion of how different qualitative researchers approach this issue, see Sandra 
P. Thomas and Howard R. Pollio. Listening to Patients: A Phenomenological Approach to 
Nursing Research and Practice (New York: Springer Publishing Company, 2002). 
359
 In my study, I carried out two preliminary interviews. Furthermore, I spent a year thinking 
about and fine-tuning my research questions. Dr. Anne Kinsella offered me excellent advice as to 
the framing of my research study for which I am most grateful.  
360
 There is a lot of contention with regard to how many participants are appropriate for a study. 
For instance, Amadeo Giorgi argues that a researcher needs at least three participants so as to get 
to general experience of a particular phenomenon. In my study, I had ten participants. 
361
 Patricia Benner, “The Tradition and Skill of Interpretive Phenomenology in Studying Health, 
Illness, and Caring Practices,” in Interpretive Phenomenology: Embodiment, Caring, and Ethics 
in Health and Illness, ed. P. Benner (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Inc., 1994), 112. 
145 
 
case to see whether similar concerns manifest themselves. Conversely, in a thematic 
analysis, you look for patterns across interviews, moving between parts and the whole of 
the text. Once you have identified paradigm cases and themes, then exemplars need to be 
discovered that display similarities or dissimilarities. Stories will come through that act as 
exemplars that capture important meanings.  
So we see that there are different ways of reading the text or, in my case, interview 
transcripts, because meaning flows from an array of traditions, contexts, and 
experiences.
362
 It is necessary to consider specific incidents or concerns, rather than 
opinions or ideology. Benner maintains that phenomenology is different from a Marxist 
‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ or a psychoanalytic reading that tries to reveal the underlying 
truth, because phenomenology tries to examine pre-understandings and to confront 
otherness, silence and commonalities. This includes the researcher's pre-understanding. 
Indeed, she argues that having research questions challenged is part of the process. In this 
regard, my own research questions altered over time as a result of conversations with 
others. Through discussions, I realised that I needed to develop research questions that 
were sufficiently broad to allow for diverse opinions to emerge. For example, my initial 
questions were often couched as “why” questions, but with careful guidance, I realized 
that to obtain rich descriptive accounts, I needed to couch my questions in a “how” rather 
than “why” framework. Furthermore, it is the task of the researcher is to keep oriented to 
the thing in question - in my case, how senior women leaders experience authentic 
leadership, or lack thereof, in a university environment. Ideally, both interviewee and 
interviewer are involved in deciding whether this description is faithful to experience. I 
will return to this point in due course. 
When conducting phenomenological research, Max Van Manen contends that it is 
important to keep each of the four existentials, that is, spatiality, corporeality, temporality 
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and relationality in mind.
363
 I thought about how I might do this as I was putting the 
research questions together, as well as when I was going through the transcripts looking 
for themes. Spatiality represents an important component of how we interact with one 
another. I considered spatiality by asking research participants to describe instances 
where they felt most comfortable leading and, conversely, to describe those times where 
they felt ill at ease. A good example of this from the interview accounts is Dianne’s 
description of the feeling of “shrinking” when she has found herself in situations where 
she felt unable to speak out. (I will discuss Dianne’s account in more depth in chapter 
five.) 
Corporeality represents the second existential, and refers to how our interactions are 
always embodied. In relation to corporeality, I asked participants to describe any physical 
or emotional sensations they experienced when they felt they were acting in a manner 
that they perceived as true to themselves, or in an inauthentic way. Most interviewees 
described a recurring physical sensation they experienced such as a tightening of the 
chest, a sickening feeling in the pit of the stomach, or a painful headache, that overcame 
them in difficult situations. It appears that these recurring embodied signals serve as a 
reminder that something about a particular situation made them feel uneasy in some way. 
It is interesting to note, however, that two of the women I interviewed reported no bodily 
sensations in relation to leadership. I sensed that neither of them was keen on answering 
the question. I am not sure what to make of this other than to wonder whether they have 
trained themselves in a way that they do not pick up on bodily cues.  
Temporality, the third existential, is non-linear because past, present and future are 
interwoven. Over time, some experiences take on greater meaning, while others recede 
into the background. There were many examples from the interviews that relate to how 
past events have an influence on present and future action. One of the most poignant was 
Jill’s description of being made homeless when her mother became sick, and she lost her 
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job. This experience of living on the street influenced not only her current research on 
prisoners’ rights but Jill’s desire to try and be responsive to others in her leadership.  
The fourth existential, relationality, can be seen from the diverse examples that interview 
participants offer of others who influenced their own thinking about authenticity and 
leadership. Some interview participants described mentors they had worked with, or how 
they tried to encourage others to be successful. Several women also mentioned the effect 
particular actions by their mothers had on their desire to lead. The stories that they told 
about an event in their childhood seemed of especial significance to them.  
I want to turn now to consider why narrative might be important to understanding. 
4.5 Narrative 
For Arendt, storytelling is intrinsic to comprehending lived experience, since it is through 
narrative that we make sense of our lives. Hence, storytelling makes us aware of the 
material reality that abstract theory overlooks. Each person has a narrative that is unique 
to them, although, as I pointed out in chapter one, she was adamant that we can never be 
the author of our life story, which can only be told in full after our death. As action is 
ephemeral, we need storytellers to record and memorialize what occurred. In her words: 
without action to bring into the play of the world the new beginning ... there 
is nothing new; without speech to materialize and memorialize the new things 
that appear and shine forth, there is no remembrance, without the enduring 
permanence of a human artifact, there cannot be any remembrance of things 
that are to come with those that shall come after.
364
  
Narrative gathers together the two aspects fundamental to an Arendtian notion of 
subjectivity, that is, action and speech. While Heidegger’s authenticity is a silent 
repudiation of communication with others, according to Jacques Taminiaux, Arendt 
                                                 
364
 Arendt, Human Condition, 204. 
148 
 
views narrative as revealing.
365
 Arendt did not approve of autobiography, for example, 
because it went against her assertion that it was the task of the storyteller, not the actor, to 
remember a person’s life. Thus, it is the spectator as narrator who is able to tell another 
person’s life-story.  
Storytelling, as Julia Kristeva notes, offers Arendt a way to re-create the connection 
between philosophy and politics that was lost following the death of Socrates.
366
 She 
perceives Arendt’s conception of narrative as a radical response to Heidegger’s attempt to 
essentialize and rationalize being. Unlike philosophers, Arendt argues that storytellers are 
able to put themselves into the minds of others without taking a definitive stance. The 
reason why storytellers are essential is because we have a plurality of viewpoints from 
which to assess a particular action.
367
 For actions to have meaning there must always be a 
spectator to engage and respond. Thus, for Arendt, it is not through self-knowledge that 
we understand what it means to exist but through our interactions with one another. 
Consequently, we need others to interpret our actions through storytelling and 
remembrance. From an Arendtian perspective, stories are plural in the sense that they are 
multiple, but also unique in that they belong to someone.  
While Arendt sometimes apologized for using storytelling to advance her argument, Lisa 
Disch maintains this was somewhat disingenuous because storytelling allowed Arendt to 
make a judgement. Storytelling is always an interpretation of events; hence, Disch 
suggests that we need to be wary of making essentialist arguments or calling for a 
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privileged standpoint through narrative.
368
 One problem with narrative descriptions is 
that stories can be taken literally because of what is supposedly “authentic” content. 
I want to pause here to consider the implications of this claim. Does it follow that one 
person’s account is worth less than multiple perspectives? I ask because, at first glance, 
Arendt’s notion of common-sense judgement suggests that a group would have access to 
more diverse opinions than a single person. These multiple voices offer a more rounded 
view of the world. Yet one could argue that the dissenting opinion is equally valid, 
because it takes courage to voice an opinion in opposition from the group. Such courage 
is central to Arendt’s notion of heroism for, in speaking up against the will of the many, it 
shows bravura. What appears on the surface to be a plurality of perspectives may be no 
more than a tacit acceptance of an idea put forward by the most forceful personality in the 
group. Without open dialogue and dissent, people may become mired in “group think,” 
which has a negative effect on people’s ability to come forward with an alternative 
perspective. Argumentation is important for it allows different people to voice their 
understanding of an issue, and brings forth a deeper engagement. Arendt refers to the 
“interspace” or “inter-est” as the public arena, where a multiplicity of opinions are heard 
and considered.
369
 Intrinsic to such a multifaceted arena is the place for discord. Hence, 
dispute and conflict are a necessary component of any political space if plurality is to 
flourish. But too often this dissenting voice is marginalized, or even silenced, as in the 
case of totalitarianism. 
In her work, Arendt tries to grasp the significance of phenomena through the lens of 
situated experience. Arendt’s predilection for storytelling is not, in Disch’s opinion, 
because she views it as a way to pass on tradition, nor as a way to express oneself. 
Rather, the storyteller, through the framework of visiting, is involved in a “practice of 
situated critical thinking.”
370
 This practice requires the researcher to be willing to “think 
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without banisters,” a phrase Arendt used repeatedly to underscore how thinking is an 
individual pursuit.
371
 It is important for the researcher to consider what it is about the 
phenomenon that she finds meaningful.  
In considering the centrality of narrative to Arendt’s work, Veronica Vasterling suggests 
that the purpose of storytelling is to ensure that there is a space where individuals feel 
able to participate.
372
 While science and philosophy are useful for the establishment of 
facts, she argues that these knowledge routes cannot make sense of the world in the way 
narrative does. Even qualitative research is not rich enough, in Vasterling’s view, to offer 
the depth of understanding that can be gleaned from a good story.
373
 This is because the 
primary aim of most social science is to clear away the ambiguity and complexity of 
phenomena in favour of a consistent pattern. We have seen this tendency in the way that 
leadership scholars define authentic leadership through four dimensions: balanced 
information processing, relational transparency, self-awareness and internalized moral 
perspective. What this desire for consistency may lead to is uniformity of meaning. Such 
uniformity may serve to obscure what is meaningful about a phenomenon, because we 
focus on similarities instead of particularity. In a phenomenological exploration both 
must be kept in view.  
Furthermore, Vasterling expresses concern that storytelling is being undermined by 
scientific studies conducted by experts. When expert accounts take over from narrative, 
all that we are left with is rationalization, which may serve to suppress the “intangible 
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web of human affairs.”
374
 The problem with rationalization is that expert accounts tend to 
privilege a particular mode of being over others. Expert accounts may result in the 
privileging of one voice over others. In doing so, we lose a plurality of perspectives, and 
the deeper understanding a multiplicity of accounts offers.  
To sum up, I have suggested that Arendt places high esteem on narrative since it allows 
us to memorialize action. We have seen that it is the role of the storyteller to recount the 
story; whose wider perspective enables her to see in a manner that the actor cannot. Now 
I want to turn to a discussion of the interview process, participant recruitment and 
extracts from field notes to shed light on how I carried out the qualitative component of 
this phenomenological inquiry.  
4.5.1 Research Participants/Recruitment 
Participants were recruited for this study in three ways. First, I sent an email to university 
Presidents, Vice-Presidents or their equivalent that belonged, like I did, to an 
organization called Women’s Education Worldwide. Second, I used a snowballing 
technique where I discussed my research with eligible candidates and asked them 
whether they wished to take part in the study, or knew of anyone else who might like to 
be involved who fit the profile - that is female, senior-level administrators, preferably 
Presidents, Vice-Presidents, or equivalent, who worked in the higher education sector. In 
the end, ten women took part in the study. These women leaders, when interviewed, 
worked in three different countries - The United States, Canada, and The Philippines. As 
well, two research participants came from the Caribbean – one from Trinidad, and the 
other from Jamaica.  
Most of the women I interviewed had worked in universities for several decades, and the 
majority had been faculty members before moving into administrative roles. Two 
interview participants had worked in the corporate sector before embarking upon a 
university career. Five women had extensive experience leading at least one educational 
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institution. The other women leaders were in charge of major portfolios such as academic 
planning, external relations and student services. The participants’ ages ranged from early 
forties to early seventies. In addition, research participants came from a variety of 
disciplinary backgrounds in the humanities, social and applied sciences. Below is a table 
that gives salient details about each research participant, followed by a brief description 
of each leader. 
 
Name Role Age Country of Origin 
Alison Leadership Director/Vice-
President 
50s America 
Claire President (recently retired) 60s America 
Dianne Vice-President 40s America 
Jane Associate Vice-Provost 50s America 
Jennifer Former Director, Diaspora 
Centre and Dept Chair 
60s Trinidad 
Jill President 50s America 
Kate President 50s Canada 
Laura International Project 
Leader/Vice-President 
60s Jamaica 
Olive President (former) 70s America 
Teresa President  60s The Philippines 
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Alison developed the leadership program in her university and is also a freelance 
consultant. She has extensive experience in the corporate world before moving to the 
educational sector. 
Claire recently retired from her role as President of a women’s college. She has extensive 
experience in the university sector in a variety of administrative roles in North America 
and France. 
Dianne is a Vice-President of a large women’s college. Previously, she worked in a 
similar role at a large university. Dianne was the youngest person interviewed. 
Jane is an Associate Provost at a major institution. A full professor, she has been at her 
current university for more than two decades. 
Jill is the President of a women’s college in the United States. Previously, she was Vice-
President in a major university.  
Jennifer was recently Chair of an institute dedicated to Diaspora Studies, and has also 
served two terms as Chair of Department. She lives in The United States but is originally 
from Trinidad. 
Kate is President of a large educational institution in a major metropolis. This is her first 
job as a President. Previously she held various administrative posts including the role of 
Vice-President. 
Laura was a Vice-President of a major Ivy League university. She currently works at a 
black college in the United States. At 68, she is the second oldest person interviewed. 
Olive has extensive experience leading co-ed and single sex institutions. She is now a 
Professor at an Ivy League institution, and was the oldest person interviewed. 
Teresa was, until recently, the President of a large university in The Philippines. She has 
also worked in North America for the World Bank. 
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4.5.2 The Interviews  
Due to financial constraints, with the exception of one interview conducted via SKYPE, 
interviews were conducted on the telephone. I found that the lack of visual stimuli helped 
me to concentrate. While this might seem to go against a phenomenological account of 
perceptual encounters, perhaps what I was experiencing was a different kind of bodily 
experience, one that centered on auditory perception. These auditory encounters worked 
well for me because, as a visual learner, I often find there are too many visual cues. 
Conversely, with the telephone, and the concentration that is required to do a successful 
interview, there were few distractions. The lack of visual cues, however, meant that there 
may have been physical responses to particular questions that I could not see that would 
also have been pertinent to this inquiry.  
Most interviews took place in the semi-darkness of my bedroom. In my bedroom, the 
telephone rests on a table, adjacent to the bed, and in front of a blank wall. When I was 
carrying out the interviews, I would face that wall. To my left, there was light coming 
through the gap at the bottom of the door, yet, I could not see outside. This was 
purposeful on my part to help with concentration, and to cut down on distractions caused 
by external noise. There was something about this semi-dark space that offered comfort, 
not least, I suspect, because the interview took “place” in my bedroom, a space where I 
felt safe. This sense of spatial belonging helped me to alleviate the anxiety I felt as a 
humanities scholar carrying out interviews. But I also believe this spatial comfort aided 
my learning process. Indeed, I was surprised at how quickly I became used to the role of 
interviewer. I do not think that I would have gained as much confidence if the interviews 
had been conducted in another person’s favourite space. While the research participants 
chose the date and time for the interview, I had that feeling of comfort that comes from 
being in a room of one’s own. Similarly the women whom I interviewed were able to 
choose a place that felt comfortable to them. In some cases, this was their work office; in 
others, it was their home. 
I began each interview by asking the participant what name she wished me to call her as a 
way to establish a sense of connection. In each case, the participants told me to call them 
by their first name. I then asked two questions asking them to describe what the term 
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“authenticity” meant to them, and what the term “authentic leadership” brought to 
mind.
375
 I sensed that interview participants had been expecting questions like these 
because they often had answers at the ready. Several research participants spoke about 
their lack of knowledge of the term “authentic leadership.” When this occurred, I tried to 
put the woman at ease by explaining that it was her experience of leading that I was 
interested in, rather than her academic knowledge of the term. As we moved further into 
the interview, people often said things like “now I see what you’re getting at,” or “I guess 
I do know more about this than I thought.” It was as if, through the interview process, we 
were bringing to light an understanding that was already present but that the interviewee 
had not previously recognized. This seems to me an example of the way that the 
phenomenological approach functions to reveal a comprehension of a particular concept 
that the person already had, but of which they may not have been aware.  
I had a specific question in my study that elicited stories from research participants with 
regard to how their personal narrative influences their desire to lead in a manner that they 
perceived as true to themselves. On several occasions, interviewees described instances 
where their mothers had played influential roles in instilling not only a sense of doing 
right, but a belief that they could lead. These stories, which I discuss in detail in chapter 
five, bring to light experiences and understandings that have been ignored. Through the 
interviews, I discovered that four of the women came from working-class, low-income 
households. The dimension of class enriched the study. Further, three interviewees self-
identified as women of colour. Their insights into racial issues deepened my 
understanding of some of the complexities surrounding race, gender and leadership.  
Occasionally, during an interview, a research participant mentioned religion. For 
example, one woman described how Buddhist thought influenced her ideas about 
authenticity. Two other participants mentioned Christianity. One of these participants was 
enthusiastic about her early leadership experiences in her church. The other participant 
who mentioned religion was less enthusiastic. In this woman’s case, she described how 
oppressed she had felt growing up by her father’s change of vocation from lawyer to 
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parish priest. She spoke of the disjuncture between the sermons preached in church, and 
her home life that she described as difficult to reconcile. For some women whom I 
interviewed, it appears that religion provided an early path to thinking about authenticity 
and leadership. For others, religion served to reinforce patriarchal systems of oppression.  
Turning to the practice of interviewing, on the one hand, an interview is similar to a 
conversation in that there is an oscillation between questioner and respondent. On the 
other hand, it is different since the interviewer sets the pace with the questions she poses. 
The researcher has an unfair advantage in that she knows the questions because she has 
the research guide in front of her. In some ways, this restricts the conversation by its 
linearity. While having research questions close at hand afforded me comfort, I can also 
see that it is a type of control, a way of unnaturally steering a conversation in a certain 
direction any time the discussion goes too far afield.  
In my case, there was also the added experience of dealing with elites, and how this could 
influence the process. For example, when interview participants began asking me 
questions, I became a little unnerved. This happened on two separate occasions. Both 
times, I felt it was a way for the interviewee to try to change the direction of the 
interview. My response to this attempt by another to take control was unease, and a desire 
to recast the dialogue along the lines I wanted. Thus, it seems to me, there are always 
power dynamics taking place within the interview that make it difficult to have the kind 
of friendly conversation that Lugones and Spelman regard as critical to feminist inquiry.  
Sometimes, those interviews that go off track can offer the most useful data if a 
researcher is willing to reflect on the reasons why the interview might seem to have 
failed. In one case, an interview I conducted became somewhat confrontational. The 
research participant found my interview questions exasperating. At one point, she 
declared that all we were doing was going around in circles as I kept asking her the same 
thing but from different angles. Phenomenologically, I suppose that was exactly what I 
was doing but my interview approach was not one with which this person was 
comfortable. I found myself becoming somewhat irritated by her negative responses. I 
thought my spirited defense of my research would culminate in the end of the interview. 
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Instead, her attitude softened, and she seemed to become genuinely interested in the 
project. There was a change in the timbre of her voice, and she began asking questions 
and sharing stories in a way that was very different from her demeanor at the start of the 
interview. Here are two examples from the beginning and end of the interview that 
illustrate this change of attitude.  
My problem is I’m not into this whole framework. I’m sure that your study is 
going to be very interesting, but you’re talking about leadership in ways that I 
don’t normally think about so I’m having trouble getting into your mindset. 
As we started out, I was thinking you know that this is going to be a very 
difficult conversation because this seems to me speaking a different language 
or too simplistic or whatever. But as we got into it, you’ve really made me 
think. 
The best way I can describe this interview experience is as a kind of thawing. It seemed 
to me we entered into the kind of dialogue and dissent that Arendt argues is crucial to 
understanding. In this particular situation, discord, rather than concord, brought about a 
deeper understanding on both our parts.  
Over the four month time span of interviewing, while I fine-tuned some of the questions, 
I did not alter them substantially because I found that each interviewee’s response to each 
question was different. For instance, I noticed that there were times when an interviewee, 
in the midst of describing a specific instance, seemed to hesitate. When I asked a follow-
up question to delve further, sometimes the interviewee remained silent. At times, 
hesitations and silences may illuminate something that dialogue fails to do. If the 
researcher pays attention to silent gaps, I believe she may gain a glimpse of something 
usually hidden from view. For instance, as I read across the transcripts, I realised that no 
one had spoken about how sexuality or disability may have affected their personal 
leadership. Conversely, participants talked freely about race, class and gender issues. I 
mention this to show there are still many things that are not discussed openly that have a 
bearing on our lives.  
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Questions that yielded seemingly superficial responses in one interview led to deeper 
responses in another. As I mentioned earlier in the chapter, two participants stated that 
embodiment played no relevance to the way in which they lead. This was in 
contradistinction to other interviewees, who talked openly about embodied experiences. 
For example, one woman, Dianne, spoke vividly about the way that she felt herself 
shrinking in certain situations. In her words, “I definitely have an emotional and physical 
sensation of shrinking, or getting smaller of being less colourful, less of me in a situation, 
I’m sort of bending myself a lot.” This sense of not taking up space is indicative of the 
way that other women spoke about the problems of finding themselves growing quieter in 
different spaces. I suggest that silence is intrinsically linked to gender hierarchy in a way 
that works to encourage some to speak while discouraging others. The decision to speak, 
or remain silent, derives from learned experience of what is perceived as appropriate for 
the public space. Many women learn to restrict themselves to what is considered proper. 
To use Heideggerian terminology, that which is proper is always-already defined ahead 
of time by social convention. These social niceties may serve to constrain authentic 
discourse, which, in turn, has an impact on a person’s sense of self.  
Active listening is a vital component of interviewing. However, I found that it was not 
always possible to stay alert. Interviewing is both mentally and physically tiring. 
Tiredness affects my ability to concentrate. At any moment, thoughts rush in that are hard 
to keep under control. As an instance, my ability to listen to one interviewee was 
interrupted by a scratching sound. Suddenly, I realized this was the sound of a mouse 
trapped in the wall of our house frantic to get out. I was equally desperate to keep focused 
on the conversation, while trying not to panic at the thought of what I would do if the 
little creature suddenly burst through the wall. Of course, I realize that, logically, this was 
an unlikely thing to happen but, at the time, it seemed possible. While one might desire to 
be an active listener, it does not always work that way in the practice of conducting 
interviews.  
In one interview, Kate talked about how she had begun to realise how leadership changed 
her personality. In her words: “I still think that it’s been an authentic journey, if you will, 
and that I can still be the leader and the human being I want to be but I have to 
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understand that just as I want to change the institution, the institution and the role 
changed me.” This statement is interesting for it shows how leaders and their institutions 
transform each other. In this case, Kate describes how being a President of an institution 
had a profound effect on her sense of self. She described how people who knew her well, 
that is, close friends and family members, saw her as a shy person. However, in the 
context of her role as leader, she thought most of her colleagues would be surprised to 
learn of her shy disposition. Kate’s distinction between herself in private and her public 
role mirrors Arendt’s belief that we take on a personae whenever we act within a public 
context. Thus, the notion that we are authentic within a social context, or even a private 
one for that matter, is somewhat contradictory. While there were some interviewees such 
as Laura who viewed their private and public personae as the same, this was not a 
common perspective. 
In this section, I have discussed the interview process. Now I would like to consider how 
this research is related to ethical matters. 
4.5.3 Reflexivity and Ethical Issues 
Each interviewer brings a particular stance to her inquiry, which influences the themes 
that come to light from each interview. This unique orientation affects the ways in which 
a researcher approaches her work. Feminist theory, like hermeneutic inquiry, makes one 
aware that it is important to be cognizant of how one’s situated perspective shapes the 
research process. Yet while I am aware of some of my prejudices, I also have blindspots. 
Reflexivity can only go so far, as we know from Arendt that we cannot see ourselves 
from the outside. What this means in terms of the interview process is that there is an 
ambiguity inherent within any research endeavour, because each person interprets the 
world from a different, situated perspective. As Merleau-Ponty tells us, we can only 
know ourselves in ambiguity.
376
 We are each differently situated and, hence, perceive the 
world in a distinct manner. Thus, each interviewer will approach her work differently.  
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Moreover, past experiences will influence a researcher’s approach to a topic. For 
example, I first became acquainted with the concept of authentic leadership through my 
experience setting up a Leadership Institute for Women at Brescia University College. 
Over the course of several years in developing a plan and a vision for the Institute, 
extensive discussions took place with faculty, staff, alumnae and community 
representatives regarding what kind of leadership the Institute was going to provide, and 
to whom. My recollection from many of those meetings was friction between those who 
wanted the Institute to be more overtly feminist in its pursuits, and others who saw this as 
too narrow a focus. Additionally, extensive dialogue took place concerning whether it 
was even possible to be an authentic leader in today’s workplace. Over the years, I was 
involved in this planning and execution, I thought a lot about the term “authentic 
leadership.” This phrase, for me, conveys a contradiction. When I think of authentic 
leadership, the term “honesty” often springs to mind, yet this word occurred only once in 
the interviews I conducted. Does that mean, then, that my initial understanding was 
wrong? Not according to Merleau-Ponty, who argues that “all views are true provided 
that they are not isolated, that we delve deeply into history and reach the unique core of 
existential meaning which emerges in each perspective.”
377
 This is what I have been 
trying to do throughout this project. 
In thinking about the relationship between interviewing and ethics, Patricia Benner 
argues that an ethical stance is one that respects the interviewee's experiences, while also 
staying true to the text. One way I approached ethics was by encouraging research 
participants to give me feedback at the end of the interview as to whether they felt that 
there was anything that we had not spoken about which they considered important. For 
instance, at the end of her interview, Dianne suggested that one thing she had been 
expecting me to ask, which I did not, was a question about social capital. The term was 
not familiar to me so I asked her what she meant. In her view, social capital means what I 
am willing to do to ensure that my objectives are met. That is, on what occasions will I 
fight for what I believe is right, and when are the times when I am willing to negotiate 
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with others. This negotiation is useful for the future since it will, hopefully, ensure that 
others will secede to her viewpoint when she most needs assistance. I find myself a little 
uneasy about this way of operating for it seems to me that this is how issues may become 
uncontested. I recognize that this is the modus operandi that many people adopt in the 
workplace. While I can see that it makes sense strategically to store up social capital; 
whether it is ethical or not is a different matter. 
Another way of considering ethics in terms of interviewing is for the researcher to be 
critically reflexive of prescribed methodologies, individual knowledge and social 
context.
378
 I tried to reflect upon my research questions and methodological approach to 
ensure that as a white, heterosexual, feminist researcher, I did not misappropriate the 
voices of others. I took field notes, both before and following each interview, so that I 
could explore my reactions to what was unfolding, as well as reflect upon my pre-
understandings. This reflexivity enabled me to delve deeper into my own assumptions 
regarding gender, authenticity and leadership, and the ways in which this prior 
understanding is contested by study participants. While it is conceivable that I could have 
conducted a phenomenological inquiry without conducting interviews, I sense that my 
overall account may not have been as evocative or meaningful without their diverse 
opinions. 
 If the researcher's views are not changed in some way, Benner argues that the process is 
insufficient. However, at the time of conducting the interviews, I did not understand what 
she meant by “reasoning in transition.”
379
 I have included below some of my field notes 
from three interviews to show how this reasoning in transition works. These notes were 
taken directly following each interview, and then after I have typed up the transcript.
380
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 In most cases, I typed the transcript up directly following the interview. I then shared the 
specific transcript with the research participant, giving each person plenty of time to respond, 
usually four-six weeks. When I had not heard from someone, I sent two follow up emails.  
162 
 
Field Notes –  August 15 
Today’s interview was much more difficult. For one thing, SKYPE didn’t work again. I 
don’t know why. She seemed very curt at first. No curt isn’t the right word but I felt that 
she was too much in her head. At one point, I thought that it would be over in thirty 
minutes but then I began to really hone in on what she was saying. I spoke a lot more 
than in the first interview but this was a necessary tactic in order to draw her out. And it 
worked, I think. She had problems with the question about comfort – something about 
that word displeased her almost. I also felt at times that she was interviewing me but then 
I thought well that’s fine, if we think about it as a conversation, it’s good for me to have 
to explain what it is I think I am doing.  
The most interesting answer I thought was related to her background where she talked 
about how learning to act had enabled her to find her voice and to get out from a 
patriarchal household as a young woman. But all in all, I have to give myself a pat on the 
back for making the interview work. She also said that she liked the questions and that 
they had made her think. I still need to go deeper with people, but this interview showed 
me how hard that might be on occasion. 
Field notes after transcription 
This was a much better interview than I thought it was. What I saw as her negativity was 
just her way of approaching questions. She is a thoughtful person; hence the long pauses. 
It was because she was thinking about the questions that it seemed to me as if she wasn’t 
interested. This is the problem, I guess, with telephone interviews. But this also says a lot 
about the way I jump to conclusions about people without having enough information – 
something that I accuse others of doing, but now I have to see that this is the way that we 
ordinarily go about the world. And, it’s a problem, as Helen would say. 
Field Notes –  August 24 
This was the first interview I had done in the afternoon. It was only 4:30 p.m. but for 
some reason I wasn’t really looking forward to it. The other interviews had gone well if 
one discounts the issues with technology. I found it difficult to get her to talk. This is the 
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second time this has happened. This time it was not due to a reticence but to a lack of 
openness. It did not appear that way on the surface because she answered without 
hesitation. I got the sense that she had answered similar questions in the past. She was 
very sure of what authentic leadership was making no distinction between personal 
authenticity and authentic leadership. It was only at the end of the interview when I 
pressed her that I found that she had left her last institution because of a moral dilemma. 
She was very pleasant but I sensed, a lack of connection, even though I did try my best. 
She was very clear, honest, and open but her answers to the embodiment questions were 
non-existent. How can someone not have a bodily response?   
Field notes after transcription 
Again, I’ve misread an interviewee. This was a really thoughtful honest appraisal of her 
notion of authentic leadership. It means so much to her not least because of her working-
class background. It is becoming clear to me that the people who this concept appeals to 
have, at one time or another, been or felt themselves to have been on the margins. I don’t 
think it matters how long the interviews take. Some people are just quicker I guess.  
Field Notes August 30 
I was a little rattled in that I had forgotten that the guy was coming to do the roof vents. 
However, I asked him not to be noisy at that time, and it was fine. She answered some 
questions in a way that resonated with what I had just been writing. Namely, the problem 
when leaders try and promote visions, or stick to plans, that go against the general will. 
The notion of fear came up again this time, not physical fear, although she did mention 
faculty meetings in which men threw chairs. Unbelievable! She talked about people 
shouting, arguing and not listening to others.  
Field Notes – following transcript 
As I’m writing up the transcripts, I’ve just realised that a word that doesn’t come up is 
honest or honesty. It’s peculiar because as I’m listening that is what I’m thinking about 
some of the stories I’m listening to. How it is that people will talk openly to a complete 
stranger who is recording their words about something deeply personal. It’s quite 
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amazing really and is happening in a way that may take many months with someone that 
you get to know. What is it about this interview structure that makes people do this?  Is it 
anything to do with Foucault’s confessional, that in some way I represent an authority 
figure?  I hope not, but it is something worth paying attention to. 
Reviewing these field notes now two years after conducting the interviews, it is 
fascinating to see how quickly I made assumptions that upon reflection were not 
necessarily an accurate representation of the interview. Conversely, they also show how 
quickly I gained confidence doing interviews. Furthermore, much of the information that 
I read about phenomenology and qualitative interviews only made sense to me after I had 
conducted the interviews. 
My initial assumptions about interviewing became unravelled by a particular experience, 
or rather my response to it. I had not anticipated that a person disagreeing with the 
written transcript would be disconcerting. Indeed, in my original submission to the 
Research Ethics Board, I wanted research participants to have lots of opportunity to 
engage in dialogue with me. But the Board informed me that I must be clear about how 
much leeway interview participants would have to make changes to the transcript. This 
proved to be good advice. At first, I wanted a more open-ended dialogue. Yet, my 
following response to someone’s desire to change a transcript reveals how contradictory 
my initial intent, and actual practice turned out to be.  
When Clare sent back the transcript, she told me that she had rewritten some of her 
answers so they flowed better. In her words, “she had run off at the mouth,” and wanted 
to change the transcript so that her responses were more focused. In her view, these 
alterations had improved what she was trying to say, rather than changed the meaning. 
When I read through the transcript, I was surprised at the extent of her changes, which 
probably took her considerable time to do. She had added words that she had not said, 
and taken away others. I was surprised at my feelings of frustration at this “rewrite.” My 
reaction confounded me because it contradicts my initial desire for an open-ended 
dialogue. I had not realised how quickly I would begin to see these transcripts as part of 
my research, and, thus, belonging to me. But Clare’s rewrite of our initial conversation 
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served to deny the spontaneity of her original account. The immediacy of the dialogue 
was lost in her revision of what took place. 
Clare was the only person to make substantial changes to the transcript. With other 
research participants, I received an “it’s fine” response indicating there were no changes 
to make, while some interviewees requested minor alterations to inelegant phrases. These 
phrases were spoken; I went back to the tapes to make sure that I had not been mistaken 
in my transcription typing. It is strange to strike out what was said, and incorporate what 
was not. This is where the co-mingling between researcher and research participant gets 
messy. In one way, it does not matter; the changes that were suggested – other than 
Clare’s – were inconsequential to the account. If people are unhappy with something they 
said, then it seems wrong not to take their views into account. From another angle, 
however, these changes to the transcript affect the integrity of the research process.  
What is ethical in this regard? To respond with care to the person who asked for changes, 
or to the original words that were spoken? Perhaps the dilemma arises from the fact that 
we want to get it right. I do not wish to suggest that this is an either/or problem, but 
perhaps researchers can become too possessive of their data. In so doing, they might 
forget that the interview is, for the participant, a distillation of lived experience that has 
significance over and above the research encounter. I mention this because on several 
occasions, interviewees told me that the interview had affected them in a way they had 
not anticipated. In follow-up emails, one person shared her ongoing insights into notions 
of authenticity and leadership, from events that had occurred following the interview. At 
first, I was surprised when a few research participants did not respond to repeated 
requests regarding whether they had any changes that they wanted to make to the 
transcription. I found this unresponsiveness odd given that all but one participant 
indicated they would be willing to be involved in follow-up interviews.
 381
 Then, I 
received an email from one participant in which she told me how difficult it had been for 
                                                 
381
 While most participants did indicate that they were willing to engage in another interview, 
these interviews did not take place as I determined, together with my advisor on the methodology 
component of my dissertation, Dr. Anne Kinsella, that with 200 pages, I had sufficient material.  
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her to go through the transcript. This made me realize how, as a researcher, my 
connection with these stories was ‘once removed.’ Within an interview context, people 
share words and worlds; this co-conversation is not anyone’s possession, although it may 
seem that way.  
When I began to think about ethics in relation to my study, it was in the context of 
gaining approval to conduct my research.
382
 One of the problems I find with the research 
ethics approval process in universities is that permission is requested from people ahead 
of time. I did wonder whether some research participants would prefer not to be included 
in the inquiry after the interviews have taken place, although no-one asked me not to use 
their accounts. In choosing to be interviewed, these women leaders did, after all, agree to 
take part in a research investigation into the nature of authentic leadership. However, at 
times, I was unclear as to what was my foremost ethical obligation. Is it to the people 
who shared their accounts? Or is it to the furtherance of knowledge? These questions of 
ethics are more complex than I had anticipated when I began my doctoral research, and 
illustrate that there are always tensions one encounters that cannot be fully resolved.  
4.6 Conclusion  
Troubling method, in the end, has led me to a consideration of what constitutes an ethical 
process, and how one shares research findings in an ethical manner. In the role of the 
interpretive researcher, I see my task as creating a dialogue between myself and the 
participants’ lived experiences. The difficulty is how to conduct interviews in an ethical 
way. Helen Fielding suggests that an ethical approach requires us to make “sense of what 
we do according to a reality that consists of multiple perspectives and voices.”
383
 Reality, 
as Fielding notes, is always evolving and dependent upon a particular situation. It is this 
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ever-changing contingency that forms the basis for our ethical, embodied relationships. 
But what constitutes developing ethical relationships within the context of interviewing? 
In other words, what did I learn from the experience of interviewing? I think that the 
most important thing I learned was that of the complexity with regard to ethical 
responsibility in regards to representing someone else’s account. There were moments 
where I felt unsure as to what was my foremost ethical responsibility – to the interview 
participants, to my scholarship, or to the university. The way I have decided to deal with 
this ethical quandary is to be clear that this is my particular interpretation. After all, this is 
the basis of research that is grounded in an existential, hermeneutic approach. Or so it 
seems to me.  
If one holds to Arendt’s way of approaching research, each scholar must be willing to 
offer us her own insights, and make judgments accordingly. In this chapter, I have shown 
that through conducting a qualitative research project, I discovered ethical issues I had 
not anticipated. It is in the act of doing that we become aware of the multiplicity of 
questions regarding what constitutes ethics. In laying out my methodological approach 
and offering some reflections on the process, my aim has been to explore my own pre-
conceptions, as well as how feminist theory and hermeneutic phenomenology intersect. 
In conducting interviews so as to better understand the interconnections amongst gender, 
authenticity and leadership, I tried to act in an ethical way, although I acknowledge that 
there is always more that could be said.  
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Chapter 5  
5 Telling Tales Out of School: Gender, Authenticity and 
Leadership 
“I wish you would write about what it is in people that makes them 
want a story ... Life itself is full of tales.”  Hannah Arendt.
384
  
In a letter to her friend, the novelist Mary McCarthy, Arendt expresses her view 
that storytelling is fundamental to human existence. For Arendt, narrative enables 
us to find meaning, and gain sense of our lives. In this chapter, I explore the 
situated, embodied nature of leadership through the narrative accounts provided by 
ten senior women leaders in higher education. My main purpose is to show how 
these diverse accounts offer insights into the interconnections among gender, 
authenticity and leadership. I will also consider how Arendt’s work may be helpful 
in creating a more inclusive way of thinking about leadership. 
My original research question asked in what ways senior women leaders describe 
their experiences of authenticity (or lack thereof) within an institutional context. 
What emerges from these research findings is a more expansive way of thinking 
about leadership. These women’s accounts serve to complicate the notion of what 
constitutes an authentic leader, and run contrary to most scholarship on authentic 
leadership especially in regards to the importance of self-knowledge. Through their 
descriptive accounts, these women reveal how leadership is a relational enterprise, 
founded upon mutual respect and trust. Viewing authentic leadership through a 
relational perspective allows us to see previously hidden aspects of leadership. For 
example, these women’s accounts reveal how gender differences reinforce 
hierarchies in subtle and sometimes not so subtle ways. As a result, a woman’s 
sense of belonging may be undermined by gender prejudice regarding normative 
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ideas about what constitutes a good leader, which, in turn, may impede her ability 
to speak or act in a manner consistent with personal conviction.  
I have divided this chapter into two parts. In part one, I introduce the research 
participants, and share two or three descriptive accounts from each participant. My 
commentary in the first section is minimal to allow these women’s stories to be 
foregrounded. In the second part of the chapter, I consider some common themes that 
flow from the interviews. The first theme I discuss concerns the conflict that may arise 
when institutional objectives are at odds with personal convictions. The second theme 
relates to care and relationships. Gender and embodiment constitutes the third theme, 
intersectional constitutes the fourth theme, while anxiety represents the final theme. 
Then, I discuss some outlying themes that I consider to have phenomenological import. 
Finally, I bring together the different strands of the discussion to consider how these 
women’s descriptive accounts shed light on the interconnections among gender, 
authenticity and leadership. Throughout this chapter, I connect these themes with 
Arendt’s reflections on leadership. 
5.1 Part I - In Their Own Words   
As I pointed out in chapter four, the ten women leaders I interviewed came from different 
economic, cultural and social backgrounds. Five women had extensive experience 
leading at least one educational institution, two women were Vice Presidents, and three 
had extensive experience running research institutes at their respective universities. Six of 
the research participants had worked in the university sector for most of their working 
lives; the other four moved into higher education following careers in other occupations, 
such as school teaching, finance or the high-tech sector. Eight women held a doctorate in 
either the social sciences, earth sciences, or the humanities. One participant was in the 
final stages of her doctorate in leadership studies; the other held a master’s degree.  
I will now turn to the descriptive accounts to see what insights these accounts offer into 
the connections among gender, authenticity and leadership.  
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Kate – Crossing Boundaries 
Kate is the President of a large educational institution in a major Canadian metropolis. 
She has also held other administrative posts including that of Vice-President in other 
higher education institutions. Kate was the first woman, as well as the youngest person, 
to be hired as President at her current institution. Authentic leadership, in her words, “is 
about being genuine; but there are pieces of your life and your world, I think, that it’s 
important that you don’t pour out in a leader role.” Here Kate highlights the importance 
of keeping boundaries between one’s public and private life; she then described what can 
happen when a leader allows their professional and private lives to become fused.  
I used to say that the College was unloved and unlead. Part of the problem 
was that the leader before me had his heart broken by the institution. He 
wasn’t able to do what he wanted to do, and it just genuinely broke his heart. 
So for the last two years, everywhere he went, everyone knew how much he 
had fallen out of love with the institution, and how badly it had hurt him. I 
think he needed for the good of XXX to keep that to himself. So these are the 
kind of boundaries that I mean, and I think that there’s humanity that is good 
to share, and that’s healthy, and then there are aspects that you need to be 
able to control. And I don’t find it inauthentic; I just think it’s responsible to 
keep some things out of that public arena. 
Here, Kate illustrates Arendt’s point about the need to separate one’s public personae 
from that of one’s private self. This separation between public and private was something 
that Arendt regarded as critical to human flourishing. The problem if we always stay in 
the light of the public realm is that we may lose a sense of depth, and even reality, since 
we forget that we play a role in our social lives. 
The separation between how a leader feels, and how much she shows to others is, to some 
degree, determined by cultural ideas about leaders. Being confident, for instance, is 
regarded in most Western societies as a positive leadership trait, while showing 
disillusionment is perceived as negative. Kate’s comments suggest that the previous 
incumbent’s expression of sadness was inappropriate given his leadership role, because it 
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had a negative effect on staff morale. In her view, a leader “can remain true to yourself in 
who you are but you still have to be able to inspire and to encourage.” To illustrate her 
point, Kate gave the following description of her first meeting as President where she 
addressed faculty and staff, and tries to engage others by sharing her vision for 
organizational change.  
I needed to build the case for change. I had to get them to start thinking that 
we needed to do things differently, but we could do it together. It was through 
stating the case in the most honest and blunt way I could. It was apologizing 
for how the institution had let them down. And I’ll tell you that this drove my 
executive colleagues crazy because, of course, none of us were there when all 
this had happened but, to me, that didn’t matter. We needed to say that 
leadership has let this place down, and leadership was going to help turn it 
around ... It was about refocusing the whole institution. That day was the first 
sort of laying it out catalyst, and then the job was to engage people and to be 
challenged. I mean, I really did go anywhere I was invited, listen to everyone 
who had an opinion. I did come with a plan, and a vision, because just 
because there is humanity, and a kindness, and sincerity, and a passion in all 
of this, it doesn’t mean that there’s not this need to deliver. So that day I said 
this is the plan we are going to follow, and here’s how you can get involved. 
... I joked with the audience that many years ago I had my thyroid out. I said 
to them the night before I had my throat cut I wasn’t as nervous as I am 
standing here in front of you today [Laugh]. Part of those nerves was just that 
I really truly believed that if we worked together we could turn the place 
around. And, for me, I felt like I had an hour and a half to at least get some of 
the sense of excitement about where we could go, what we could do, and how 
we could all be in this together. I’m extraordinarily lucky that XXX rallied to 
that, and we are a fundamentally different place than we were. 
Kate describes how important it is not just to have a vision, but to be able to encourage 
others to become enthusiastic about organizational change. Getting other employees to 
commit was critical to success. But she also discusses how nervous she was in standing 
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up before an audience. What Kate demonstrates here is Arendt’s point that it is not what 
we feel inside that matters but how we present ourselves to others. Courage comes not 
from a lack of fear, but from being willing to hide those feelings in order to present a 
confident outward appearance. I’ll return to this point later. 
Later in the interview, Kate described an ethical dilemma she faced in her role as Vice-
President at a different higher education institution. As she states,  
I was working for this extraordinary man who talked a lot about integrity in 
leadership, and all these kinds of things. But XXX’s political environment is 
a little bit different than here. There’s a lot of politics, and it’s all small “p” 
political. I received an email from the President saying he’d been called by a 
priest in XXX about a student who was trying to get in to the College and 
would I deal with it. So I followed up and, in a nutshell, this priest wanted to 
get this young woman into our nursing program, despite the fact that she 
didn’t qualify. He described her as a nice, good Catholic girl, and so I should 
just let her in. And I had an absolute reaction to that. I actually encountered 
that several times in XXX; this is the daughter of that politician, or this is the 
cousin of that man, who’s a big man in that town. They either wanted you to 
find them a job, or wanted you to find them a way into the College. In this 
specific instance with this student, we managed to help her find a pathway by 
putting her into a program that she was more academically suited to so, that if 
she did well in, she could get in to nursing. ... I remember going back to the 
President because I was disheartened by the sense that, despite the 
conversations about integrity and values, and changing the place, I felt a not 
so subtle pressure to do what was being asked of me by the outside people. 
And, in the end, I was supported in that instance, and in others, in doing what 
was right; but I found it extraordinarily difficult to feel I might be asked to 
bend rules, to ignore a policy, to do something that fell out of line with my 
values. ... I told every Board Chair that I will always act in the best interests 
of the institution, and if ever I feel that I can’t, it will be the day I leave.  
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In this account, Kate describes her difficulty in working for an organization where the 
values that were espoused in theory were different from everyday practice. This 
distinction between values that were espoused by the leader of the organization, and 
being asked to bend the rules was, for her, an inauthentic way of leading that ultimately 
led her to leave the institution. Being asked to ‘bend the rules’ was anathema to Kate, and 
contrary to her idea of leading in a genuine way. 
 
Jane – The vision thing 
Jane is an Associate Provost of a large, public university in the American Midwest. A full 
professor, Jane has worked in a university setting for most of her career. She recently 
moved into an administrative post, where she is responsible for gender issues university-
wide. Jane describes authentic leadership as  
being aware, as much as possible, of who you are and bringing all the pieces 
of that to your job, to your leadership to open things, and get the obstacles out 
of the way so that other people that I work with can bring great ideas forward. 
And, to me, that’s what an authentic leader really does.  
She contrasted her view of what constitutes authenticity in leadership with what she 
described as “command and control” leadership.  
The command and control kind of leader is not particularly authentic because 
they are not making room for other people to be authentic themselves, and to 
bring what they can, all that they can, to the process. A command and control 
person is saying, I don’t care what else you have, what I want from you is 
this, and it better be exactly my way. …That’s what we have a lot of at the 
administration level at the moment. And so they are perfectly happy for some 
of us who are at the next level, or [a] couple of levels down, to be more about 
opening things up for other people. After all, that is my job. They probably 
would not view me as particularly good material for a Vice-Presidential post 
because I don’t just lay it out and tell people what they are going to do ... I 
ask people what they think needs [to be] done. I try to bring people together 
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to talk about what we should do, and their tendency is not to do that. They 
want to be able to check the box that says we collaborated, and we asked 
opinions, but they don’t actually want to hear those opinions, and they 
certainly don’t want to act on them.  
In her negative assessment of what Jane calls ‘command and control’ leadership, she 
reveals how important it is not only to ask for opinions, but to be willing to hear what 
people say. She also indicates that her unwillingness to operate in this manner is likely to 
affect her future prospects for advancement. Jane’s account reminded me of Arendt’s 
insistence that dialogue and debate are critical aspects of plurality, and central to human 
flourishing. The type of leader who is unwilling to hear others’ divergent opinions is 
displaying a form of mastery that, while on the surface asks for input, is not interested in 
receiving different perspectives.  
I showed earlier how Kate described how important it was to gain support for her vision. 
In the next account, Jane discusses some of the problems that ensue when visionary 
leaders do not include the opinions of others.  
We hired a new Director for the School of XXX. The Search Committee 
decided that they wanted a visionary, and so that’s what they got. But the 
visionary was completely incapable of doing straight administrative work, 
which is okay; you can hire somebody else to do that. But the real problem, in 
my mind, was that the person just assumed that the vision was shared, and 
made no effort to explain it to anybody, to convince anyone that this vision 
was good, to even ask anybody else if they had any other ideas, or would like 
to have input on a vision. She just marched off on this vision, and spent four 
years trying to convince the university of this vision. The rest of us [were left] 
sort of looking at each other. And you know what? That’s not really what we 
wanted to do. I’m not sure she ever really figured that out. At the end of her 
four-year term, she asked to retain the job and they said no because she had 
alienated so many people by not being at all interested in what anybody else 
thought. Yet I know she thought that somehow she had consulted. She really 
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believed that everyone was on board with this vision, but she just didn’t have 
the first clue how to go about listening to other people. My sense is that the 
reason why she didn’t dare ask anyone else is she wasn’t really that 
confident; that is, she wasn’t authentic enough, sure enough of herself, 
confident enough of herself to allow herself to open up to other possibilities. 
And so she grabbed on to this vision ... and it gave her something to cling to, 
and to aim for, and helped her to keep a shell around everything else so that 
she didn’t have to hear from [others], or hear things that might not be 
comfortable to hear, or try to incorporate ideas that were unfamiliar or alien 
to her.  
Oftentimes, leaders are hired because they have a specific vision as to where the 
organization should be going. In Kate’s description, she explains how she spent a great 
deal of time trying to get others involved and enthused. What Jane suggests here is that 
trying to impose a vision on others is an inauthentic way of leading. When a leader shows 
up with a ready-made vision about where an institution should be headed, this may lead 
to unresolved conflict which, in time, may result in the leader’s termination.
385
 What 
Jane’s account brings to light is how leaders are dependent upon others.  
Dianne - “A value perspective” 
Dianne is Vice-President of External Relations at a women’s college in the Pacific North 
West. She has held similar roles at different universities across The United States. In her 
early forties, Dianne was the youngest person I interviewed. Authentic leadership, in her 
words, is about “consistency of behaviour in keeping with a kind of internal compass.” In 
the following account, she explores a time when her ethical beliefs were tested, and how 
she responded.  
At a former employer, a staff member came to me to express discomfort with 
something that was going on with my manager. My manager was doing 
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something that was making my subordinate uncomfortable. For me, it was a 
matter of integrity, and principle, and ethics to really deal with this in a very 
forthright and direct way. And I think that, I don’t know whether that’s a 
good example of what you are looking for, because it did end up involving a 
sexual harassment suit or claim. For me, it was a big moment of saying, okay, 
I claim that I adhere to all the laws, and all the values, and the spirit of the 
law related to a sexual harassment free workplace, and here I am confronted 
with a very awkward situation; how will I live with my principles and my 
responsibilities? I got some advice from the University Ombudsman [who] 
gave me a menu of options. I decided to pursue the most aggressive of those, 
and turn the situation over to the people who had more expertise than me to 
really raise it to the highest level. And so, to me, that’s an example of, you 
know, it was hard, it was unpleasant. It led to pretty much a year of 
unpleasantness, and yet it was something that I felt that I had to do. I had to 
figure out the best way of doing it and the best support for this staff member 
in this really uncomfortable position. I was very sorry for her that I was 
putting this forward at this very high level. That was uncomfortable for her, 
and we had to have a number of conversations about it. But, ultimately, she 
felt, I think, really valued that we were on the same page from a value 
perspective, and that we really mean what we say when we talk about, in this 
case, a harassment-free work place. It developed a very high level of trust for 
us, and a degree of mutual trust, mutual loyalty that has endured. I certainly 
think about my relationship vis-à-vis people who have managed me - the 
person in this sexual harassment situation at my former employer. I mean this 
lack of authenticity, and integrity, and ethical standard that were part of his 
behaviour. He certainly violated the sense of being a common shared team 
and loyalty. 
In this description, Dianne shows how it is not enough to adhere to particular values, it is 
necessary to act upon them.  
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Since the time of the sexual harassment suit, Dianne has worked at two different 
universities. She contrasts her previous sense of disengagement with her current 
experience.  
At my last employer I felt very hesitant about speaking up. I did not feel that 
I, or anyone else, was given the benefit of the doubt in those leadership/team 
meetings. There was a very specific place or agenda that a couple of people 
were driving, and the rest of us were sort of, kind of, [it] seemed like our 
participation was for show. So, okay, we have to have these meetings, and 
you are part of the senior leadership team, but your input isn’t really valued 
and, in fact, we are going to be pretty skeptical of the input you provide. And, 
over time, that has a very inhibiting impact for me. I became less engaged, 
and less likely to share, or to give input or feedback, or attempt to play a 
meaningful role setting organizational direction and priorities. By contrast, in 
my current position, I very much feel that within the team of college officers 
or cabinet members that people do recognize the value that I bring even when 
it’s a topic where it’s not in my particular scope. That has a great source of 
meaning and gratification for me that I can take part in the sessions about 
other areas - not just my own - and that my input is valued. It doesn’t mean 
everyone agrees with me, by no means [laugh].  
There are similarities here between Dianne’s account and Jane’s in that both show 
the problems that ensue when leaders do not provide an environment where 
dialogue and dissent is respected. Further, as we saw with Jane, asking for input 
when contrary views are not wanted is counterproductive, since employees may 
become disengaged. In her new place of employment, when meetings are open to 
different viewpoints, Dianne states she is more engaged. It does not seem to matter 
that people disagree with her; what counts is that people are willing to listen to her 
perspective. In turn, this sense of being valued enables Dianne to stay engaged.  
Alison “It’s all about relationships” 
Alison is responsible for a university leadership program in The Rocky Mountains. 
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Her path to leadership was different from the other women I interviewed. For most 
of her career, Alison was employed in the corporate sector, rising to become Vice-
President in a large high-tech corporation. She decided to leave the corporate 
setting, in her words, “because I wasn’t able to go deep enough in that environment. 
I wanted to provide something that was more transformative for people.” Since 
leaving the corporate sector, Alison has developed and facilitated leadership 
programs for an international not-for-profit organization and a university. In 
response to a question about authenticity and leadership, she replied:   
It’s not that either you’re an authentic leader or you’re not. It’s really a kind 
of an orientation toward a path. I don’t think it’s a steady state. I think it is 
something that people aspire to, and every once in a while they are able to be 
authentic. To me, that is when they are synchronized in what they are doing, 
what they are saying, what they are thinking all match, and where they are 
also in touch with the world. It’s all about being in relation to others. Having 
authentic relationships means being genuine with one another, creating clear 
expectations, talking with one another about the relationship, rather than just 
enacting the relationship, and having meta-conversations about how we are 
doing what we are doing are all very important elements. 
For Alison, authenticity is not something that can be possessed but rather flows from an 
alignment in values, thought and action. This alignment results in what she terms 
“synchronicity,” which appears to be founded on genuine relationships whereby each 
person is clear about what is expected from them.  
In response to a question about how past experiences influenced her ability to lead, 
Alison described her discomfort with her family’s gender dynamics, and how learning to 
act helped her find her voice.  
In our family, the men were the more kind of verbal, outgoing ones and the 
women were more in the role of being the audience. ... When I was in high 
school, I wanted to find my own voice. I entered into a theatre class and 
learned about acting and improvisation. Those were just wonderful ways for 
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me to really discover my authenticity, although it was kind of odd because I 
was discovering myself through other people, through playing roles as an 
actor. I discovered existentialism in high school, and I learned about 
authenticity. It just became a theme for me in my life. And it’s something I 
have pursued ever since in just so many different ways. So I guess the theme 
is something about finding voice and about being in a patriarchal situation 
where I felt like I didn’t have voice, and that this whole theme of authenticity 
became very important for me. ... My interest has always been in facilitating 
opportunities for people to have genuine or authentic voice in the workplace.  
What I find fascinating about this extract is how Alison describes how it was through 
role-playing that she found her own voice. Alison discusses her choice to leave a 
corporate setting in order to create a more holistic approach to leadership training. She 
also described how her deeply-held spiritual beliefs – Alison is a Buddhist – play a 
profound role in her desire for a deeper sense of connection with others.  
For Alison, relationships are critical to her understanding of what authentic leadership 
might look like. As she states:   
Relationships are extremely important because they are the glue or the 
connection that allows us to be in this dispersed, networked environment and 
still remain connected to one another, and in ways that are meaningful ... You 
can have rules, or guidelines, or even customer service agreements, or 
whatever construct that you want to have that you think is creating connection 
with people, but without authentic relationships it really lacks heart, resilience 
and a feeling of continuity. 
In her account, Alison seems to reinforce Arendt’s notion of the importance of plurality, 
gained through creating deep connections between people. 
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Olive - “Coming into focus” 
Olive had been President at two higher education institutions. Of all those women 
interviewed, Olive was the most negative about the notion of authentic leadership. In her 
words: 
I have problems with authenticity as a measure of the quality or aspirations of 
a leader because authentic to me sounds like its simply drawing attention to 
the alternative that you would be somehow hypocritical or flawed ... I prefer 
integrity because I think you can show integrity even as you deal with 
different situations in different ways if your personal balance, your moral 
compass are still strong. But authenticity, to me, doesn’t convey what I think 
leaders need.  
Like Dianne, Olive mentions how a moral compass is vital for leaders. But the problem 
with linking leadership to authenticity is that, for Olive, this suggests that leaders might 
act in a hypocritical way.  
In our conversation, Olive described how, as a young scholar, she was invited to apply 
for the position of President of her alma mater. She described her surprise at this offer, 
since at that time Olive had no experience in administrative roles, such as Dean or Vice-
President, the usual stepping stones to a Presidential appointment. In her description of 
what it was like to be a President, Olive states 
It was a prickly kind of position in many ways and full of potential pitfalls 
than being a professor in ways that you could go awry or make decisions that 
wouldn’t help your institution so that you were always on the alert, in a sense. 
There was always something else you ought to be doing, and your days were 
incredibly full and demanding. ... It’s an exhilarating, demanding, sometimes 
frustrating, energetic kind of job. It was a pretty demanding kind of role and, 
therefore, there were times when you felt somewhat off-balance. Often, you 
weren’t sure about the direction you ought to be taking, making decisions that 
seemed the right ones but had certain, potential problems that you couldn’t 
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avoid or hadn’t foreseen. ... I thought about trying to do the very best I could 
as a leader of two institutions that I deeply valued. I thought about trying to 
honor the post, and honor those institutions and be fair to the people with 
whom I worked, and advance goals that were valuable for the people 
involved as much as I possibly could. It never occurred to me that this was 
either true to myself or not true to myself.  
 Olive went on to describe the initial strangeness of being a President.  
It didn’t seem to me at the outset that this could possibly be me; as a sort of 
an ordinary young woman college professor from XXX, or somebody from 
the South, or whatever, it just didn’t fit. It didn’t seem easy at the start. 
Maybe your word comfortable is relevant here, but that feeling didn’t persist, 
or it didn’t impede my being able to do my work, and maybe following out of 
what you’ve been saying, when it stopped feeling that way, when I sort of felt 
well - for better or for worse - this is what the President of XXX is like … I 
was at the point that you would call authentic leadership. At the time that I 
was going through all this, I was also spending a lot of my energy trying to be 
an effective president. So I didn’t spend a lot of time wrestling with it. But, as 
I look back, I think it’s probably true that there would have been some point 
at which it’s like an out of focus picture that comes into focus, not all of a 
sudden, but gradually so where you sort of see doubled vision of something, 
something happens where everything sort of fits together. As I look back on it 
that may have been the way it was. I would certainly probably never have 
been able to explain it that clearly at the time. But I think something like that 
was going on.  
Olive offers the visual metaphor of “double vision” to describe how leadership, over 
time, became a fit for her. While the job at first seemed something that was foreign to 
her, over time it became like an “out of focus picture that comes into focus.” I find this 
metaphor striking as a way to describe how something that was initially strange, and 
potentially alienating, becomes with time and practice more comfortable to us.  
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Teresa - “Thinking through” 
Teresa had recently stepped down from her role as Principal of a university in The 
Philippines, to head up an environmental organization.
386
 Like Olive, Teresa spoke about 
how difficult it could be to remain focused, given the multiple demands of being a 
President. 
There are a lot of things that could distract you, so that you constantly have to 
be reminded of what you are really trying to achieve. ... You have to deal 
with different personalities and how you keep the team going even in spite of 
personal differences. When you are working with people, conflicts always 
arise as to how you do things, or even in terms of getting the fair amount of 
commitment. A lot of the work is actually doing conflict management. I 
would have regular problems with the labour union. That is, for me, a very 
difficult situation. But people, like the Board members, would comment that I 
didn’t seem to be affected ... I like to think about how to solve these 
problems, and how to establish your minimums, or your parameters. And how 
do you deal with issues, how do you organize; for instance, get the rest of the 
staff to your side, that sort of thing. So while this seems to be a huge problem 
for others, it upsets them; for me, I think I have a gift for thinking through 
and, you know, thinking of various ways of how to solve such problems.  
In the extract above, Teresa relates her success as a leader to her ability to problem-solve, 
which she describes as “gift of thinking through.” This “thinking through” enables her to 
dwell with problems, and to see problems from different aspects. The way that Teresa 
described her way of leading reminded me of Arendt’s call to “think without bannisters” 
                                                 
386
 Previous to working as a University President, she had worked at The World Bank in the 
United States. Teresa was adamant that there was less gender discrimination in The Philippines 
than in North America, especially in regards to pay. A recent World Economic Forum 2012 
report on the Global Gender Gap substantiates Teresa’s claim. The Philippines was ranked 8th in 
terms of gender equity whereas Canada and the United States rank 21
st
 and 22
nd
 out of the 135 
countries studied. See Ricardo L. Hausmann, Laura Tyson and Saadi Zahidi, The Global Gender 
Gap Report 2012 (Geneva: World Economic Forum). 
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so as to arrive at a better understanding. For Teresa this meant trying to think about a 
problem from different points of view in order to consider how best to act. Later in the 
interview, Teresa reflected on the ethical dilemma that came with the realization that, as a 
leader, she could wield power over others. 
I question what my motives are for reacting that way, or doing this or that. 
For instance, you know you are President but then you realize you cannot 
dictate [laugh]. You have to persuade people even if you have probably the 
authority. Sometimes that could be addictive, no? You know you have the 
power, but then you cannot do as you want. So at that point, you examine 
yourself to see why am I reacting that way to certain things that I hear, or 
certain ways that people react to you?  
Teresa perceives her leadership as involved in persuading others to her point of 
view. She also describes how easy it could be for a leader to become addicted to 
power, and begin to dictate to others. To avoid this temptation, Teresa suggests that 
leaders need to examine their actions so as to reflect on why they are acting in a 
particular way. This strikes me as similar to the “stop and think” that Arendt 
suggests is a necessary component of an ethical approach to leadership.  
In her next example, Teresa describes a conflict she experienced when institutional 
priorities and workers’ demands were at odds. 
I always had the welfare of the employees in mind but this is not the 
institutional position. When you have a very demanding union ... you go 
through this brinkmanship. ... There is an internal conflict that says you have 
to reserve the resources of the school. Of course, that’s one thing you have to 
be constantly conscious about ... So you try to put up a front, that’s okay, 
that’s not a go. Of course, you have already set up how far you can negotiate 
with them. You are just acting your role of the Chief. ... It’s a very difficult 
thing being authentic, right?  
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In Teresa’s examples, she describes how there are times when leadership requires a 
person to forego compassion so as to deal with union negotiations. This was one of 
several times that a woman leader talked readily about the distress she felt at wanting to 
be more caring while knowing that this was not, in Teresa’s words, “the institution’s 
positioning.” What Teresa reveals here is the dissonance between her role as leader, and 
her desire to care for her employees.  
Jill - “A sense of possibilities.” 
Jill is the President of a women’s college in New England. For more than twenty years 
she worked at a large co-ed university where she was employed, first as a faculty 
member, and later in a series of administrative roles, culminating in Vice-President, 
Research. Authenticity in leadership, in Jill’s view, refers to leading in a way that is 
consistent to ensure every aspect of one’s life reflects personal values. She also discussed 
how, in her role as President, she sometimes feels like an imposter, not least because her 
working-class background makes her feel out of place. In the interview, she described 
challenges she faced as a young woman, which she viewed as influential to her ideas 
about leadership. In her words,  
I grew up in a single parent household with a mother who dropped out of 
school at the age of sixteen to marry my father, who was nine years older, and 
who was in the military. ... I lived with [my mother], and worked with her in 
the summers in a light switch factory. I saw how institutional or 
organizational cultures really perpetuate and reinforce classism and sexism. 
There were no men in the factory. The only men were in the loading docks, or 
in the catering trucks, or in the boss’s office. All the workers were women 
doing piece work. Yet I saw through my mother, in her role as a shop 
steward, how you could confront head on those issues of classism and sexism, 
and so it engendered in me a sense of possibilities in terms of women’s 
leadership. And that had a profound influence.  
In this description, Jill shows how the factory in which she and her mother worked was 
divided on gender lines. However, her mother’s union activism engendered “a sense of 
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possibilities.” Even though there was gender prejudice within the workplace, there were 
still avenues for women to show leadership.  
Later in the interview, Jill described how she decided to give up a scholarship in order to 
look after her mother, and its impact on her sense of social justice.  
I was the first person in my family to ever graduate from high school, and 
first person to go to college. I attended two years of community college 
before my mother became chronically ill. I needed to be a care-giver for her. 
... That had an impact on my perceptions of social justice, and what it means 
to live authentically. I lived for a while on the streets with my mother, who 
was homeless, and got to know that people often don’t have control over the 
circumstances of their lives, and it’s through no fault of their own. So my 
commitment to looking at prisoners’ rights emerged from that as well - the 
extent to which society’s failure to protect people from preventable harm 
mitigates when the victimized become the victimizers. [This] has always been 
a concern to me, because I have seen how people have been marginalized, 
and disenfranchised, and how they act out. So I try to lead with a sense of 
empathy and a commitment to social justice, and access to education for 
people from all socioeconomic backgrounds.  
Jill’s experience of homelessness had a profound impact, not only on her decision to do 
research into prisoners’ rights, but also her ideas about authenticity and leadership. She 
described the practical ways in which she tried to create a more humane work 
environment. Here’s one example: 
When I came to XXX, which is a women’s college, the structure for faculty 
meetings was very different from what I was used to. I was at a state 
institution for 23 years. Then I was at a private institution that was very 
collaborative. [Here] the faculty meetings were set up so that the President sat 
in the front, and the faculty was in this auditorium. It was a very patriarchal, 
hierarchical structure, and I was running the meetings. I heard from junior 
faculty that they had a couple of concerns. One was about child care, and the 
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fact that the meetings extended past the time when child care ended. And the 
other [issue] was that they felt unengaged with respect to shared governance. 
The first issue was easy [as] we can subsidize day care until the meetings end. 
The other issue I suggested we could deal with by saying okay, if you want to 
be more engaged, why don’t you set the agenda instead of having the 
President run the meetings. Why don’t you have faculty stand up and 
facilitate the meeting? This was proposed at my first faculty meeting. It was 
voted down because there was a comfort level with the way things had 
always been done in the past. So I said my commitment to authentic 
leadership, and to feminist principles, really argue against this kind of 
structure, but I’m happy to accede to your will if this is what you want. But it 
was, I guess, a willingness to say this is important to me to at least raise the 
issues with respect to hierarchy. 
In this description, Jill shows how she tried to alter what she saw as a hierarchical 
structure that was negatively affecting younger scholars’ engagement at faculty meetings. 
Her failure to get adequate buy-in reveals how difficult it can be for leaders to make 
structural changes when they do not obtain support from others.  
Laura - “Situational leadership” 
Laura had been employed as a Vice-President at a prestigious Ivy League university in 
America. She left that role to work at a smaller college for black students where she 
heads up an international science and education project. In the interview, Laura described 
how her childhood experiences were fundamental to her ideas about the interconnections 
among authenticity, gender and leadership.  
I came out of a type of society where the designated heads of households 
were not necessarily those of management. It was a dominated society in 
rural Jamaica; men may have had the leadership roles but, I know and I saw, 
that women, my mother included, managed things and made things happen, 
changed the dynamics of things, had her three daughters become educated 
women even though she wasn’t, participated in organizational structures in 
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her church, and pushed us along in programs learning to play music, and to 
do algebra, and foreign languages, and so on. My mother who, by the way, 
did not finish high school, grew up in a strange kind of time warp in rural 
Jamaica. … Colonial society was dying. There was a move from rural to 
urban, and large land owners were now becoming land poor. I grew up in a 
transitional society and, for me to survive, I had to figure out ways to make 
the transition. I had to be comfortable with change.  
You know early on in life, I lived in a world of my own. I was lucky enough 
to have space, maybe because it was structured by all of those male 
expectations. And although I recognize there are boundaries set for women, 
you know, we should be nurturers, I also understood from early interface with 
smart women, who are always around, we just have to change our definition 
of smart. The women who ran institutions in my village or my teachers, they 
had purpose, and value and integrity. … I come to authentic leadership 
through that kind of quiet recognition of how powerful situational leadership 
can be. I grew up in a rural setting, and I had freedom. You see, sometimes, 
you conceptualize the situation from which you come from as being deficient. 
It doesn’t have elaborate schools, and so on, but leadership, having people 
follow you, being recognized as having a set of ideas that you can change 
something were an early part of my view of the world.  
Laura describes how it was the women in her village who were the quiet leaders who got 
things done. Their expertise was often discounted; that is why she argues we need to 
change our definition of smart. I take her to mean that it is important to recognize that it 
is not always those in power who are the ones who get things accomplished.  
Then, Laura described her experiences as a student abroad.  
I was accepted as an international student as part of a gesture to do good and 
to reach out to the poor. … I actually had very little money when I went to 
university. I, perhaps, was the poorest student there; but, for some reason, I 
didn’t seem poor because I was on a quest. For my whole life what I 
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originally thought were disadvantages have turned out to be advantages. … I 
had women role models who kept saying to me you must defy the gods. 
Being poor is not necessarily a disadvantage. Being a black woman at XXX is 
not alone a disadvantage, because it allowed me to have double 
consciousness. It allowed me to be very aware of who I was as an individual, 
and to be very strategic in my thinking. Other women who were not 
minorities were going there for the ride because the environment said to them 
come along for this ride, you are entitled to it. My difference kept saying to 
me you are not here for this ride, alone you are different. You are here for the 
ride but it is required of you to give back, to be authentic. I am always aware 
that I’m looking forward, but I have one hand reaching back. 
In describing what she first viewed at first as the disadvantage of being a poor, black 
woman, Laura shows how she changed her views. Being on the margins enabled her to 
realise that her success was not hers alone, and that she had women role models in her 
village encouraging her to succeed. Chief amongst these role models was her mother, 
who she described in the following way, 
My mother was a situational leader. ... She would say to you: “Oh no, my 
child, I’m not a leader. I’m just a simple, rural woman trying to make sure the 
church and the poor children are taken care of. She was, in fact, a powerful 
woman. A storm blew down the church; a hurricane earthquake tore it down. 
She rebuilt it. She had an after school program, she fixed the pipe organ so I 
became a classical musician. I played the piano. I’ve done so all my life. ... 
It’s my mother who made it possible for me.  
While her mother described herself as a simple, rural woman, for Laura, her mother was a 
powerful role model because she was willing to take action to improve the community’s 
well-being. Thinking about Laura’s account, I was reminded of Arendt’s claim that it is 
during a crisis that people show how courageous they are. In Laura’s description of how 
her mother set about to rebuild the church following a devastating hurricane, we gain a 
glimpse of how a woman takes on a leadership role in her community because she cares. 
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It was caring for others that encouraged Laura to have the courage to succeed even when 
she felt isolated in her North American environment. When she described the women 
from her village it was as if they held her metaphorically as she attempted to “defy the 
Gods” and become a successful leader. 
Claire – “Mom taught me about authentic leadership.” 
Claire retired recently from her role as President of a women’s college. Prior to her 
presidency, she served in a variety of administrative roles in universities in North 
America and Europe. In Claire’s words, an authentic leader “must think and act in the 
context of her values.” As with Laura and Jill, Claire’s mother was an important role 
model in shaping her daughter’s leadership values. Claire describes a particular event 
from her childhood that she found meaningful:  
My mother came from an affluent Greek family who, for a variety of complex 
reasons, forfeited the family’s wealth to come to the United States. She was 
raised to be thoughtful and open to the ideas of others, as well as to people of 
other races and cultures. She observed and considered many things that others 
in her day did not. When I was ten years old, we lived in XXX - at that time a 
highly segregated small city – home of many of the old woolen mills. 
Catholics dominated the town, primarily French Canadians, Irish and Italian 
Catholics, as well as Ukrainian Orthodox. Nearly all activities and enterprises 
were based in the many local churches that were themselves divided by 
religion and ethnicity. The Boy and Girl Scout troops the churches housed 
were also homogeneous. My mother – who had been a girl scout years before 
- noticed this situation and didn’t accept it as normal or desirable, as most 
people did. She said to me: ‘I don’t believe this was what Juliette Gordon 
Low envisioned when she founded girl scouting years ago. Her vision was to 
create an environment in which girls would develop skills, confidence, and 
understanding of others in the company of girls and women leaders who have 
different beliefs and come from many cultures. That’s not what’s happening 
here. So she packed my brother and me in the car and drove to the state office 
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for girl scouting in XXX. She told them about what she saw as inconsistency 
between founding values of girl scouting and the way it was playing out in 
XXX. She told them that she wanted to found an inter-denominational, cross-
cultural troop, but felt she had to ask permission to do so and didn’t want to 
go against rules that might exist [laugh.] From the surprised manner in which 
the officials looked at her, it was clear they had never thought to question the 
status quo. ‘There are no rules against it,’ they said, adding that it sounded 
like a good idea and wished her luck.  
Upon returning to XXX, Mom found a few like-minded women who offered 
the Unitarian Church hall for the troop meeting place, and assisted in getting 
the word out to prospective girls. The response was strong and immediate. 
First of all, African American, Hispanic, and Jewish girls who had no troop to 
join before seemed to ‘come out of the woodwork’ to join the new troop. As 
news about the new troop and its vision spread, girls from existing parish-
based troops asked to join. When the new troop totaled fifty girls, another one 
was started to accommodate the demand. The troops quickly became known 
as the best ones in town. Watching my mother – who always described 
herself somewhat disparagingly as ‘just a housewife’ – accomplish something 
so transformational was a powerful, early learning experience for me. To 
some extent, throughout my entire career, I’ve followed her example at the 
schools, colleges, and universities in which I’ve served. She wouldn’t put it in 
these words, but in effect, Mom taught me about authentic leadership.  
Claire’s mother offered a powerful example of leadership that has stayed with her. We 
see in both Laura and Claire’s descriptions how their respective mothers spoke of 
themselves in self-effacing ways such as ‘just a housewife’ or ‘simple, rural woman.’ For 
their daughters, however, their mothers’ actions proved how it was possible to move 
beyond the gender stereotypes of their environment, and for women to take on a 
leadership role. In both cases, we see how leadership emerges when individuals are 
willing to act to improve their communities, primarily because they care.  
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Later in the interview, Claire juxtaposed the positive mentorship she received as a school 
teacher with her early experiences in university administration. 
When I worked in the schools, there were many women role models to 
emulate. … However, when I became an Academic Dean and later Vice- 
President for Academic Affairs in higher education in the early 1970s, I 
quickly discovered that I was one of only a few women present among a sea 
of men in dark suits at committee meetings and conferences. It was really 
challenging since men weren’t used to having women in such positions. So I 
would say that I started my career in the comparatively comfortable setting of 
public school teaching in which I became confident about my leadership 
ability and felt accepted. However, initially, higher education was another 
story altogether. It was very challenging to be what can only be described as 
an ‘outsider’ on formerly all-male terrain. It was much more difficult to help 
create educational access and equity for women, girls, and students of color, 
when I, myself, had to also work to be accepted by my colleagues as a 
‘deserving’ peer. However, in the end, these personal and professional 
experiences only heightened my resolve and sense of purpose.  
In describing her positive experiences in a school setting versus higher education, 
Claire indicates these latter experiences informed her resolve. In her case, the 
marginalization that she experienced served to strengthen her determination to 
succeed. Again, we see how being marginalized may, in the long term, offer a 
person valuable leadership lessons. 
Jennifer “I will always be the outsider” 
Jennifer was, until recently, Chair of an Institute dedicated to African Diaspora Studies. 
She lives in the United States, but is originally from Trinidad. Jennifer relates her earliest 
leadership experiences with her current ideas about being a leader. 
I was a leader in my church. I ran things like the women’s bible studies 
groups, and so on. I tried to incorporate this idea of being humble, 
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understanding the needs of the people, listening to each and every one of 
them, and making them feel valued as individuals. I tried to develop a 
democratic style where it wasn’t my ideas alone. I was leading but, at the 
same time, people were also involved. I would listen to what they had to say 
and try, so far as it was possible, to incorporate their ideas. When I became 
Director of the African Diaspora Program, I used the same approach, not only 
with the faculty who worked and taught in the program, but the 
administrative staff, and also the students. ... I felt, for example, that faculty 
couldn’t understand and teach about the African Diaspora successfully 
without experiencing that Diaspora. So I started a faculty trip every year 
where we’d go to a different place in the African Diaspora. ... So that was one 
of the things that faculty felt that we were not just a team, but we were a 
family. It was not like I’m up there, and they are down there. That’s one thing 
I don’t like about a lot of leaders.  
Part of successful leadership, is what you do and how you approach it. But 
also part is who you are. And who you are is a composite of a lot of things 
and, for me; the difficulty that I found at XXX was leading from a position as 
the outsider. And so that creates its own problems, not of your making, but it 
leads to either some people will accept you and overlook your difference, 
your diversity, and others will not. And, in those cases, regardless of what 
you do, you can’t please all of the people, all of the time. There will be 
detractors so I just had to keep, just keep on my path, and not let these things 
make you lose focus. You know, I will always be the outsider. I can’t change 
who I am [laugh]. I don’t intend to. 
To me, an authentic leader has to understand the culture that you are working 
with, and also become responsive and sensitive. I learnt very quickly - that 
you don’t compare, you don’t say: ‘Well, when I was teaching here this is 
how we did it.’ Or ‘When I was leading in this space this is how I did it,’ 
because people become very resentful of that. So I learnt very carefully that 
you don’t compare; you accept people for who they are, and you work with 
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the conditions that you are faced with.  
Jennifer shows how important it is for a leader to be comfortable in her own skin, as well 
as to be responsive to the situation that she finds herself in, rather than assume that what 
works in one context will work in another. This requires a leader to refrain from making 
comparisons between one organization and another, and be willing to accept people as 
they are, rather than as she wishes them to be.  
In the next account, Jennifer recounts how showing courage is an essential component of 
leading.  
As a single mother, I have had to find my voice and an example of that - even 
when I was not technically in a leadership position that people looked to me 
as a leader – was when my son was in kindergarten. [The School] kept 
sending these notes when they wanted to take them on field trips. The notes 
would say ‘[W]e consent for our child to go on this outing.’ All the mothers 
were complaining, and I was complaining, but nobody spoke up. So 
eventually when one of the notes came home I crossed out We and I put 
I/We. Then I put a p.s. at the bottom and said that in future create an option 
for single parents. I was called into the Office and the Principal was not very 
happy with me. I said to her: ‘Though I am a single parent and a woman, you 
have to respect me.’ The next time the slips came back home they had the 
I/We on them. All the other single mothers came and thanked me and told me 
they didn’t like it, but they didn’t have the courage to speak up. 
Someone has to have the courage to step up. To me, that is leadership 
[however] women tend to not want to put their voice out there because they 
feel powerless. But you have to because that’s the only way that you can get 
people to listen to you. Sometimes if you are a little more courageous than the 
others then you have to step out and lead. 
We started with Kate’s example of feeling fear but displaying courage; again, in 
Jennifer’s description, we see an example of how a woman is willing to take a lead so as 
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to speak out against perceived injustices. Arendt argues that courage is not the absence of 
fear. Rather a person shows courage, because they have decided that this is how they 
want to be seen. The display of courage, for Jennifer, is at the heart of leadership. 
In these narrative accounts, what emerges for me is that these women leaders have very 
different experiences and views about gender, authenticity and leadership. At the same 
time, one constant seemed to be that each of them was committed to leading by being 
cognizant of, and willing to learn from, the people they work with. Their descriptive 
accounts also reveal how specific childhood experiences shaped their leadership values. 
In particular, three women noted how their mothers’ actions to help build community, or 
stand up for workers’ rights were fundamental experiences that shaped their ideas about 
authenticity and leadership. These narratives indicate how leadership emerges out of a 
context whereby someone cares enough to try and change a situation which they regard 
as unfair. In addition, in these women’s descriptions of the interconnections among 
gender, leadership and authenticity, what emerges is how past events can have a lasting 
effect on present and future action.  
5.2 Part II Themes 
In the second part of this chapter, I draw together some themes that emerge from the 
interviews to see what insights they offer concerning the interconnections among gender, 
authenticity and leadership. The first theme I discuss relates to ethical dilemmas, that is, 
when personal convictions are at odds with institutional objectives. The second theme 
concerns care and relationships. Embodiment is the focus of the third theme, while the 
fourth theme explores intersectional identity. The final theme I discuss is anxiety. Before 
turning to the themes, however, I want to examine participants’ responses to two 
questions.  
One of the problems with regard to some scholarly accounts of authentic leadership is the 
attempt to fix meaning. In chapter one I showed how scholars privilege four dimensions 
of authentic leadership (self-awareness, relational transparency, balanced processing and 
internalized moral perspective).  I wanted to ascertain what the women leaders I 
interviewed thought about this topic. So I asked them two questions. In the first question, 
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I asked them to tell me what came to mind when they thought about the term 
“authenticity.”  Then, I asked them to describe what came to mind when they thought 
about the term “authentic leadership.” Figures one and two represent the collated answers 
to these two questions. (When a word appears larger, it means that the word was used 
more often across the different responses.)  
 
Figure One – Responses to “What is Authenticity?” 
The word that appears most frequently in response to “What is Authenticity?” is values, 
closely followed by the term “integrity” and “self.” The other words to appear in multiple 
responses were consistency and awareness. From these women’s responses, authenticity 
appears to relate to adhering to particular values, and practicing integrity through being 
consistent in one’s actions, and an awareness of the effect those actions might have on 
others. Their responses suggest that a consistency of attitude and self-awareness are 
important to their understanding of authenticity.  
When we consider the responses to authentic leadership, we see a change in emphasis. In 
responses to the collated responses to this question, we have much more diversity of 
words used, as can be seen below.  
Figure Two – Responses to “What is Authentic Leadership?” 
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In terms of the responses to the question “What is Authentic Leadership?” the word that 
research participants used most often was “genuine,” followed by “listening” and 
“journey.”  What is noteworthy here is that none of the responses to this question 
mentioned the self, even though it appeared quite prominently in the responses to the 
question “What is Authenticity?” Instead, interviewees used action-oriented words such 
as “engagement” and “questioning.” From these women’s descriptive accounts, it appears 
that “authentic leadership” relates to a genuine engagement with others. This genuine 
engagement was sometimes described as a willingness to listen respectfully, and other 
times as responding in a respectful manner.  
Furthermore, it seems that there is a spatial and temporal quality to authentic leadership 
since research participants often used the term “journey.”
387
 What these responses 
indicate is that, for these women, there is an inner orientation with regard to authenticity, 
and an external orientation in relation to authentic leadership. I suggest, tentatively, that 
this different orientation may relate to the activities of acting and thinking. That is, when 
we act, we are not reflecting upon what we are doing. It is only through the process of 
thinking that we start to engage in inner dialogue. Acting requires that we participate in 
the moment; reflection allows for what Arendt called “the stop and think.” It is through 
the reflective process that we are able to consider whether our actions are in line with our 
principles. Action requires a forward momentum, whereas thinking requires us to step 
back, and this is why I see a different spatial orientation.  
When we try and define a concept like “authenticity,” we attempt to crystallize something 
that is essentially fluid. As I noted in chapter four, Heidegger argues words are like 
wellsprings; we cannot fix their meaning since they change over time. If we try to pin 
down meaning, words like “authenticity” lose their significance. Yet a desire for clarity 
leads scholars to attempt to contain a concept. When we seek to define words in this 
manner, we are in danger of losing a plurality of meaning. I suggest concepts like 
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authentic leadership must be left open to contestation. These women’s responses to these 
questions are not offered as an alternative to the four dimensions of authentic leadership, 
but rather to show that there are different ways of thinking about these terms. 
Indeed, while there are similarities in these responses, there were also divergences. As I 
mentioned earlier, Olive rejected the idea of a connection between authenticity and 
leadership because she argued it shines the light on its converse, that is, that a person 
would be deliberately inauthentic as a leader. Instead of authenticity, she preferred the 
word integrity to describe a genuine way of leading. The other nine women leaders might 
be placed on a continuum with some regarding authenticity as central to their desired way 
of leading, while others viewed it as an ideal to strive for. At one end of that spectrum, 
Alison describes authentic leadership as a practice that people can aspire to, rather than a 
steady state. On the other end, Laura was convinced authentic leadership exists since, in 
her words; “I have lived it.”  
5.2.1 Institutional Challenges 
I want to turn now to a discussion of themes. The first theme I consider is the clash of 
personal versus institutional values, a recurring motif in the interviews. Earlier, Kate 
described an instance when she was under pressure to admit an unqualified student. This 
was not an unusual occurrence she told me, and she expressed discomfort with what she 
termed the “disconnect between what’s said to be valued and I guess reality.” In another 
example, Jill described her frustration at being unable to change what she saw as an 
unfair policy. 
I started an initiative to make SATs optional because I believed that they are 
discriminatory. There were gender biases and class biases inherent in the 
standardized test that we used to get into the university, and into certain 
schools, and so that was the case where I had some true supporters, but there 
were many people who were opposed. I failed ultimately in my objective. … 
It was frustrating and so I left the institution. ... I didn’t want to work in an 
institution that didn’t share the values that I shared. 
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Jill’s frustration at the institution’s decision not to change its policies led her to leave an 
institution that she had worked at for 23 years was expressed in a change of vocal tone as 
she spoke. Her voice became quieter, and took on a wistful tone. What this example 
brings to light is a contradiction between an organization’s stated values and everyday 
practices, something that we saw earlier in one of Kate’s descriptions. This contradiction 
meant that, at times, these women leaders had to choose between upholding personal 
values and complying with the institution. Some women described how they gave up the 
fight for institutional change, choosing to seek new career opportunities, rather than stay 
in an environment that did not allow them to remain true to their principles.  
Yet while some women described experiencing moral angst as a result of institutional 
practices that negated their sense of fairness, others expressed opposing views. For 
instance, Olive argued that a leader’s primary responsibility was to support the 
institution, and not to agonize over ethical dilemmas. Leaders have a duty to act for the 
greater good, she contended, even when this meant acting contrary to personal principles. 
Olive described an instance when she called in police to break up a peaceful student 
demonstration because she judged the students’ actions to be potentially harmful to the 
rest of the College community. She made this decision even though she agreed, in 
principle, with the students’ cause. For Olive, this was not a comfortable decision to 
make but necessary for what she saw as the community’s good.  
Most of the women leaders I spoke with appeared to find it more difficult than Olive to 
distinguish between ethical principles and their leadership responsibilities. In the 
interviews, women described the tensions that surfaced regarding the quandaries they 
faced regarding leading ethically and adhering to particular institutional priorities. For 
instance, some women described how they were made to feel as if their leadership style 
was not in step with institutional objectives. Here we may remember that earlier Teresa 
noted how caring for the welfare of others was not “the institutional position.” In another 
instance, Jane described how being regarded as sensitive to the needs of others, her 
definition of authentic leadership, was unlikely to result in promotion in her university. In 
both instances we see a tension between institutional priorities and what these women 
regard as a more caring approach to leading. 
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It is noteworthy that, for the women who were Presidents of institutions, their discussion 
of ethical tensions appeared to centre on problems that arose when they tried to bring in 
what they considered as fairer policies, and/or tried to effect institutional change. In Jill’s 
case, trying to change the hierarchical structure was met with hostility. She argued that 
when people get used to working in a hierarchical place, they are less open to embracing 
new ideas. While some research participants talked about how concern for their 
employees and students’ welfare was important to their ideas about authenticity in 
leadership, others suggested that responding in a compassionate manner was often 
perceived as a sign of a leader’s weakness. It seems that there is a delicate balance 
between wanting to lead in a caring way, and institutional pressures to perform leadership 
in a particular manner. 
In many accounts, women describe the back and forth that occurs between thinking about 
what is the best decision to make. In Dianne’s account of the sexual harassment case, she 
asks herself whether the values she espouses in theory are ones for which she is willing to 
take action. As I have previously mentioned, Arendt argues that who we are is defined by 
our actions. Sometimes, a leader views her actions through the lens of what is deemed 
socially acceptable. This may mean that for pragmatic reasons she judges it wise to 
concur with majority opinion. On the one hand, this decision may be a positive outcome 
if it has been arrived at following dialogue and debate. On the other, it could be negative 
if a leader acts in accordance with “group think,” at the expense of personal principles. I 
view this as a concern in relation to authenticity since what a particular group may think 
is morally good may not necessarily be so. Leaders, just like the rest of us, need to stop 
and think about what they value and why, rather than agreeing with what most people 
think is right. What is crucial, according to Arendt is that irrespective of our motives 
“success and failure in the enterprise of self-presentation depend on the consistency and 
duration of the image thereby presented to the world.”
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5.2.2 Care and Relationships 
Turning to the second theme, from these descriptive accounts there seems to be a strong 
connection between leadership, authenticity and care. Some women contended that when 
a leader encourages an atmosphere of openness, it is more likely to bring about a trusting 
environment. It takes time, and sustained effort, for a leader to build meaningful 
relationships. But it also requires a leader being candid about the reasons for unpopular 
decisions that, in turn, means being willing to listen to points of contention, as Jill notes:  
This type of leadership requires transparency and ongoing dialogue with 
different groups. It is vital for a leader to lay out the choices, and then 
identify shared values, and then prioritize in a way that reflects those values. 
This is crucial for authentic leadership, because if people don’t understand 
why we are making these decisions then there’s suspicion, and mistrust, and it 
creates a toxic culture. However, if a leader makes decisions while keeping 
people informed, this creates collegiality and collaboration in the face of 
adversity.  
Here Jill contends that it is important for leaders to ensure that people are both expected, 
and empowered, to make decisions. In her words, empowering others creates an 
atmosphere of collaboration and consensus-building. To avoid mistrust, it is necessary for 
a leader to have the courage to share organizational problems so that employees work 
together collectively to find solutions. Jill suggested that when a leader develops an 
atmosphere of trust, it leads to shared governance and mutual respect, fostered through 
meaningful conversations. Kate and Teresa voiced similar sentiments regarding the 
importance of being as transparent as possible in one’s dealings with employees. These 
sentiments seem to me similar to Arendt’s contention that the desire to care is related to 
allowing others to express themselves freely. One way to ensure that different viewpoints 
flourish is for a leader to welcome dialogue and debate. But this cannot be done in a 
superficial manner. If leaders are seen to be asking for opinions, but not really engaging 
with dissenting voices, this is likely to prove counterproductive. 
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Several women mentioned how becoming a leader was a vehicle for them to try and 
effect a more just environment. In some cases, there was a strong correlation between 
their feminist politics and their desire to lead. As Olive stated “I wasn’t interested in just 
being a college president to be a president. I had no ambitions for that at all, but when 
XXX asked me to think about it, I mainly did it because I cared a lot about advancing the 
cause of women’s liberation.” Other research participants made a connection between 
feminist practice and caring leadership. In fact, Jill suggested that a feminist ethics of 
care was crucial to her understanding of leadership.
389
 Indeed, some research participants 
argued that it was their feminist principles that encouraged them to lead in a caring way. 
What we must be cautious about, however, is the supposition that just because someone 
espouses feminist principles that this will mean that they have a caring approach to 
leadership. This would be tantamount to some earlier leadership scholarship which 
argued that having more women in the workplace would improve the lot of all. That has 
not happened. Therefore, we need to be cautious about suggesting that feminist principles 
are conducive to a desire to eradicate injustice. We can tentatively suggest that an interest 
in the structural and social effects of gender might encourage a leader to act in a more 
caring way, but this might not always prove the case.  
Other research participants described how building strong relationships through caring 
was integral to their ideas about authenticity and leadership. Alison spoke about the 
importance of self-awareness in relation to leadership.  
One thing that interferes with authenticity is having an idea about yourself 
that’s not accurate and trying to live up to that. So what I am trying to get at 
here is being aware of one’s capacity and one’s capabilities - not to say that 
you can’t continue to grow and learn, but knowing something about your 
strengths and areas when you can contribute and being able to continue to 
track that, rather than fall into trying to become someone that you are not. 
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to be deeply personal matters, demonstrates a willingness to care.  
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For Alison, there is a relationship between authenticity and learning about one’s 
capabilities. Being self-aware, in her view, makes it easier to lead in a genuine manner. 
Her views here would seem to align with authentic leadership scholars. However, 
knowing who we are is not a simple task. In reflecting on her leadership experiences, 
Teresa states: “you were asking are you true to yourself when you are doing this or that? 
That’s always a question. I don’t know. Sometimes, you could see that it’s you but, in 
other instances, it’s not very clear.” Hence, there are situations where it is difficult to 
know whether you are acting in a manner in accordance with your principles. Teresa’s 
assessment seems similar to Arendt’s assertion that self-knowledge is always a partial 
understanding. 
On a related note, Claire and Kate mention difficulties that may ensue when leaders 
become caught up in their role. For example, Claire states:  
I’m remembering an exchange I had with a colleague some years ago. He’d 
just taken a college presidency, and I had not yet gotten to that point in my 
career. I remembered him talking about what it’s like to be a college 
president, and I thought to myself afterwards - he’s posing! He was primarily 
talking about how he would act in new ways to be presidential and be taken 
seriously. A few other colleagues also seemed to begin to behave differently 
when they became presidents – posing is how I describe it. I think the most 
effective leaders are those who remain authentic – true to themselves, and 
their personalities, and don’t try to have a ‘make-over.’  
Over time, Claire argues that leaders who indulge in leadership makeovers will be less 
successful because others will see through their disguise.  But there are institutional 
pressures to perform in a manner that people expect. Kate states that sometimes, “people 
try to be the leader that they think the organization wants or expects and that it pulls them 
away, or they get trapped into feeling they have to lead in a particular way. I think, in the 
long run it destroys your soul.”  Instead of leading from one’s unique strengths, trying to 
conform to an ideal may have a negative effect. This is why Kate argues it is important to 
feel “comfortable in your own skin doing something that you love. And doing it the best 
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way you know how ... I think that how we do things matters as much as what we do.” 
This connection to the how of leadership emerged several times, and seemed to indicate 
how important it is for a person to lead in a manner that feels right for them, while at the 
same time, being cognizant of others. One has to be somewhat cautious here given that 
what feels right for one person may actually be negative for others. It seems to me if they 
keep the idea of self/world in mind, leaders may guard against the dangers of hubris.  
5.2.3 Gender and Embodiment 
Turning to the third theme of gender and embodiment, a prevailing theme arising from 
several interviews is how a woman’s appearance can reinforce gender stereotypes 
because how a woman looks is regarded as important. This can add an additional burden 
in terms of trying to conform to what an ideal woman leader is supposed to look like, as 
Jill notes: 
All of these expectations about what it is to be an effective woman leader the 
men never have to think about including wardrobe issues. And so that’s a 
challenge to have to think about all of these things. That people will judge me 
based on whether I have my nails done, whether my hair’s done, whether I 
wear a particular dress, my weight, all of these things. [Laugh]. 
As I spent more time with the transcripts, I noticed that several women leaders referred to 
the ways in which ‘wardrobe issues’ played a part in how they are perceived as leaders. 
This brought to light different ways in which women leaders may be undermined by 
stereotypical assumptions regarding how the ideal woman leader is supposed to look. 
This does not stop at a woman’s wardrobe, but encompasses the body from top to toe. 
Any deviation from what is considered culturally normative may prove prejudicial to her 
leadership. This social prejudice may be further heightened when other social locations 
such as race, class, disability and sexuality are mapped onto the leader’s body. If this is 
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indeed the case, then variation from what is considered to be the bodily cultural norm in 
terms of leadership may hinder a person’s ability to lead.
390
  
It appears that it is not enough for a woman leader to do a good job; she also has to make 
a good job of herself. For women leaders, the connection between their appearance and 
their role can be a source of frustration. Indeed, some of the leaders I spoke with 
expressed irritation at how a focus on their appearance sometimes detracted from their 
actions. Kate offered a striking description of this type of gender stereotyping.  
I have done presentations to rooms where because of the grace of the 
audience they’ve jumped up to their feet, and it’s been wonderful and 
spontaneous and amazing, and I’ve come off the stage and I’ve had a man say 
to me: ‘That was fantastic, that’s wonderful, but where did you get your suit? 
I’d like to buy it for my wife.’  
Such a superficial evaluation serves to marginalize a woman leader’s performance since 
her actions are dismissed in favour of her outfit. These trivial comments reinforce gender 
hierarchy by discounting a woman leader’s words in favour of her appearance. A 
woman’s attire thus becomes a defining factor in how she is perceived by others to such 
an extent that this focus on the visual body may serve to undermine her actions. At times, 
too much emphasis on the visual body may prove detrimental to a woman’s leadership.  
Yet, at other times, Kate regards being a woman as advantageous to leadership, especially 
in regards to expressing emotion. Following the accidental death of a faculty member, 
she described how being a woman leader gave her an opportunity to publicly express 
grief. In her words:  
When I was standing up in front of our folks welcoming them back, and 
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talking about XXX, the tears were rolling down my face. I was broken-
hearted, and everybody knew it. I think that was easier, that was more 
accepted, and as I said, to some degree, expected because I was a woman.  
Here we see how stereotypical notions about gender enable her to openly express her 
emotion, since this is what is expected.  
5.2.4 Intersectional Identity 
It became apparent that gender on its own was not sufficient to understand these women’s 
experiences of authenticity, or lack thereof, in relation to leadership. Many times in the 
interviews, women made reference to class, race and age. Thus, gender while a critical 
factor needs to be understood within a broader context of intersectional identity. As we 
saw with Laura’s account, being a black woman in a predominantly white environment 
helped her to gain a sense of who she was. It was, in her view, being on the margins that 
gave her strength because it allowed her to reconnect with her past. In our conversation, 
she mentioned that she felt far more comfortable at the margins of an organization.  
But being on the margins is not necessarily a positive experience. For example, Jennifer 
spoke of how she has to hide the knowledge that she learned from her experiences in 
Trinidad, since it was not regarded as relevant by her North American colleagues. This is 
surprising given that she currently works in a black college, but Jennifer was adamant 
that she witnesses racism because she is seen to be the outsider. As a result, from time to 
time, she experiences depression.  
Class was also something mentioned in the interviews. For example, Jill spoke of times 
when she has been made to feel an imposter. In her role as President of a prestigious 
women’s college, she described how some alumnae express surprise when they learnt of 
her working-class origins remarking on how strange it seems that someone from her 
background could be so eloquent. In another interview, Claire discussed how her 
working-class background had made her more aware of gender injustice, and encouraged 
her to fight against prejudice in her work. 
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Age was another factor that interview participants mentioned. It seems that age affects 
how we see things, as well as how we are seen by others. Maturity can result in a greater 
sense of confidence, as Jane notes: 
When I was younger, I was only comfortable if I could control the situation, 
and now I’m much better at being comfortable letting the situation become 
something, and just letting or waiting to see what it’s going to become, and 
working with that rather than trying to force it into some particular direction.  
Rather than trying to control one’s environment, it seems that allowing situations to 
unfold organically is one way for a woman to become more comfortable with the 
contingent aspects of life. Several participants described how, when they were younger, 
they were more likely to conform to the rules. As they grew older, however, women 
described how they gained courage in speaking their minds. As Jane explains “I spent a 
lot of time in my younger years trying to be the way that I was supposed to be … this is 
how a professor is; this is how a graduate student is, rather than thinking about who am I? 
And what do I bring to this?”  
Interestingly, two women – Jane and Laura – used the same phrase to emphasize what 
they saw as a barrier to women’s leadership, namely, that women had to “be comfortable 
coming first.” Both women described how when they were younger they had not taken 
some opportunities offered to them because of what they now describe as an uneasiness 
with success. However, as they gained confidence and maturity, they were more open to 
possibilities. 
There are other ways in which a woman’s age can have an effect on her leadership. As 
Kate demonstrates:  
I had a very sort of humbling moment when I was negotiating my contract to 
come to XXX. The Chair of the Board and I were negotiating my salary. I 
told him what I expected, and he said that’s a lot of money for a young girl 
like you. I was forty. This was my first one-on-one with the Board Chair. I 
was tempted to say and if I were a man would you have even thought of 
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making that comment?   
Here we see that Kate’s attempt to negotiate her salary is belittled by a person who has 
power over her. In this case, the Chair of the Board use terms like “young girl” to bring 
Kate into line with what he considers appropriate expectations, given her age and gender. 
Rather than her leadership capabilities, youth and gender were used to resist paying what 
Kate regarded as an acceptable salary.  
When we think about gender issues, we must also pay attention to other social factors. 
For these women, gender on its own is insufficient to explain the connections between 
leadership and authenticity. 
5.2.5 Anxiety 
The theme of anxiety was also mentioned by several interview participants. For example, 
some women described times when their self-assurance was negated by anxiety. Dianne 
offered a striking example of this angst when she described an instance when she chose 
to remain silent following repeated attempts to put forward views that ran contrary to her 
colleagues on the senior management team. In describing her experience, she states:  
Sometimes, we think of people as taking up too much space, and that’s often 
a criticism that someone is too loud, or too verbal, or too dominant. When I 
said shrinking, I was sensing the opposite of that sort of not owning the space 
that I could or should own. Taking up a smaller corner of that and trying to be 
– maybe trying is the wrong word because that sounds conscious – but ending 
up being smaller, littler and less influential, both in physical presence and in 
impact. When I have been in situations where I feel uncomfortable, or 
devalued, or disempowered, I have been a smaller version of myself, smaller, 
quieter, and less impactful. I do experience a sense that I’m not behaving the 
way that I aspire to behave, or that I believe that I should be behaving.  
Feeling a sense of belonging to the group is one way that a person is able to share her 
ideas. When Dianne senses this is not the case, the result is a sense of unease. Anxiety 
allows some bodies to gain prominence while other bodies recede into the background, as 
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Dianne’s account illustrates. According to Sara Ahmed, “the economy of fear works to 
contain the bodies of others.”
391
 In spatial terms, as Ahmed notes, “the regulation of 
bodies in space through the uneven distribution of fear which allows spaces to become 
territories, claimed as rights by some bodies and not others.”
392
  
For some of the women leaders I interviewed, it appears that a refusal to speak out can 
result in feelings of anxiety. I suggest that it is only when a woman leader feels a sense of 
belonging to her institution, and to those whom she works with, that she is able to act in a 
manner she judges to be authentic. The problem is that by not taking a stance against 
something that you see as unjust, other instances may be ignored.  
In discussing what made her feel anxious in her leadership role, Alison responded:  
I feel uncomfortable when there are expectations that are hidden or unstated 
or when there’s a mismatch between what I think I am to be doing or what I 
think we have agreed on and the way things are unfolding. So that feeling of 
discomfort is usually something that triggers me to move toward more 
authenticity … I experience it in my body as tension, as anxiety.  
Another issue to emerge in relation to anxiety was dealing with hostile environments. As 
Claire explains, “I had to learn how to deal with not being loved and to stay focus on the 
long-term good. That wasn’t easy.” A willingness to be unpopular was, at times, the only 
way these women leaders told me it was possible to remain true to their principles. 
Having the courage to go against the will of the majority seems, therefore, to be an 
integral component of how these women viewed authentic leadership. However, this may 
be more difficult for those who have been brought up to be self-deferential. 
Submissiveness in childhood may mean that some people are reluctant to take a stance, 
especially in a hostile environment. At times, therefore, there may be a dissonance 
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between a woman’s learned behaviour, and her desire to act. Such passivity may have a 
negative effect on a woman’s ability to lead. A woman’s desire to be pleasant, for 
instance, may lead her to refuse to speak out.  
5.2.6 Outlying Themes 
I want to mention some outlying themes that seem to me to have phenomenological 
import. As I noted earlier, most women saw authentic leadership as having a relational 
quality. According to Laura, however, authentic leadership is also connected to what she 
called “aloneness.” She described how important it was to her to spend time alone in 
order to think. In the interview, she expressed the view that other women I interviewed 
might suffer from aloneness. Laura views this isolation as necessary for a leader if she is 
to forge her own path. I mention this comment by Laura because Arendt also thought it 
important for each of us to be willing to spend time alone. Solitude is necessary so that 
we can gather our thoughts, but also so that we can reconnect with others.  
At the end of the interview, I asked each participant if they had anything they wanted to 
add. Here are two responses; the first is from Dianne. 
I think sometimes we can burn a lot of political capital by taking against the 
majority when it has to do with something that’s important to you from a 
principled or valued point of view. As a woman, one of the challenges for me 
is thinking how I maintain my organizational power while, at the same time, 
acting and influencing the organization in a way that is in keeping with my 
internal compass.  
We can see from Dianne’s description that she is constantly reflecting upon the balance 
between keeping organizational power and taking principled action.  
At the end of another interview, Olive returned to the question of leading ethically. In her 
words,  
I wouldn’t want to give the impression that I think that it doesn’t make a 
difference whether leaders have a moral compass whether they are trying to 
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behave as ethically as they can. I think it makes a profound difference. I just 
don’t think it’s always easy to describe what moral, or immoral, leadership is, 
particularly if you are trying to do it through the familiar lens of private, 
personal ethical decisions. 
Here, Olive expresses how important she perceives leading ethically to be. But she also 
shows that describing what constitutes moral, or immoral, leadership is complex. What 
constitutes authentic leadership may be much easier to describe in theory than it is within 
the context of everyday life.  
5.3 Conclusion 
From these descriptive accounts, we see that the question of what it means to lead 
authentically is a complex one. For some women, authentic leadership suggests a genuine 
engagement that requires a willingness to listen to others. For others, a genuine approach 
to leadership depends upon being consistent with personal values. Some women 
emphasized caring while others focused on the need for a strategic approach. What 
becomes clear is that authentic leadership evokes different things for different people. 
This multiplicity of perspectives is due to the fact that each of us is unique, and that 
uniqueness, which is made up of social factors as well as embodied lived experience, will 
influence the way that we lead.  
While my original intention was to concentrate on the connections amongst authenticity, 
gender and leadership within an institutional setting, this was not where the interviews 
led me. It became apparent that leadership within the context of an institution was only 
one aspect of how these women conceived of what it meant to be an authentic leader. 
They spoke on a variety of topics, such as politics, racism, family, and the interconnected 
ways that their lived experiences shaped their ideas about what it might mean to be an 
authentic leader. A common thread weaving through these different conversations is that 
leadership needs to be conceptualized outside of hierarchical frameworks. Rather than 
focusing on a person’s position in an institutional setting, it is important to redefine our 
notions of what constitutes leadership, and show how different situations call for diverse 
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kinds of leaders. This is a more expansive way of thinking about leadership, and 
complements Arendt’s idea that leadership is situational.  
Too often we have a narrow idea of what constitutes leadership. By making institutional 
life the centre of attention, it is possible to underestimate, or even ignore, the important 
leadership work that is carried out in the home, family, volunteer or church groups. This 
situated knowledge, if considered at all, is perceived as less valuable than the “business” 
of leadership. Too often the focus on leadership is where most of us think power resides, 
that is, the public realm. Furthermore, the seeming disregard for other spaces/ways of 
leading may be linked to a Western obsession with hierarchies, based on considerations 
of profit and prestige. Hence, ways of leading that do not have a monetary value attached 
to them may appear to have less cache.  
For most of these women leaders, there is a strong correlation between wanting to lead in 
a caring way, and a desire to be authentic in their leadership. Such openness shows itself 
through our embodied relationships with others. This relational approach to leadership is 
fundamental to creating an environment where others will be able to flourish. It requires 
leaders to welcome different viewpoints. A relational approach to leadership is 
fundamental to addressing the problems of instrumental ways of being that focus on a 
means-ends way of thinking. This is why it is important, as these women leaders have 
shown me, to think about leadership beyond an institutional framework. As Jennifer 
states, “We have to explode the idea of being a leader as a thing created by a position.”  
From these women’s narratives, we see how leadership is complicated by gender 
socialization. This can lead to a dissonance between learned behaviour on the one hand, 
and a desire to act in a manner consistent with her values on the other. Leaders, just like 
the rest of us, must choose between acting in accordance with institutional practices and 
upholding personal principles. At times, people will make a decision in line with their 
values; at other moments they may not do so. From these interviews, I conclude that 
authenticity cannot be contained within a conceptual framework of leadership that denies 
difference. This is why a theory of leadership, based on authenticity, cannot take its cue 
from the self.  
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I leave the final word to Jennifer who states: 
 I just want to re-emphasize that you lead, not just for your own personal 
embellishment and self-aggrandizement, but with the goal of moving the 
community forward, or the group forward. That should be your primary focus 
as a leader. That, to me, is authentic leadership.  
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6 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis has been concerned with the ways in which authenticity, gender and 
leadership interconnect. I have contended that a significant shortcoming in current 
accounts of authentic leadership is that scholars tend to privilege a leader’s self-
knowledge at the expense of intersubjectivity. Such thinking is troubling since it ignores 
how the intersections of identity, as well as cultural context, affect the theory and practice 
of leadership. Defined in this way, authentic leadership is an example of a master 
narrative that takes inner truth as its bedrock without paying sufficient attention to our 
social, cultural and historical positioning. Such an abstracted way of thinking is not a 
useful way of conceptualizing human existence. Rather, it is through our intersubjective, 
embodied relationships that we define ourselves. These meaningful encounters always 
take place within a world of others.  
Arendt’s insights into the questions of uniqueness and plurality offer an important 
correlative to problems inherent with the concept of authentic leadership, and what I see 
as its overemphasis on the self. In contradistinction to scholars of authentic leadership, 
she maintains that self-knowledge can only be a partial understanding. I suggest that 
thinking with Arendt offers an important correlative to problems inherent with authentic 
leadership and its focus on the self. In her view, uniqueness emerges from shared 
communication through action and speech. I suggest, therefore, that Arendt’s concept of 
uniqueness can expand our understanding of authentic leadership through its grounding 
in an intersubjective way of viewing the world.  
I have argued that Arendt’s work allows for a re-thinking of the notion of authenticity in 
leadership that is attentive to difference. For example, to ensure uniqueness is fostered, 
we need to create environments that are open to different opinions. Otherwise, we are left 
with a hierarchical system of ruler and ruled that has adversely affected social relations 
since ancient times. Arendt’s emphasis on uniqueness within a plural environment is 
important with respect to how people choose to conduct themselves as leaders. When 
leaders are unwilling to listen to different opinions, they will be unable to govern in a 
manner that enables a society and its citizens to thrive. It is only when citizens are able to 
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speak and act freely in the public sphere that a society prospers since it is through 
dialogue and debate that we gain the plurality of viewpoints necessary for a society to 
flourish. Moreover, ignoring the intersubjective dimension of everyday life may have far-
reaching implications, because it can result in leaders becoming separated from everyday 
concerns and acting in self-indulgent ways to the detriment of everyone else. Indeed, the 
differentiation between the few and the many have led to disastrous consequences. 
Whether it’s the banking crisis or the negative effects of globalization, what becomes 
apparent is that some leaders are failing to reflect upon, or care about, how their actions 
negatively affect others, something Arendt regarded as a necessary requirement for a just 
society. To ensure uniqueness is fostered, therefore, we need to create environments that 
are open to different opinions. 
A detailed engagement with the Arendtian corpus allows for a re-thinking of the place of 
authenticity in leadership that is attentive to difference. Thinking with Arendt 
complements existing leadership scholarship because of her emphasis on the myriad 
ways in which leaders must be responsive to others. By seeing leadership in relational 
terms that weave together diverse perspectives, her work opens up fruitful avenues of 
investigation. As such, she offers us an alternative ethical guide from which to consider 
the place of authenticity in leadership. In the course of writing this thesis, what I have 
aimed to show is that, when we think about the interconnections among authenticity, 
gender and leadership, we need to do so in a way that connects the universal with the 
particular. It seems to me that Arendt’s call to “think without bannisters” helps us do this, 
since what it allows for is a way of thinking that takes into account the ideas of others.  
We are caught up in our times, and this is why it is so important to look at how notions of 
authenticity show up in different ways. I have argued with Heidegger that language 
changes over time and place. Hence, it is futile to define authentic leadership in terms of 
four dimensions (balanced information processing, self-knowledge, relational 
transparency and moral perspective) to the exclusion of others. These definitions, 
common in the authentic leadership scholarship, serve to obscure the effect that gender, 
and the multiplicity of lived experience, has on our understanding of leadership. I have 
also contended that gender cannot be considered in isolation from other social factors. It, 
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too, needs to be considered within the context of lived experience. Thus, when we think 
about what constitutes authentic leadership, we need to take into account how various 
social factors affect our understanding of leadership. In the interviews I conducted, 
women described how – in different situations – race and class would surface alongside 
gender. One of the major aspects that flow through the interviews for me is how much 
thinking from the margins offers insights into leadership. This seems to me to reinforce 
Arendt’s notion that it is the pariah, rather than the parvenu, who gains insight into the 
workings of a society. 
Authentic leadership remains troubling to me, not least because I perceive a tendency 
amongst some leadership scholars to define and constrain the ways in which authenticity 
reveals itself. There is a tendency to abstract and privilege the universal over the 
particular. This is the problem with what Arendt termed the Archimedean worldview, 
which seeks to explain and justify the world from the perspective of selfhood.
393
 It offers 
us a particular worldview. As such, it represents a mode of investigation that, unwittingly 
perhaps, suppresses possibilities, in favour of a regimented, abstract way of thinking. I do 
not mean to imply that those who conduct research in this area are lacking an ethical 
approach. In its current form, I do not believe that authentic leadership offers us a helpful 
way of thinking about leadership. I find myself somewhat concerned that the theory of 
authentic leadership leads to a flattening of individuality.
394
 Authenticity has many critics 
but I have tried to show that it is not authenticity per se that is the problem but the way in 
which we perceive it in the guise of self alone. Thus, I agree with those who suggest that 
it may be possible to fashion an ethics of authenticity.
395
  
Here is where I think Arendt can help. By considering uniqueness within the plural 
context of the web of human relationships perhaps we can resist the impulse to place self 
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earlier. What is missing in their accounts for me, however, is any deep discussion of gender. 
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above world. In my view, authenticity must remain indefinable so as to allow for the 
spontaneity of individual action. That being said, I do believe that it is fruitful to consider 
some of the ways in which authenticity, or lack thereof, shows itself in leadership from a 
gender perspective since it may offer insights into problems related to social conformity 
and gender socialization.  
We saw in chapters two and three the devastation that is caused on the political stage 
when leaders are given free rein. While Robespierre may have initially acted out of good 
intent, following Arendt, we note this is not enough. What matters is not whether a 
leader’s action is good for the self, but whether that action is good for the world.
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Arendt maintains that political arenas that do not allow space for dialogue and debate are 
anathema to human flourishing. Such dialogue takes place in the present but is a remnant 
of the past and speaks to the future. I think that starting the conversation, as I did in 
chapter two, with the Enlightenment helps us to see how authenticity shows up 
differently in different times. I perceive a similarity between the women who tried to gain 
a public voice then, and the women I interviewed, as the connection between authenticity 
and courage. Having the courage to speak out is a thread that I now see running through 
this dissertation. This notion of courage in leadership is, I think, connected to the 
importance of creating spaces for dialogue and dissent. This is for me Arendt’s most 
productive insight for leadership.  
As I was involved in the final stages of writing this dissertation, I had the opportunity to 
facilitate a discussion between women leadership scholars from various parts of the 
world.
397
 In this discussion on gender, authenticity and leadership, I observed themes that 
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flow from this dissertation come to life. One example was how one woman argued that 
she was always authentic in her actions. If we asked her colleagues, she stated, they 
would agree that what you see is what you get. The woman sitting next to her argued that 
it is not possible for a person to be authentic all of the time. She contended that when she 
is out running with her friends, she is a different person than when she teaches in the 
classroom. A third woman sitting across the table said that she did not believe that it was 
possible to be authentic in the workplace. Moreover, she argued it was important for a 
person to have boundaries between their personal and private personas. Following this 
comment, a fourth woman maintained that it was important to distinguish between 
authenticity in relation to being and doing. In her view, being authentic and acting 
authentically were not the same. In response, a fifth woman argued that all action is 
performative. Just before the conversation ended, the first woman who had spoken 
announced that she had been thinking about the question of boundaries. The notion of 
boundaries had never occurred to her before, and she reflected that she needed to think 
about this in relation to her ideas about authenticity, gender and leadership. 
 In addition, two of the women who took part in this discussion had recently conducted 
qualitative studies on women and leadership. One study was conducted in The United 
States and the other study was conducted in Malawi. While neither study had originally 
concerned itself with questions of authenticity, it appears that the topic of authenticity 
kept resurfacing in their interviews. What seems clear to me is that the concept of 
authenticity is meaningful to questions of gender and leadership. However, there is much 
to do in teasing out the many connections among gender, authenticity and leadership. 
This thesis is just a starting point. 
My original research question asked in what ways do senior women leaders experience 
authenticity or lack thereof in the university workplace. By focusing on the institutional 
context, as I mentioned in chapter five, I almost fell into the trap of comparing women 
leaders in relationship to their male counterparts, rather than expanding our notion of 
leadership to fit with diverse lived experiences. It is only by reconsidering what it means 
to be an authentic leader beyond the confines of the work environment that we can see 
the myriad ways in which gender plays a role in our understanding of what constitutes 
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leadership. Ignoring the intersubjective dimension of everyday life has negative 
implications because it can result in leaders becoming separated from everyday concerns 
and acting in self-indulgent ways to the detriment of everyone else. Indeed, the 
differentiation between the few and the many has led to disastrous consequences. 
Whether it’s the banking crisis or the negative effects of globalization, what becomes 
apparent is that some leaders are failing to reflect upon, or care about, how their actions 
negatively affect others, something Arendt regarded as a necessary requirement for a just 
society.  
In Being and Time, Heidegger maintains that each person’s life is shaped partially by 
things outside of her control, not least because we are “thrown into the world.” Yet 
Arendt suggests that he may be in error. As she states,  
Heidegger is wrong: man is not ‘thrown in the world;’ if we are thrown, then 
– no differently from animals – onto the earth. Man is precisely guided, not 
thrown, precisely for that reason his continuity arises and the way he belongs 
appears. Poor us, if we are thrown into the world!
398
  
For Arendt, we are guided in our entry into the world; this guidance takes many forms, 
but an important aspect is that of a child’s relationship to her parent, especially her 
mother. We saw how important that maternal guidance can be in relation to questions of 
authenticity and leadership. But guidance takes many forms. In the process of writing this 
thesis, I have been guided by many people whose consideration of authenticity in relation 
to leadership has enriched my own understanding, although I find myself like Socrates as 
puzzled at the end of this project as I was at the beginning. What constitutes authenticity 
is thus an open question for me. 
I began my research by looking at authentic leadership through an institutional lens to 
look at some of the gender barriers that women encounter in leading within an 
institutional context, especially as it relates to questions of authenticity. I wanted to 
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ascertain the conditions whereby women leaders described a tension between their desire 
to act in what they perceived as a genuine manner, and the limitations of the institutional 
environment. I see now that my bias against bureaucracy played a significant role in the 
way that I initially thought of my project. What I assumed to be central to my research, 
that is, how ethical dilemmas are affected by bureaucratic restraints was not where my 
research took me. What stops me feeling uneasy about this directional change is 
something that Patricia Benner wrote that has stayed with me. She contends that any 
researcher’s preconceptions need to be challenged; if this does not happen then the 
research is not, in her opinion, sufficiently hermeneutical.
399
 My research certainly went 
along different lines than what I had imagined. The research participants’ descriptive 
accounts enriched my understanding of the role of authenticity in leadership in ways that 
I had not anticipated. These women leaders, together with Arendt, led me to an 
understanding that it is necessary to broaden our enquiry from institutional life to how we 
live in the world. Through the sharing of words and worlds, I have been guided back to 
what I had always known but had forgotten.  
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8 Appendix A  
 
Letter of Information and Consent Form 
PROJECT: Women and Authentic Leadership 
I invite you to participate in a university-based research projected entitled “Women and 
Authentic Leadership.” This project involves conducting, recording, and transcribing 
interviews with senior women administrators in higher education who have expertise in 
the theory and practice of authentic leadership, as a supplement to a review of the 
relevant literature. The project’s main goal is to consider how gender may have an 
influence on the practice of authentic leadership.  
If you agree to participate in this study, you will have one interview with me during 
which you will be asked questions about (1) what authentic leadership means to you; (2) 
your experience of authentic leadership; (3) the efficacy of this approach to leadership; 
and (4) your observations regarding how gender may have an influence on the practice of 
authentic leadership. This study has the potential to lead to insights related to gender and 
authentic leadership which may be of interest to society at large.  
The interview will last between 90 and 120 minutes and will be conducted either by 
telephone at a time convenient to you, via email, or in person at a time and location 
convenient for you. As researcher, I will audio-record the interview to ensure the 
accuracy of data, and provide you with a transcript of the recorded interview so that you 
may authorize its contents (i.e., delete or revise any part of it) before the researcher 
makes any use of it as a source of information or quotations within the study. It may be 
necessary to connect with you once more to ensure that I have a deep understanding of 
your viewpoint. You will have final say with regard to discrepancies within the transcript.  
Recordings and transcripts will be safely stored throughout the period of this doctoral 
study. I anticipate that results from this study may be published in academic journals or 
books. If this research results in publication, I will provide you with a copy upon request. 
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Any personal identifying information will be removed from transcripts unless you have 
authorized the retention of such information in the transcript (1) insofar as it directly 
pertains to your work and (2) the use of the transcript as a source of quotations or 
information for study purpose.  
This letter is yours to keep for future reference. Please read this letter carefully to ensure 
you understand all the implications of participation. Participation in the study is 
voluntary, and you may refuse to participate, decline to answer specific questions, or 
withdraw from the study at any time. For further details about this research, you may 
contact me.    
If you have questions about this study with regard to your rights as a participant, you may 
contact the Office of Research Ethics at The University of Western Ontario, by telephone 
at (519) 661-3036, or via email at ethics@uwo.ca.  
Sincerely, 
 
 
Rita A. Gardiner 
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INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM 
 
Principal Investigator:   
Researcher:     
I have read the Letter of Information, have had the nature of the study explained to me 
and I agree to participate. All questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  
 Please check this box if you are willing to allow direct quotes from the transcript 
to be used.  
__________________________________ 
Date 
___________________________________________________________ 
Interviewee Name (please print) 
 
            
Interviewee Signature 
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9 Appendix B  
 
Interview Guide 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study on women and authentic leadership. 
The purpose of this interview is to discuss your experiences – as a successful female 
leader – of authenticity and leadership. I have a number of questions to guide the 
interview, but these are only guides. I am interested in understanding your experience as 
a woman leader. Therefore, anything that you would like to share with me that will help 
my understanding would be most welcome.  
1. What does the term authenticity mean to you? 
2. Similarly what comes to mind when you think about authentic leadership? 
3. In your experience, what makes a leader authentic?   
4. Can you think of any leaders you have known, or worked with, that exemplify 
authentic leadership?  If so, what qualities exemplified these leaders? 
5. Could you give an example that exemplifies how you try to lead authentically?  
Prompt: What impact do you think this type of leadership has on others?  
6. Can you describe how your personal background has influenced your views on 
authenticity and leadership?  Is there a particular story that springs to mind? 
7. What makes you feel comfortable or “at home” in your role as a leader?   
8. Do you recall any physical or emotional sensations you experienced at this time?  
9. Alternatively, what makes you feel ill at ease in your leadership role?   
Prompt: Did you experience any physical or emotional sensations when you 
feel ill at ease in your leadership role?  
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10. As a woman leader, have you experienced challenges to your desire to be true to 
yourself?  Is there any instance that comes to mind? 
11. Conversely, have you felt, that being a woman has given you any advantages in 
your ability to lead authentically?  Can you describe these? 
12. Can you describe a time when your desire to be true to yourself was at odds with 
institutional needs?  How did this make you feel? 
As we’ve spoken, have any other thoughts related to the theme of authenticity, gender 
leadership come to mind that you would like to share?  
Over the next few weeks, I will be transcribing the interview which I will send to you. 
I may need to contact you in case of clarification. As well, I will send you the 
interview transcript. I would like to do a follow up – either by telephone or email. Is 
that okay?  
It’s been a pleasure talking with you. Enjoy the rest of the summer.  
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